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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Hume's brilliant and dispassionate essay "Of Miracles" has been added in this expanded edition of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, which also includes "Of the Immortality of the Soul", "Of Suicide", and Richard Popkin's illuminating Introduction.
160 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1779
About the author
David Hume
2,760 books1,512 followersDavid Hume was a Scottish historian, philosopher, economist, diplomat and essayist known today especially for his radical philosophical empiricism and scepticism.
In light of Hume's central role in the Scottish Enlightenment, and in the history of Western philosophy, Bryan Magee judged him as a philosopher "widely regarded as the greatest who has ever written in the English language." While Hume failed in his attempts to start a university career, he took part in various diplomatic and military missions of the time. He wrote The History of England which became a bestseller, and it became the standard history of England in its day.
His empirical approach places him with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others at the time as a British Empiricist.
Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably René Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour. He also argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience. He argued that inductive reasoning and therefore causality cannot be justified rationally. Our assumptions in favour of these result from custom and constant conjunction rather than logic. He concluded that humans have no actual conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with the self.
Hume's compatibilist theory of free will proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles, and expounded the is–ought problem.
Hume has proved extremely influential on subsequent western philosophy, especially on utilitarianism, logical positivism, William James, the philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive philosophy, theology and other movements and thinkers. In addition, according to philosopher Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science". Hume engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Boswell, and Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume's influence on his economics and political philosophy). Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".
In light of Hume's central role in the Scottish Enlightenment, and in the history of Western philosophy, Bryan Magee judged him as a philosopher "widely regarded as the greatest who has ever written in the English language." While Hume failed in his attempts to start a university career, he took part in various diplomatic and military missions of the time. He wrote The History of England which became a bestseller, and it became the standard history of England in its day.
His empirical approach places him with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others at the time as a British Empiricist.
Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably René Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour. He also argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience. He argued that inductive reasoning and therefore causality cannot be justified rationally. Our assumptions in favour of these result from custom and constant conjunction rather than logic. He concluded that humans have no actual conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with the self.
Hume's compatibilist theory of free will proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles, and expounded the is–ought problem.
Hume has proved extremely influential on subsequent western philosophy, especially on utilitarianism, logical positivism, William James, the philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive philosophy, theology and other movements and thinkers. In addition, according to philosopher Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science". Hume engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Boswell, and Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume's influence on his economics and political philosophy). Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".
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August 2, 2015
All the New Atheists I've come across cite the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, most recently A.C. Grayling in his horrible The God Argument. But I wonder how carefully they read it; more and more often I feel they are metamorphosing into their creationist enemies, diligently mining out-of-context quotes to support their claim that there is no God and they can prove it. Hume would never have said anything so silly, though I doubt he'd be surprised at the way he is now used: he gives the impression of having seen every side of this debate a hundred times. He is not an atheist but a sceptic, an important distinction. His task here is to look critically at the arguments which purportedly demonstrate that the universe displays evidence of having been created by God. He is remarkably convincing when he demonstrates their essential weaknesses.
The main problems are easy to state: we can only ever reason by analogy with things we know, we only know a small part of the universe, and, worst, we only have one example of a universe to reason about. It is impossible under such circumstances to draw firm conclusions about our universe's origins. It is arguable that the universe in some ways resembles a machine; machines are designed and produced through the agency of human minds, hence it is possible, by analogy, that the universe was produced by some Being whose mind resembles ours. Hume has little difficulty in showing that the argument is weak, and that, even if the universe was produced by a purposeful Being, we have no reason to deduce that this Being necessarily resembles us in any important respects.
The New Atheists like to quote passages from the above. Hume also considers related arguments. Machines are not the only complex, ordered things we are familiar with; there are also living creatures, which are produced by reproductive processes. (It is startling to see how close he is to explicitly hypothesizing a version of evolution). As he says, the universe is arguably as much like a living creature as it is like a machine, so once again it is feasible to reason by analogy: living things arise by reproduction, the universe is like a living thing, hence the universe perhaps arose through a process like reproduction. Yet another possibility is that the universe arose through a process of blind chance. Given enough time, its particles will cycle though all possible combinations, and in the end one configuration may arise which causes the production of the complex world of living creatures that we see.
I think Hume would have been amused to see people like Richard Dawkins and Lawrence Krauss claim, in all seriousness, that they know some version of his second or third scenario to be the true account of our universe's origin. He advances these ideas in a spirit of playfulness, to show that there are equally good alternatives to a Divine Watchmaker, but he makes it clear that he trusts them neither more nor less. He can't see any way to resolve the questions given the evidence at our disposal. We now have a great deal more evidence, but the difficulties in principle remain. With only a single universe, it is not obvious how one can use the scientific method, which relies on accumulating evidence from multiple related cases. This point has been made repeatedly in recent years by Lee Smolin, who accuses speculative cosmologists of concocting radical metaphysical fantasies and marketing them as science.
I'd love to see Hume in a panel discussion with Lawrence Krauss and Francis S. Collins. Since that, alas, seems unlikely to happen, read his book. It's short, amusingly written and remarkably sensible.
The main problems are easy to state: we can only ever reason by analogy with things we know, we only know a small part of the universe, and, worst, we only have one example of a universe to reason about. It is impossible under such circumstances to draw firm conclusions about our universe's origins. It is arguable that the universe in some ways resembles a machine; machines are designed and produced through the agency of human minds, hence it is possible, by analogy, that the universe was produced by some Being whose mind resembles ours. Hume has little difficulty in showing that the argument is weak, and that, even if the universe was produced by a purposeful Being, we have no reason to deduce that this Being necessarily resembles us in any important respects.
The New Atheists like to quote passages from the above. Hume also considers related arguments. Machines are not the only complex, ordered things we are familiar with; there are also living creatures, which are produced by reproductive processes. (It is startling to see how close he is to explicitly hypothesizing a version of evolution). As he says, the universe is arguably as much like a living creature as it is like a machine, so once again it is feasible to reason by analogy: living things arise by reproduction, the universe is like a living thing, hence the universe perhaps arose through a process like reproduction. Yet another possibility is that the universe arose through a process of blind chance. Given enough time, its particles will cycle though all possible combinations, and in the end one configuration may arise which causes the production of the complex world of living creatures that we see.
I think Hume would have been amused to see people like Richard Dawkins and Lawrence Krauss claim, in all seriousness, that they know some version of his second or third scenario to be the true account of our universe's origin. He advances these ideas in a spirit of playfulness, to show that there are equally good alternatives to a Divine Watchmaker, but he makes it clear that he trusts them neither more nor less. He can't see any way to resolve the questions given the evidence at our disposal. We now have a great deal more evidence, but the difficulties in principle remain. With only a single universe, it is not obvious how one can use the scientific method, which relies on accumulating evidence from multiple related cases. This point has been made repeatedly in recent years by Lee Smolin, who accuses speculative cosmologists of concocting radical metaphysical fantasies and marketing them as science.
I'd love to see Hume in a panel discussion with Lawrence Krauss and Francis S. Collins. Since that, alas, seems unlikely to happen, read his book. It's short, amusingly written and remarkably sensible.
June 25, 2018
دوستانِ گرانقدر، من فلسفۀ انگلیس را نمیپسندم، چون به جایِ اندیشیدن برایِ اندیشیدن و پاسخ به پرسشِ ایجاد شده، بیشتر در موردِ خودِ پرسش تفکر میکنند ... بارها سؤال و پرسش را بالا و پایین میکنند و برایِ آن فلسفه میبافند تا از پاسخ دادن به پرسش شانه خالی کنند... امّا زنده یاد «دیوید هیوم» در میانِ فلاسفهٔ انگلیسی، چیزِ دیگری بود، یک نابغۀ خردمند و یک فیلسوف به معنایِ واقعی بود که عقایدِ روشنگرانه اش تا به امروز بر بینشِ انسان هایِ خردگرا تابش داشته و دارد
عزیزانم، تلاش نمودم تا چکیده ای مفید و کافی از این کتاب را برایِ شما خردگرایانِ ایرانی در زیر بنویسم
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دیوید هیوم مینویسد: برایِ اثباتِ وجودِ هر چیزی، خواه اثباتِ وجودِ خدا و یا هر چیزِ دیگری، به جایِ متوسّل شدن به خرافات و موهوماتی بیخردانه همچون «وحی» و «الهام»، باید به دلیل و منطق و تجربه متوسّل شد
دوستانِ گرامی، اگر بخواهیم در موردِ خطِ اندیشهٔ هیوم و یا همان مکتبِ فکریِ «هیوم» برایتان بنویسم، باید بگویم: مکتبِ فکریِ «هیوم» میگوید برایِ درکِ واقعیت، نیازی ندارد که ما در ورایِ مرزهایِ دانش به جستجو و کنکاش بپردازیم و یا برایِ اثباتِ آنچه که در آنسویِ «حواسِ تجربیِ» ما قرار دارد، به منطق و دلایلِ فلسفی متوسل شویم
در این کتاب اینگونه آمده: یکی از دلایلی که دینکاران و دیندارانِ بیخرد و معتقدان به وجودِ خدا، بارها از آن استفاده میکنند، «نظم و ترتیبِ جهانِ آفرینش» است... این افرادِ بیخرد میگویند، نظم و ترتیبی که در این جهان وجود دارد، خود دلیلِ اثباتِ وجودِ خداست... «هیوم» این دلیلِ غیرِ منطقیِ آنها را رد میکند و در برابرِ آن میگوید: اصلاً گیریم که ما دلیلِ شما را قبول کردیم و بنا به گفتۀ شما این درست است که این جهان سازنده ای خردمند و توانا دارد، ولی چگونه است که این سازندۀ خردمند و توانایِ شما نتوانسته جهانی را که ساخته است را از وجودِ زشتی ها، بد رفتاری ها و بدکاری ها در امان نگه دارد؟؟! اگر نظمِ دستگاهِ آفرینش میتوانست دلیلِ اثباتِ خدا باشد، چرا این سازندۀ توانا برایِ از بین بردنِ بی نظمی هایِ ویرانگر و خانمان برانداز، مانندِ زلزله، سیل، طوفان و غیره در حساب هایِ مکانیسمِ آفرینش، چاره ای نیندیشیده است؟؟... دوستانِ گرانقدر البته باید توجه داشت که «هیوم» برایِ پاسخ به موجوداتِ بیخردِ مذهبی و عرب پرستان، مجبور شده به مانندِ آنها، شرط را بر منظم بودنِ جهان در نظر بگیرد، در صورتی که منظم دانستنِ دستگاهِ آفرینش و این جهان، بزرگترین مغلطۀ تاریخ است که دینکاران مذهبی و عرب پرستان، مدام از آن برایِ اثباتِ موهومات و خزعبلاتی که میگویند، استفاده میکنند... عزیزانم، بارها در ریویوها و نظراتِ دیگری که نوشتم، این را بیان نمودم که: دستگاهی را میتوانیم منظم در نظر بگیریم که برایِ انجامِ هدفِ مشخصی درست شده باشد، مانندِ ساعت، که هدف از ساختش اعلامِ زمان است و یا ماشین حساب، که هدف از ساختش انجامِ محاسباتِ اعداد و ارقام میباشد... پس ساعت و ماشین حساب را میتوانیم منظم بدانیم... حال به نظرِ شما خردگرایانِ اهلِ دانش، این جهان، هدفِ مشخصی را دنبال میکند؟ آن هدف چیست!!؟ ...عزیزانِ من، معلوم است که هدف مشخص ندارد، پس منظم نیست... فصولِ سال و شب و روز دلیل بر نظمِ جهان نیست، چراکه در سرزمین هایِ مختلف، رخ دادنِ شب و روز و فصولِ سال متفاوت میباشد، در فضا انواع و اقسامِ حرکاتِ مختلفِ سیاره ها و اجرامِ آسمانی است که تازه از خیلی از آنها اطلاعی نداریم و هیچکدام پیروِ نظمِ خاصی نیستند، و مهمتر از همه، این است که موجوداتِ زنده و به خصوص ما انسانها خودمان به زندگی و حیات، هدف می دهیم
دوستانِ من، طراحیِ ذهن انسان در طبیعت، به گونه ای بنا شده است که از معانیِ واحدِ واژه ها، برداشت هایِ متفاوتی در خود دارد. اما در طولِ تاریخ، حاکمیتِ ریش سفیدان و پیرانِ قبایلِ قومی و قبیله ای، که ریشه در باورهایِ دینی دارد، اذهانِ عموم را طوری برنامه ریزی کرده اند؛ تا ذهنیتِ اقشارِ نوعِ بشر، در فهمِ یک کلمه تعریفِ مشترکی در خود داشته باشد، و آن اشتراک شعورِ جمعی، معنایی جز «خدا» نیست، که مدعی هستند، همهٔ هستی را بنا نهاده است و متولیانِ دروغگو و کلّاشِ ادیانِ گوناگون، قرنهاست که بیشترین بخشِ انرژیِ شعورِ انسان ها را به حیلهٔ خدایی موهوم و نامرئی، باطل و منجمد کرده اند... که خطرناک ترینِ این خدایان، " اللهِ اکبر" و " یهووه" میباشند
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امیدوارم این ریویو برایِ فرزندانِ سرزمینم مفید بوده باشه
«پیروز باشید و ایرانی»
عزیزانم، تلاش نمودم تا چکیده ای مفید و کافی از این کتاب را برایِ شما خردگرایانِ ایرانی در زیر بنویسم
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دیوید هیوم مینویسد: برایِ اثباتِ وجودِ هر چیزی، خواه اثباتِ وجودِ خدا و یا هر چیزِ دیگری، به جایِ متوسّل شدن به خرافات و موهوماتی بیخردانه همچون «وحی» و «الهام»، باید به دلیل و منطق و تجربه متوسّل شد
دوستانِ گرامی، اگر بخواهیم در موردِ خطِ اندیشهٔ هیوم و یا همان مکتبِ فکریِ «هیوم» برایتان بنویسم، باید بگویم: مکتبِ فکریِ «هیوم» میگوید برایِ درکِ واقعیت، نیازی ندارد که ما در ورایِ مرزهایِ دانش به جستجو و کنکاش بپردازیم و یا برایِ اثباتِ آنچه که در آنسویِ «حواسِ تجربیِ» ما قرار دارد، به منطق و دلایلِ فلسفی متوسل شویم
در این کتاب اینگونه آمده: یکی از دلایلی که دینکاران و دیندارانِ بیخرد و معتقدان به وجودِ خدا، بارها از آن استفاده میکنند، «نظم و ترتیبِ جهانِ آفرینش» است... این افرادِ بیخرد میگویند، نظم و ترتیبی که در این جهان وجود دارد، خود دلیلِ اثباتِ وجودِ خداست... «هیوم» این دلیلِ غیرِ منطقیِ آنها را رد میکند و در برابرِ آن میگوید: اصلاً گیریم که ما دلیلِ شما را قبول کردیم و بنا به گفتۀ شما این درست است که این جهان سازنده ای خردمند و توانا دارد، ولی چگونه است که این سازندۀ خردمند و توانایِ شما نتوانسته جهانی را که ساخته است را از وجودِ زشتی ها، بد رفتاری ها و بدکاری ها در امان نگه دارد؟؟! اگر نظمِ دستگاهِ آفرینش میتوانست دلیلِ اثباتِ خدا باشد، چرا این سازندۀ توانا برایِ از بین بردنِ بی نظمی هایِ ویرانگر و خانمان برانداز، مانندِ زلزله، سیل، طوفان و غیره در حساب هایِ مکانیسمِ آفرینش، چاره ای نیندیشیده است؟؟... دوستانِ گرانقدر البته باید توجه داشت که «هیوم» برایِ پاسخ به موجوداتِ بیخردِ مذهبی و عرب پرستان، مجبور شده به مانندِ آنها، شرط را بر منظم بودنِ جهان در نظر بگیرد، در صورتی که منظم دانستنِ دستگاهِ آفرینش و این جهان، بزرگترین مغلطۀ تاریخ است که دینکاران مذهبی و عرب پرستان، مدام از آن برایِ اثباتِ موهومات و خزعبلاتی که میگویند، استفاده میکنند... عزیزانم، بارها در ریویوها و نظراتِ دیگری که نوشتم، این را بیان نمودم که: دستگاهی را میتوانیم منظم در نظر بگیریم که برایِ انجامِ هدفِ مشخصی درست شده باشد، مانندِ ساعت، که هدف از ساختش اعلامِ زمان است و یا ماشین حساب، که هدف از ساختش انجامِ محاسباتِ اعداد و ارقام میباشد... پس ساعت و ماشین حساب را میتوانیم منظم بدانیم... حال به نظرِ شما خردگرایانِ اهلِ دانش، این جهان، هدفِ مشخصی را دنبال میکند؟ آن هدف چیست!!؟ ...عزیزانِ من، معلوم است که هدف مشخص ندارد، پس منظم نیست... فصولِ سال و شب و روز دلیل بر نظمِ جهان نیست، چراکه در سرزمین هایِ مختلف، رخ دادنِ شب و روز و فصولِ سال متفاوت میباشد، در فضا انواع و اقسامِ حرکاتِ مختلفِ سیاره ها و اجرامِ آسمانی است که تازه از خیلی از آنها اطلاعی نداریم و هیچکدام پیروِ نظمِ خاصی نیستند، و مهمتر از همه، این است که موجوداتِ زنده و به خصوص ما انسانها خودمان به زندگی و حیات، هدف می دهیم
دوستانِ من، طراحیِ ذهن انسان در طبیعت، به گونه ای بنا شده است که از معانیِ واحدِ واژه ها، برداشت هایِ متفاوتی در خود دارد. اما در طولِ تاریخ، حاکمیتِ ریش سفیدان و پیرانِ قبایلِ قومی و قبیله ای، که ریشه در باورهایِ دینی دارد، اذهانِ عموم را طوری برنامه ریزی کرده اند؛ تا ذهنیتِ اقشارِ نوعِ بشر، در فهمِ یک کلمه تعریفِ مشترکی در خود داشته باشد، و آن اشتراک شعورِ جمعی، معنایی جز «خدا» نیست، که مدعی هستند، همهٔ هستی را بنا نهاده است و متولیانِ دروغگو و کلّاشِ ادیانِ گوناگون، قرنهاست که بیشترین بخشِ انرژیِ شعورِ انسان ها را به حیلهٔ خدایی موهوم و نامرئی، باطل و منجمد کرده اند... که خطرناک ترینِ این خدایان، " اللهِ اکبر" و " یهووه" میباشند
---------------------------------------------
امیدوارم این ریویو برایِ فرزندانِ سرزمینم مفید بوده باشه
«پیروز باشید و ایرانی»
June 15, 2016
In almost every aspect of his thinking, David Hume was a man ahead of his time. His views on the nature of causality and induction—the foundation of the scientific method—are still relevant, unsolved problems in philosophy. His views on morals, however simple-minded they may seem, do presage the sociobiological explanation of ethical behavior by pointing to an innate sense. His Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are perhaps more relevant still, as it seems the debate over evolution vs. intelligent design has not yet been laid to rest.
I am not sure how much needs to be said about this work. To begin with, David Hume is an excellent writer—clear, charming, and concise. What's more, he is profound without being pompous, and serious without being stultifying. The reader of these conversations may doubt that they are, in fact, doing cutting-edge philosophy—as this book is so enjoyable and effortless to read—but they are, indeed.
It is too little remarked that, had not Darwin and Einstein lighted upon the principles that explained the organization of the natural world, the argument from design would still be fundamentally flawed. People act is if the question of God’s existence hinged on the accuracy of Darwin’s theory. It does not, and it never has. This is because the argument by design cannot, almost by definition, be verified, and does not have any predictive power.
This is not to say that the questions that these dialogues explore (e.g. the existence and nature of God) have been answered, but that both sides in the debate should be more careful in their arguments. In point of fact, one of the most endearing quality of this work is that Hume leaves the question open, and probes its answer from multiple directions. No careful thinker can honestly say that they are totally certain of the truths of religion. Hume will show you why.
I am not sure how much needs to be said about this work. To begin with, David Hume is an excellent writer—clear, charming, and concise. What's more, he is profound without being pompous, and serious without being stultifying. The reader of these conversations may doubt that they are, in fact, doing cutting-edge philosophy—as this book is so enjoyable and effortless to read—but they are, indeed.
It is too little remarked that, had not Darwin and Einstein lighted upon the principles that explained the organization of the natural world, the argument from design would still be fundamentally flawed. People act is if the question of God’s existence hinged on the accuracy of Darwin’s theory. It does not, and it never has. This is because the argument by design cannot, almost by definition, be verified, and does not have any predictive power.
This is not to say that the questions that these dialogues explore (e.g. the existence and nature of God) have been answered, but that both sides in the debate should be more careful in their arguments. In point of fact, one of the most endearing quality of this work is that Hume leaves the question open, and probes its answer from multiple directions. No careful thinker can honestly say that they are totally certain of the truths of religion. Hume will show you why.
February 27, 2017
“All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious, and not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is
supported by no appearance of probability.”
― David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Reading Mill's Utilitarianism the other day reminded me that it has been ages since I've read Hume. Hume's last little book, for me, is nearly perfect. He combines skepticism with a dark and mischievous humor. He is infinitely quotable and his dialogue on natural religion seemed to anticipate PERFECTLY our current Neoatheist debates and squabbles. It is hard for me to read Hume's dialogues without inserting Hitchens, Sullivan and Douthat into the place of Philo, Cleanthes and Demea (not a perfect transposition, but you get what I'm saying).
Anyway, it was a great lazy Sunday afternoon read. I'm glad I read it in my forties, because the humor I found now (based on 20+ more years lived) is considerably more that what I found reading this as an undergraduate at BYU so many, many years ago.
(for a better, fuller review, go read Manny's review).
supported by no appearance of probability.”
― David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Reading Mill's Utilitarianism the other day reminded me that it has been ages since I've read Hume. Hume's last little book, for me, is nearly perfect. He combines skepticism with a dark and mischievous humor. He is infinitely quotable and his dialogue on natural religion seemed to anticipate PERFECTLY our current Neoatheist debates and squabbles. It is hard for me to read Hume's dialogues without inserting Hitchens, Sullivan and Douthat into the place of Philo, Cleanthes and Demea (not a perfect transposition, but you get what I'm saying).
Anyway, it was a great lazy Sunday afternoon read. I'm glad I read it in my forties, because the humor I found now (based on 20+ more years lived) is considerably more that what I found reading this as an undergraduate at BYU so many, many years ago.
(for a better, fuller review, go read Manny's review).
February 28, 2017
David Hume gravé par Carmontelle
Parmi les œuvres philosophiques du célèbre Marcus Tulius Ciceron, la La Nature Des Dieux est l'un de ceux qui m'ont le plus marqué. Trois amis disputaient sans acrimonie, mais en toute franchise de leurs visions respectives de la religion, en fonction de leurs appartenance à telle ou telle école philosophique, alternant les rôles de thuriféraires et de contempteurs des différentes opinions. Ces anciens se laissaient une grande latitude sur les possibilités de la nature des dieux, mais ils ne perdaient pas pour autant de vue l'importante question de la nature des rapports qui devaient les lier à l'humanité. Dans sa forme, ce dialogue à trois permettaient d'astucieux renversements d'alliance en fonction des sujets abordés. A côté de certains dialogues de Platon, où l'une des parties est réduite à un rôle de faire-valoir, chacun recevait toutes les chances d'exposer ses vues de la manière la plus complète, sans négliger les possibilités de la rhétorique. Tulius se permettait même de garder le flou sur son opinion finale, en partageant son assentiment entre plusieurs. Ce dialogue écrit par Hume, dix-huit siècle plus tard, est un hommage à Cicéron, car il reprend largement la forme de ce dialogue.
Ici, le philosophe anglais met ensemble trois amis: Philon, un sceptique, sorte de Lucien qui en ayant mit un frein à sa causticité, aurait en même temps aiguisé son sens critique. Déméa, un déiste rationaliste, aimant à fonder sa croyance sur des arguments a priori. Et enfin Cléanthe, déiste empirique, qui préfère fonder sa foi sur son expérience, et adepte de cette fameuse religion naturelle, sujet du dialogue. Dans un premier temps, Philon va mener une critique serrée des arguments de Cléanthe, et de son arguments principal, la téléologie: cet horloger de Voltaire, Philon, va en montrer toutes les faiblesses, à la grande satisfaction de Déméa, car elle se fonde sur une analogie gratuite entre l'homme et la divinité. Mais Déméa va bientôt changer de couleur lorsque Philon retournera ses armes critiques contre lui, et lui montrera l'égale vanité de ses prétentions a priori : rien de permet raisonnablement de confondre morale, origine du monde, et tout autre sujet métaphysique dans une substance unique. Déméa, fâché, abandonne la compagnie, et Philon expose alors son scepticisme devant Cléanthe, et fait sentir leur véritable accord commun, en dépit des dissentiments apparents : les trois aiment la morale, ont un sentiment d'émerveillement devant la nature, et souffrent de sentir la faiblesse de l'esprit humain, incapable de trouver des réponses satisfaisantes à son insatiable curiosité. Pastichant la fin du texte de Cicéron, Pamphile (en grec, celui qui aime tout), le narrateur, partage son assentiment entre les diverses opinions exprimées.
Hume n'a pas pris le risque de publier ce texte de son vivant, sans doute pour s'épargner les tracas que lui auraient causé ceux qui ne l'auraient point gouté. Il a pourtant pris les plus grandes précautions pour qu'il puisse être publié après sa mort, chargeant plus de trois personnes de remplir cette commission. Ces précautions ne furent point inutiles, car les deux premiers trouvèrent des prétextes pour se dérober à la demande du défunt. Ce texte est à mon sentiment une vrai réussite, et devient mon préféré de Hume. Je trouve que c'est de loin le plus stimulant et le plus serré de ceux qu'il a composé.
February 16, 2017
I don't like most of the New Atheists (Dennett is the exception). They take their arguments beyond the point they should. They seem to open up a needlessly indefensible special hatred towards Muslims hence allowing for a non-tolerant person to occupy the White House and appointing a white supremacist to the NSC. This book shows in nuanced ways how to argue against dogmatist while not also becoming a dogmatist in the process. Nothing really changes under the sun, and Hume's book is still as relevant today as it would have been if it were published in his life time (which, of course, it was not).
I've got a really special affection for this book and Galileo's "Dialogue Concerning Two Chief World Systems". Hume was obviously influenced by that book and one can tell by the way he gives it special mention within this book. He mentions that within Galileo's book much of the first part of the book is meant to refute the Peripatetic notion of sublunar substance verse the heavenly perfect essence ('quintessence'). Much of this book is also to defend against the pernicious teleology and the special pleading for an immaterial nature of an undefined substance that magically interacts atemporally (often referred to as God) that permeated his time and still lingers today.
A simple book. A brilliant dialogue. I really wish they would make a movie of this book. I can say with certainty that all the apologia that gets presented in the God exists debates I watch online would get shot down by Philo (the skeptical philosopher in the dialogue). The modern debaters use different formulations but the kernel of their arguments always rely on some variation of a Thomas Aquinas/Aristotle final cause with a prime mover argument and something only known to them "objective morality" whatever that may be.
Philo is always reasonable. He'll use reason as his guide. The typical arguments used by apologist fall into at least one of the following categories: 1) ontological, 2) cosmological, 3) objective morality only comes from God, 4) meaning of life must be outsourced to a God to avoid nihilism 5) I feel it in my bones and know it is true 6) or we are in the best of all possible worlds therefore some evil is possible. Hume refutes them all within this short text.
1) is the question of being. It's a variation of Anslem's proof of God. I've been reading St. Aquinas lately and he quickly dismissed those kind of arguments. Hume (through Philo) will say that for any dichotomous statement to be true that the negation thereof must lead to a contradiction. If 'being' is a necessity it follows that 'not being' must lead to a contradiction. It will not. Therefore, the necessity of being (or God) is not provable ontologically. Aquinas rejects them differently but just as effectively.
Hume points our how the dogmatist must often resort to infinity to make their point. That is God must be all knowing, all wise, or another omni. Since likes must come from likes (their language) our mind must come from an infinite mind or similar logic which leap into eternal or infinite spheres which add nothing to the defense except confusion and obfuscation (as pointed out by Hume).
Hume yields on design (a variation of the cosmological argument, and today we might even call it fine tuning). He knew evolution is a fact and calls it such within the text but doesn't have the explanation of natural selection in order to fully grasp its full meaning and implications. According to Hume (through Philo), the world is too complex, humans, animals, the eye, and nature work too well to not have been designed by something. He'll grant a designer or multiple designers but nothing more.
I've never have been enthusiastic about the 'theodicy' argument. Hume thinks it refutes a Christian God and that's why I cited Liebnitz's "best of all possible worlds" above. Because, it can be a response to evil. I liked Liebnitz's "Monadology" and would recommend it. Hume is fair and gives Liebnitz a mention for it. Hume does take the presence of evil and superstition further then I would in his arguments against religion.
Hume is a good presenter for all sides. For me, I favor the position of "hard atheist". It just means that I don't reject all notions of God, but only the ones for which I've heard about so far. There could be a rational and reasonable story to be told for which I am not aware of. Hume, at least within this book, gives credence to a creator God(s). He ultimately would not be swayed by 'a priori' arguments (before the fact, or from first principles, deductive, or without empirical data) and is opened to 'a posterior' arguments (after the fact, derived from data, inductive, or from particular to general). I'm always open for good arguments and Hume is an expert at tearing apart poor reasoning.
Intolerance of others leads to white supremacist in the White House and on the NSC. Hume shows how to defeat the dogmatist while not becoming one.
I've got a really special affection for this book and Galileo's "Dialogue Concerning Two Chief World Systems". Hume was obviously influenced by that book and one can tell by the way he gives it special mention within this book. He mentions that within Galileo's book much of the first part of the book is meant to refute the Peripatetic notion of sublunar substance verse the heavenly perfect essence ('quintessence'). Much of this book is also to defend against the pernicious teleology and the special pleading for an immaterial nature of an undefined substance that magically interacts atemporally (often referred to as God) that permeated his time and still lingers today.
A simple book. A brilliant dialogue. I really wish they would make a movie of this book. I can say with certainty that all the apologia that gets presented in the God exists debates I watch online would get shot down by Philo (the skeptical philosopher in the dialogue). The modern debaters use different formulations but the kernel of their arguments always rely on some variation of a Thomas Aquinas/Aristotle final cause with a prime mover argument and something only known to them "objective morality" whatever that may be.
Philo is always reasonable. He'll use reason as his guide. The typical arguments used by apologist fall into at least one of the following categories: 1) ontological, 2) cosmological, 3) objective morality only comes from God, 4) meaning of life must be outsourced to a God to avoid nihilism 5) I feel it in my bones and know it is true 6) or we are in the best of all possible worlds therefore some evil is possible. Hume refutes them all within this short text.
1) is the question of being. It's a variation of Anslem's proof of God. I've been reading St. Aquinas lately and he quickly dismissed those kind of arguments. Hume (through Philo) will say that for any dichotomous statement to be true that the negation thereof must lead to a contradiction. If 'being' is a necessity it follows that 'not being' must lead to a contradiction. It will not. Therefore, the necessity of being (or God) is not provable ontologically. Aquinas rejects them differently but just as effectively.
Hume points our how the dogmatist must often resort to infinity to make their point. That is God must be all knowing, all wise, or another omni. Since likes must come from likes (their language) our mind must come from an infinite mind or similar logic which leap into eternal or infinite spheres which add nothing to the defense except confusion and obfuscation (as pointed out by Hume).
Hume yields on design (a variation of the cosmological argument, and today we might even call it fine tuning). He knew evolution is a fact and calls it such within the text but doesn't have the explanation of natural selection in order to fully grasp its full meaning and implications. According to Hume (through Philo), the world is too complex, humans, animals, the eye, and nature work too well to not have been designed by something. He'll grant a designer or multiple designers but nothing more.
I've never have been enthusiastic about the 'theodicy' argument. Hume thinks it refutes a Christian God and that's why I cited Liebnitz's "best of all possible worlds" above. Because, it can be a response to evil. I liked Liebnitz's "Monadology" and would recommend it. Hume is fair and gives Liebnitz a mention for it. Hume does take the presence of evil and superstition further then I would in his arguments against religion.
Hume is a good presenter for all sides. For me, I favor the position of "hard atheist". It just means that I don't reject all notions of God, but only the ones for which I've heard about so far. There could be a rational and reasonable story to be told for which I am not aware of. Hume, at least within this book, gives credence to a creator God(s). He ultimately would not be swayed by 'a priori' arguments (before the fact, or from first principles, deductive, or without empirical data) and is opened to 'a posterior' arguments (after the fact, derived from data, inductive, or from particular to general). I'm always open for good arguments and Hume is an expert at tearing apart poor reasoning.
Intolerance of others leads to white supremacist in the White House and on the NSC. Hume shows how to defeat the dogmatist while not becoming one.
July 1, 2015
I read this book for Cornel West's course on Hume & Kant during my last semester at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. This and his Treatise of Human Nature are my favorite books by Hume, one of my favorite philosophers.
It struck me today whilst thinking back upon Hume that his critique of necessity in evidentiary cases of causality, the spark that set off Kant's revolution in philosophy, might be a salutory read for those, like Einstein, who've been troubled by developments in microphysics which have shattered some of the last vestiges of apodictic necessity in the physical sciences. What Hume noted was that there is no such thing as a law as regards our understandings of experience. As regards causal relations, the best we can hope for are more, rather than less, likely patterns, strong tendencies which may be relied on. Some, of course, approach the ideal of lawfulness such as the "laws" of Newtonian mechanics, but, as Kant noted, the ideal of perfect lawfulness in nature is something we impose upon it. Such necessity in the physical sciences is but "a regulative ideal of the Vernunft", something aimed at and aspired to, but never obtainable to finite beings like ourselves restricted, as we are, to our finite inductions from experiment and experience. This being acknowledged, the probability vectors of electrons, indeterminacy and the uncertainty principle, are not so hard to adjust to after all.
It struck me today whilst thinking back upon Hume that his critique of necessity in evidentiary cases of causality, the spark that set off Kant's revolution in philosophy, might be a salutory read for those, like Einstein, who've been troubled by developments in microphysics which have shattered some of the last vestiges of apodictic necessity in the physical sciences. What Hume noted was that there is no such thing as a law as regards our understandings of experience. As regards causal relations, the best we can hope for are more, rather than less, likely patterns, strong tendencies which may be relied on. Some, of course, approach the ideal of lawfulness such as the "laws" of Newtonian mechanics, but, as Kant noted, the ideal of perfect lawfulness in nature is something we impose upon it. Such necessity in the physical sciences is but "a regulative ideal of the Vernunft", something aimed at and aspired to, but never obtainable to finite beings like ourselves restricted, as we are, to our finite inductions from experiment and experience. This being acknowledged, the probability vectors of electrons, indeterminacy and the uncertainty principle, are not so hard to adjust to after all.
April 19, 2023
Een oninteressant, uiterst achterhaald werk, dat tot hoofdstuk 10 erbarmelijk slecht is geschreven.
Het liefst laat ik Hume als martelaar sterven zodat ik zijn volgelingen kan uitroeien.
Haha
Het liefst laat ik Hume als martelaar sterven zodat ik zijn volgelingen kan uitroeien.
Haha
June 5, 2011
I thought, you know, that the idea of an imaginary "dialogue" was cheesy and overdone. But Hume is a riot. He is such a devastatingly skilled debater--so insightful, careful, witty, and unafraid of going waist-deep in his (numerous, varied) convictions--that I've been left in quiet awe of him. And what struck me too was the even-handedness with which Hume dealt all sides, giving equal credence to the voices of his three characters, Philo, Cleanthes, and Demea.
Cleanthes--well, okay so his argument from design holds some water, but it's hard to sympathize with someone so rude! Calling skeptics jesters and railliers? Atheists? Come, come, tsk, tsk. Skeptical Philo was my obvious favorite, but surprisingly (or unsurprisingly?) I found myself empathizing most with Demea, the religious conservative and mystic, especially in his call against the anthropomorphic view of the universe that supposes God must be like ourselves.
My paper on the Dialogues and Cleanthes' argument from design is due Friday. Then all I've got left to read are the two essays on Suicide and Miracles. I can safely say that I'm kinda looking forward to this week...
***Update: I'm done. And my verdict? Smashing.
Cleanthes--well, okay so his argument from design holds some water, but it's hard to sympathize with someone so rude! Calling skeptics jesters and railliers? Atheists? Come, come, tsk, tsk. Skeptical Philo was my obvious favorite, but surprisingly (or unsurprisingly?) I found myself empathizing most with Demea, the religious conservative and mystic, especially in his call against the anthropomorphic view of the universe that supposes God must be like ourselves.
My paper on the Dialogues and Cleanthes' argument from design is due Friday. Then all I've got left to read are the two essays on Suicide and Miracles. I can safely say that I'm kinda looking forward to this week...
***Update: I'm done. And my verdict? Smashing.
May 17, 2022
Hume schenkt ons een levendige geloofsdiscussie
In deze goed leesbare dialoog verkent David Hume (1711-1776) via drie personages fascinerende topics zoals de vraag of het universum geschapen is, of er God of een god is, of we hier überhaupt iets over kunnen weten, hoe het bestaan van lijden verenigbaar is met het bestaan van een (algoede, almachtige, alwetende) god (het 'problem of evil'), de aard van religieuze discussies en de plaats van religie in de samenleving.
Deze abstracte discussies worden uitermate levendig verteld door Humes luchtige en geestige pen, hier wellicht op z'n scherpst. Het lijkt er op dat Hume met dit werk zowel de absurditeit van rationele theologie (Cleanthes, die geloof rationeel wil bewijzen) als fideïstisch geloof (Demea, die vindt dat geloof niet kan of hoeft rationeel bewezen te worden, geloof is anders of sterker dan de rede) aan wou tonen (via de kritiek van de scepticus Philo). Natuurlijke theologie loopt vast in antropomorfisme (God is ook maar een mens?) en ongeldigheid van de gelovige argumenten, fideïstisch geloof in relativisme (jij voelt je misschien gelovig, maar ik niet, net zoals jij die film prachtig vond en ik niet).
Wie dus in dit werk op zoek gaat naar een sterke geloofsverdediging, zal bedrogen uitkomen, ondanks het feit dat de drie personages schijnbaar de hele dialoog niets anders doen dan het geloof verdedigen - dat de drie personages zeer overtuigde theïsten zijn, lijkt me vooral een strategische keuze van Hume om zich zo in te dekken tegen verwijten van atheïsme, lijkt me. (Eerder kan het werk van Kierkegaard aangeraden worden voor wie zijn geloof wil versterken en verkennen).
Een kleine bloemlezing
(Dit boek was verplichte lectuur voor het vak 'Filosofie van de religie' van prof. Walter Van Herck)
In deze goed leesbare dialoog verkent David Hume (1711-1776) via drie personages fascinerende topics zoals de vraag of het universum geschapen is, of er God of een god is, of we hier überhaupt iets over kunnen weten, hoe het bestaan van lijden verenigbaar is met het bestaan van een (algoede, almachtige, alwetende) god (het 'problem of evil'), de aard van religieuze discussies en de plaats van religie in de samenleving.
Deze abstracte discussies worden uitermate levendig verteld door Humes luchtige en geestige pen, hier wellicht op z'n scherpst. Het lijkt er op dat Hume met dit werk zowel de absurditeit van rationele theologie (Cleanthes, die geloof rationeel wil bewijzen) als fideïstisch geloof (Demea, die vindt dat geloof niet kan of hoeft rationeel bewezen te worden, geloof is anders of sterker dan de rede) aan wou tonen (via de kritiek van de scepticus Philo). Natuurlijke theologie loopt vast in antropomorfisme (God is ook maar een mens?) en ongeldigheid van de gelovige argumenten, fideïstisch geloof in relativisme (jij voelt je misschien gelovig, maar ik niet, net zoals jij die film prachtig vond en ik niet).
Wie dus in dit werk op zoek gaat naar een sterke geloofsverdediging, zal bedrogen uitkomen, ondanks het feit dat de drie personages schijnbaar de hele dialoog niets anders doen dan het geloof verdedigen - dat de drie personages zeer overtuigde theïsten zijn, lijkt me vooral een strategische keuze van Hume om zich zo in te dekken tegen verwijten van atheïsme, lijkt me. (Eerder kan het werk van Kierkegaard aangeraden worden voor wie zijn geloof wil versterken en verkennen).
Een kleine bloemlezing
Don't you remember, said PHILO, the excellent saying of LORD BACON on this head? That a little philosophy, replied CLEANTHES, makes a man an Atheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious remark too, said PHILO. (Part 1)
Empires may rise and fall, liberty and slavery succeed alternately, ignorance and knowledge give place to each other; but the cherry-tree will still remain in the woods of GREECE, SPAIN, and ITALY, and will never be affected by the revolutions of human society. (Part 6)
Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may [...] preserve an uniformity of appearance [...]? This we find to be the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually changing, and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains, in appearance, the same. (Part 8)
In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or rhinoceros; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his soul. (Part 11)
(Dit boek was verplichte lectuur voor het vak 'Filosofie van de religie' van prof. Walter Van Herck)
June 7, 2022
Presented as a dialogue between three characters, Demea, Philo, and Cleantes, the philosophe tries, a priori, to understand what is the nature of God -if we can know it at all. The fact that the three orators disagree with each others so badly serves, in fact, as a pretext to shatter the whole idea that God... exists in the first place! Here's the whole genius of David Hume: implying, without ever compromising himself (you had to be suicidal to openly admitting to be an atheist in 18th century Scotland!).
Started in 1750 and ended in 1776, the book will, in fact, be published anonymously and posthumously in 1779. Adam Smith, the economist to whom Hume had entrusted the text, had found the argument so destructive indeed that he had taken all the necessary precautions to reveal it publicly...
The thing is, the traditional arguments to support the existence of God are dismissed quite easily, especially one of the most powerful and (seemingly) convincing that is, the idea that the perfectly ordered nature of the world must reflect the hand of a no less perfect 'creator'. Using examples such as a house or a boat, Hume doesn't need much to demonstrate what a fallacy such an argument is! God? To the philosophe, God is but an error in reasoning; and he visibly took great pleasure into dismantling such error!
Sharp. Incisive. And, still convincing.
Started in 1750 and ended in 1776, the book will, in fact, be published anonymously and posthumously in 1779. Adam Smith, the economist to whom Hume had entrusted the text, had found the argument so destructive indeed that he had taken all the necessary precautions to reveal it publicly...
The thing is, the traditional arguments to support the existence of God are dismissed quite easily, especially one of the most powerful and (seemingly) convincing that is, the idea that the perfectly ordered nature of the world must reflect the hand of a no less perfect 'creator'. Using examples such as a house or a boat, Hume doesn't need much to demonstrate what a fallacy such an argument is! God? To the philosophe, God is but an error in reasoning; and he visibly took great pleasure into dismantling such error!
Sharp. Incisive. And, still convincing.
March 15, 2013
There is something analogous in Hume’s characters of Cleanthes, Philo, Demea, and their pursuit of natural religion to the workings of a dog track. In order to get the dogs to run in a circle, a metal, rabbit-shaped animal—often given a cute name like “Sparky”--appears in front of the pack just when the starting gate is lifted. The dogs, driven by natural instinct, catch sight of Sparky and begin the race. Sparky, driven by an intelligently designed mechanism that surpasses the speed of even the fleetest greyhound, manages to stay ahead of them until he disappears at the finish line. To the gambler, the fastest dog wins the race, but to a more dispassionate observer, the real winner is Sparky. In Hume’s Dialogues, Demea and Philo are the greyhounds, but the winner of the race is the machine, the Sparky-like Cleanthes.
That Cleanthes emerges as the winner of the debate on natural religion isn’t really a surprise. In the first chapter of the Dialogues, Pamphilus introduces Cleanthes as the accurate philosopher, Philo as the careless skeptic, and Demea as the rigidly inflexible orthodox. It is rare in a competition for anyone either careless or rigidly inflexible to prevail. These aren’t the qualities of a winner. While Philo may give the best account of himself with the depth and breadth of his knowledge, I think Cleanthes delivers the ultimate rejoinder at the conclusion of Part VII. Philo’s theories, Cleanthes posits, are “whimsies … that may puzzle but never can convince us.” Cleanthes is forever contemptuous of Philo’s skepticism. That skepticism is “fatal to knowledge but not to religion.” While I tend to identify more with Philo the skeptic or Demea the mystic, their reasoning and eloquence are ultimately futile. If your opponent in a religious debate is convinced that the Deity is “similar to human mind and intelligence” and endowed with anthropomorphic characteristics, any attempts to dislodge him from that belief are likely to end in failure.
Cleanthes thesis is succinct: “the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much greater faculties.” He goes on to say “by this argument, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his similarities to human mind and intelligence.” The world is “nothing but a machine” of the highest order that is “subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines.”
Philo immediately attacks this premise. How can order alone be the proof of design? Couldn’t matter itself function as the source, or what he more often calls the “spring,” of the order that we see in the world? Design is merely one of the springs or principles of the universe.
In response, Cleanthes makes one of his best points when he asks Philo to consider the human eye. If you think about the marvelous structure of the eye, isn’t it obvious that some kind of design is responsible for its function? This argument might seem less persuasive in the modern age where people carry around man-made eyes embedded in their cell phones, but even today science is better able to explain the dynamics of the distant universe than the inner workings of the human mind. Can even the smartest man explain how we see, or how we remember things from our past? Where in the plethora of animals is the dividing line between consciousness and mere instinct, and how did humans rather than chimps acquire it? Cleanthes reference to the human eye is very brief, but this portion of the dialogue is especially persuasive to the notion of intelligent design.
Cleanthes takes issue with Demea’s proposition that God is unknowable. Humans, Demea says, are too “infirm” to understand the Divine, and it is dangerous to equate God to man. Mystics like Demea, Cleanthes replies dismissively, are really nothing more than atheists. Demea later asks Cleanthes for data to support his thesis. Philo quickly agrees with Demea and states, “we have no data to establish any system of cosmogony.” Human experience is too limited to make positive assertions about natural religion. The world, Philo says, resembles the working of an animal or a vegetable; nature is spontaneous and follows its own accord without any particular design. It just grows. Cleanthes response is simple. Use your common sense, Philo. Does the world really resemble a vegetable? Philo’s arguments are pretty, but they are unconvincing. Cleanthes isn’t citing any data; he relies on what I would call his “gut feel.” To impute the nature of the world to some kind of regenerative animal or vegetable doesn’t really refute his contention—those theories might even corroborate it.
Demea then proposes two classical proofs of the existence of God. The first is the “voluntary agent or first mover” theory of Aquinas fame. Philo takes issue with this and says that motion is just a principle of matter. Nature doesn’t require a prime mover to be in motion. Cleanthes, who has little use for proofs in the first place, makes an interesting point about camels. What good are they? Would the world have dissolved if camels or any domestic animal had never existed? Cleanthes makes a strong point here, just as he did when he put forth the example of the human eye. In my opinion, the human eye and camels are good arguments for design, or what Cleanthes more accurately calls “benevolent design.” Camels are indeed natural creatures, but it is hard to understand why they exist if not for some kind of divine benevolence, or perhaps some divine sense of humor that exists in a Deity (just as it exists in man) but is totally absent from nature.
A second classical argument about the existence of God is the ontological one. There must have been a first being, Demea says, because nothing can cause itself to exist. Not so, replies Cleanthes. In a conclusion that could have emanated from Philo, Cleanthes says that the material universe itself could be the first Being. There is something contradictory about this explanation. If Cleanthes admits that the universe could be the first Being, it follows that the universe could also be the source of its own design, but he denies this. Cleanthes is not a logician like Philo. As the debate unfolds, Cleanthes relies less on logic and philosophy to support his contention of intelligent design and falls back on that age old device to support a position that cannot be proven by evidence: belief.
In the last two chapters of the Dialogues, the nature and pervasiveness of evil play central roles in the debate. Here Cleanthes is relatively silent, his rebuttals falling short of the mark. When Demea and Philo insist that most men are miserable, Cleanthes can only say that he has observed “something like what you say in others,” but rarely in himself. He is a happy man indeed. Health, he says, is more common than sickness. Pleasure is more common that pain. That might be so, agrees Philo, but isn’t pain “infinitely more violent and durable?” Philo is ready to rest his case at the end of Chapter X. Heretofore, he has resorted to metaphysical arguments to refute Cleanthes’s system of design, but now he is certain the Cleanthes cannot explain how an infinitely powerful and infinitely wise Deity can be conjoined with the violent nature of the world.
Cleanthes doesn’t have much of a counter punch. His lame contention that the world experiences lesser evil in place of a greater one lacks credibility. Seemingly tired of the discussion, he asks Philo to explain the nature of evil. He does so over several pages. Cleanthes is not impressed, and he recovers himself to make what I think is his strongest statement in support of his position
A false, absurd system, human nature, from the force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and perseverance; but no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported by strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend.
It is better to believe in something than in nothing. A few pages later Cleanthes says, “religion, however corrupted, is better than no religion at all.”
Is that the final word? Is a corrupted religion better than no religion at all? Philo very properly argues that few doctrines have led to more misery in the records of history than religion. He is correct, but most people still believe because most people are not philosophers or skeptics. From my own perspective, I like facts and data more than I like stories, so my personal inclination is to side with Philo, or perhaps more closely to Demea. God probably does exist, in one form or another, but he is unknowable, and any attempts to get at him eventually dissolve into nothingness. It is certainly possible that God looks exactly like the strong, grandfatherly figure that Michelangelo drew at the apex of The Sistine Chapel. But mankind’s experience with God is minimal, and our data, as Philo contends, is nonexistent. It is just as likely that God created humans experimentally in an effort to devise something totally unlike himself. God might resent any comparisons between Him and us.
At the end of Part IV in the Dialogues, before the debate has really gained any traction, Cleanthes says, “I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go farther who are wiser or more enterprising.” I might not agree with Cleanthes, but his practical arguments about the Author of Nature prevail over the skeptical and the mystical.
That Cleanthes emerges as the winner of the debate on natural religion isn’t really a surprise. In the first chapter of the Dialogues, Pamphilus introduces Cleanthes as the accurate philosopher, Philo as the careless skeptic, and Demea as the rigidly inflexible orthodox. It is rare in a competition for anyone either careless or rigidly inflexible to prevail. These aren’t the qualities of a winner. While Philo may give the best account of himself with the depth and breadth of his knowledge, I think Cleanthes delivers the ultimate rejoinder at the conclusion of Part VII. Philo’s theories, Cleanthes posits, are “whimsies … that may puzzle but never can convince us.” Cleanthes is forever contemptuous of Philo’s skepticism. That skepticism is “fatal to knowledge but not to religion.” While I tend to identify more with Philo the skeptic or Demea the mystic, their reasoning and eloquence are ultimately futile. If your opponent in a religious debate is convinced that the Deity is “similar to human mind and intelligence” and endowed with anthropomorphic characteristics, any attempts to dislodge him from that belief are likely to end in failure.
Cleanthes thesis is succinct: “the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much greater faculties.” He goes on to say “by this argument, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his similarities to human mind and intelligence.” The world is “nothing but a machine” of the highest order that is “subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines.”
Philo immediately attacks this premise. How can order alone be the proof of design? Couldn’t matter itself function as the source, or what he more often calls the “spring,” of the order that we see in the world? Design is merely one of the springs or principles of the universe.
In response, Cleanthes makes one of his best points when he asks Philo to consider the human eye. If you think about the marvelous structure of the eye, isn’t it obvious that some kind of design is responsible for its function? This argument might seem less persuasive in the modern age where people carry around man-made eyes embedded in their cell phones, but even today science is better able to explain the dynamics of the distant universe than the inner workings of the human mind. Can even the smartest man explain how we see, or how we remember things from our past? Where in the plethora of animals is the dividing line between consciousness and mere instinct, and how did humans rather than chimps acquire it? Cleanthes reference to the human eye is very brief, but this portion of the dialogue is especially persuasive to the notion of intelligent design.
Cleanthes takes issue with Demea’s proposition that God is unknowable. Humans, Demea says, are too “infirm” to understand the Divine, and it is dangerous to equate God to man. Mystics like Demea, Cleanthes replies dismissively, are really nothing more than atheists. Demea later asks Cleanthes for data to support his thesis. Philo quickly agrees with Demea and states, “we have no data to establish any system of cosmogony.” Human experience is too limited to make positive assertions about natural religion. The world, Philo says, resembles the working of an animal or a vegetable; nature is spontaneous and follows its own accord without any particular design. It just grows. Cleanthes response is simple. Use your common sense, Philo. Does the world really resemble a vegetable? Philo’s arguments are pretty, but they are unconvincing. Cleanthes isn’t citing any data; he relies on what I would call his “gut feel.” To impute the nature of the world to some kind of regenerative animal or vegetable doesn’t really refute his contention—those theories might even corroborate it.
Demea then proposes two classical proofs of the existence of God. The first is the “voluntary agent or first mover” theory of Aquinas fame. Philo takes issue with this and says that motion is just a principle of matter. Nature doesn’t require a prime mover to be in motion. Cleanthes, who has little use for proofs in the first place, makes an interesting point about camels. What good are they? Would the world have dissolved if camels or any domestic animal had never existed? Cleanthes makes a strong point here, just as he did when he put forth the example of the human eye. In my opinion, the human eye and camels are good arguments for design, or what Cleanthes more accurately calls “benevolent design.” Camels are indeed natural creatures, but it is hard to understand why they exist if not for some kind of divine benevolence, or perhaps some divine sense of humor that exists in a Deity (just as it exists in man) but is totally absent from nature.
A second classical argument about the existence of God is the ontological one. There must have been a first being, Demea says, because nothing can cause itself to exist. Not so, replies Cleanthes. In a conclusion that could have emanated from Philo, Cleanthes says that the material universe itself could be the first Being. There is something contradictory about this explanation. If Cleanthes admits that the universe could be the first Being, it follows that the universe could also be the source of its own design, but he denies this. Cleanthes is not a logician like Philo. As the debate unfolds, Cleanthes relies less on logic and philosophy to support his contention of intelligent design and falls back on that age old device to support a position that cannot be proven by evidence: belief.
In the last two chapters of the Dialogues, the nature and pervasiveness of evil play central roles in the debate. Here Cleanthes is relatively silent, his rebuttals falling short of the mark. When Demea and Philo insist that most men are miserable, Cleanthes can only say that he has observed “something like what you say in others,” but rarely in himself. He is a happy man indeed. Health, he says, is more common than sickness. Pleasure is more common that pain. That might be so, agrees Philo, but isn’t pain “infinitely more violent and durable?” Philo is ready to rest his case at the end of Chapter X. Heretofore, he has resorted to metaphysical arguments to refute Cleanthes’s system of design, but now he is certain the Cleanthes cannot explain how an infinitely powerful and infinitely wise Deity can be conjoined with the violent nature of the world.
Cleanthes doesn’t have much of a counter punch. His lame contention that the world experiences lesser evil in place of a greater one lacks credibility. Seemingly tired of the discussion, he asks Philo to explain the nature of evil. He does so over several pages. Cleanthes is not impressed, and he recovers himself to make what I think is his strongest statement in support of his position
A false, absurd system, human nature, from the force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and perseverance; but no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported by strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend.
It is better to believe in something than in nothing. A few pages later Cleanthes says, “religion, however corrupted, is better than no religion at all.”
Is that the final word? Is a corrupted religion better than no religion at all? Philo very properly argues that few doctrines have led to more misery in the records of history than religion. He is correct, but most people still believe because most people are not philosophers or skeptics. From my own perspective, I like facts and data more than I like stories, so my personal inclination is to side with Philo, or perhaps more closely to Demea. God probably does exist, in one form or another, but he is unknowable, and any attempts to get at him eventually dissolve into nothingness. It is certainly possible that God looks exactly like the strong, grandfatherly figure that Michelangelo drew at the apex of The Sistine Chapel. But mankind’s experience with God is minimal, and our data, as Philo contends, is nonexistent. It is just as likely that God created humans experimentally in an effort to devise something totally unlike himself. God might resent any comparisons between Him and us.
At the end of Part IV in the Dialogues, before the debate has really gained any traction, Cleanthes says, “I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go farther who are wiser or more enterprising.” I might not agree with Cleanthes, but his practical arguments about the Author of Nature prevail over the skeptical and the mystical.
February 17, 2021
Few books have impacted my beliefs as much as this. I was first introduced to it my senior year of college in a Metaphysics class when we were discussing God. My professor cited this book multiple times as containing an excellent argument against the teleological design line of reasoning. Additionally, that this book contains an excellent line of reasoning arguing that even if the teleological argument is assumed as true, it tells us nothing about the character of the being(s) which created the universe.
All in all, this is a concise and wonderful discussion (Hume writes as three separate characters all arguing different angles in reference to the points listed above and we tend to assume that Hume adopts the role of the skeptic) on the points I mentioned. And he successfully convinced me that, upon further reasoning, I held views that were faulty. I was convinced that the argument by design was true and that I was able to draw from it the Christian God as I thought of him. I no longer think that the argument by design is convincing and I certainly don’t see how making that argument anymore advantages the Christian, for it is an argument that yields only uncertainty. I recommend anyone interested in these topics read this book! It is short and dense yet manageable and worthwhile.
All in all, this is a concise and wonderful discussion (Hume writes as three separate characters all arguing different angles in reference to the points listed above and we tend to assume that Hume adopts the role of the skeptic) on the points I mentioned. And he successfully convinced me that, upon further reasoning, I held views that were faulty. I was convinced that the argument by design was true and that I was able to draw from it the Christian God as I thought of him. I no longer think that the argument by design is convincing and I certainly don’t see how making that argument anymore advantages the Christian, for it is an argument that yields only uncertainty. I recommend anyone interested in these topics read this book! It is short and dense yet manageable and worthwhile.
February 7, 2019
Anybody who doesn't appreciate Hume doesn't appreciate philosophy. His dialogues are entertaining and insightful, and they are a good introduction to Hume's style and thought.
The dialogues exhibit the typical Humean combination of technically proficient but also commonsensical arguments. Hume methodically dispels the haughty aura of self-declared experts in the ivory tower by appealing to the intuitions and the common sense of ordinary people. (In this there are strong echoes of Plato's dialogues.) But he simultaneously, and miraculously, avoids the trap of being caught up in the superstitions and logical fallacies of the uneducated mind.
Hume's skeptical agnosticism, while not as radical as the atheistic materialism of Hobbes or Lucretius, carried out the death sentence of theism and abstract theology. The arguments are rhetorically powerful and framed in a fashion that respects the intelligence of the reader. Religious philosophy has never recovered.
The only thing that drags the dialogues down is the passage of time. They seem partially outdated in the Western world, where Humean skepticism has become fashionable. The even more radical Marxist atheism and New Atheism have seemingly overtaken Humeanism. At the same time, advances in cosmology and biology have rendered some of the scientific speculations in the dialogues moot. But I'm sure Hume would appreciate those things, since he was a fan of radical thinking and science.
And in some ways these new developments have strayed from Hume's teachings. The spirit of Humean skepticism is a precious civilizational heirloom whose true value is easily forgotten by the younger generations. The skeptical attitude has too often been lost in the exuberant hubris of Enlightenment, Marxist, New Atheist, or physicalist-scientistic dogmatism.
Only a perpetual recursion back to Hume can save the critical spirit of humanity from succumbing to the dark nemesis of its own creation: the dogmatic certainty of belief.
The dialogues exhibit the typical Humean combination of technically proficient but also commonsensical arguments. Hume methodically dispels the haughty aura of self-declared experts in the ivory tower by appealing to the intuitions and the common sense of ordinary people. (In this there are strong echoes of Plato's dialogues.) But he simultaneously, and miraculously, avoids the trap of being caught up in the superstitions and logical fallacies of the uneducated mind.
Hume's skeptical agnosticism, while not as radical as the atheistic materialism of Hobbes or Lucretius, carried out the death sentence of theism and abstract theology. The arguments are rhetorically powerful and framed in a fashion that respects the intelligence of the reader. Religious philosophy has never recovered.
The only thing that drags the dialogues down is the passage of time. They seem partially outdated in the Western world, where Humean skepticism has become fashionable. The even more radical Marxist atheism and New Atheism have seemingly overtaken Humeanism. At the same time, advances in cosmology and biology have rendered some of the scientific speculations in the dialogues moot. But I'm sure Hume would appreciate those things, since he was a fan of radical thinking and science.
And in some ways these new developments have strayed from Hume's teachings. The spirit of Humean skepticism is a precious civilizational heirloom whose true value is easily forgotten by the younger generations. The skeptical attitude has too often been lost in the exuberant hubris of Enlightenment, Marxist, New Atheist, or physicalist-scientistic dogmatism.
Only a perpetual recursion back to Hume can save the critical spirit of humanity from succumbing to the dark nemesis of its own creation: the dogmatic certainty of belief.
August 18, 2014
In these Platonic-like dialogues, Hume uses three characters to lay out three views on religion. In one, God transcends all human attributes and is incomprehensible. In another, God is modeled after humans, focusing on intelligence in a super-human sort of way. The third view, articulated by Philo, takes Hume’s empiricist approach to argue that we cannot establish the existence or non-existence of God. Philo’s ambivalence on the issue of God is palpable and in the end he lands on a deist approach: God, whatever that might be, set things in motion and then (God’s) natural laws took it from there.
The book closes with two short essays. The first, and consistent with the arguments in the Dialogues, opposes the traditional arguments regarding the immortality of the soul. The second, an essay on suicide, argues that since we take charge of our lives in all other respects, we should be able to take our own life.
This book is written in Hume’s thick prose. Without detraction, Hume’s argument could have been shortened, significantly. Substantively, Hume’s deist approach may have made sense at the time, but it seems now more like a last ditch attempt to seam a religious sensitivity and a scientific worldview together.
The book closes with two short essays. The first, and consistent with the arguments in the Dialogues, opposes the traditional arguments regarding the immortality of the soul. The second, an essay on suicide, argues that since we take charge of our lives in all other respects, we should be able to take our own life.
This book is written in Hume’s thick prose. Without detraction, Hume’s argument could have been shortened, significantly. Substantively, Hume’s deist approach may have made sense at the time, but it seems now more like a last ditch attempt to seam a religious sensitivity and a scientific worldview together.
December 27, 2012
It's dangerous to rate and review such an influential work, and philosophy nonetheless. So for now, my review will be short...
Hume writes well, and is pretty winsome, however I disagree with the conclusions of most of the works in these essays. I find that Hume does not question his own presuppositions, but asserts them and argues from them. If one accepts those presuppositions as true, then the conclusion does naturally follow, but if you do not grant the presuppositions (which I do not), then the conclusion stands in midair ready to fall.
I give it 5 out of 5 for making me think...
I give it 2 out of 5 for compelling argumentation...
I give it 3 out of 5 for style...
I give it 1 out of 5 for conclusions...
I give it 1 out of 5 for the dangerous implications being played out now if one takes what he's written as true.
3 out of 5 overall.
Hume writes well, and is pretty winsome, however I disagree with the conclusions of most of the works in these essays. I find that Hume does not question his own presuppositions, but asserts them and argues from them. If one accepts those presuppositions as true, then the conclusion does naturally follow, but if you do not grant the presuppositions (which I do not), then the conclusion stands in midair ready to fall.
I give it 5 out of 5 for making me think...
I give it 2 out of 5 for compelling argumentation...
I give it 3 out of 5 for style...
I give it 1 out of 5 for conclusions...
I give it 1 out of 5 for the dangerous implications being played out now if one takes what he's written as true.
3 out of 5 overall.
May 8, 2022
Perhaps the most over-rated thinker of all time. The only thing Hume ever proved is that men who don't want to believe in God will invent innumerable loopholes to reason their way to that conclusion.
Read
September 3, 2016When I read this the cover was brown. Books have to be so sexy now!
January 19, 2024
Philosophers are so good at praising and dissing. Schopenhauer said "there is more to be learned from each page of David Hume than from the collected philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart and schleiermacher taken together." Kant credited Hume for his awakening from his dogmatic slumber. Hearing such veneration, I was extremely excited to read my first David Hume book, The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
I loved The Dialogues and would recommend it to anyone, though admittedly I am quite biased as religion is one of my favorite topics in philosophy.
Stylistically, this book is absolutely fantastic. Obviously, the language used in philosophy is a huge detraction. The abstractions, jargon, and poor writing skills have frequently combined to make some books near unreadable. I am happy to report that this book was surprisingly easy to read. Hume writes with meticulous clarity, for sacrificing linguistic rigor for showmanship’s sake, aside from a few ironic comments. The ideas conveyed through the dialogue are extremely well-expressed, leaving little uncertainty at all due to the mode of his expression. Somehow, he manages to combine this clarity of ideas with an extremely entertaining format. This is no Socratic dialogue. There is no didactic tirade. This conversation captures the essence of a spirited debate perfectly. Sometimes they go too far, sometimes no responses can be thought of, sometimes it is acknowledged that the arguments are off the cuff.
Obviously, the arguments contained within are fantastic. The prevalent speaker here is Philo, debating Cleanthes, along with Demea. Philo and Demea generally agree that whatever ultimate force/god may be outlined by empirical findings, there can be nothing more inferred about it’s nature other than its existence. Cleanthes disagrees, holding an anthropomorphic view of god. I tended to agree more with Philo, but Cleanthes is not strawmanned at all. I thought many of his arguments were very strong. This changes at the end, as Philo certainly “wins” the debate, and Cleanthes has less and less to say, though the book ends with Philo somewhat agreeing with Cleanthes, and the narrator even crowns Cleanthes the victor.
That's essentially what this book is, just arguments. There is no overly abstract system of philosophy erected here, no life-altering worldview switches, just arguments and rebuttals. It’s great, it’s like a toolbox. Take what you need, provoke some thought, and go on with your day. Of course, there are many hints of Hume’s overall empiricist outlook, which were very interesting.
The essays included in this edition are entertaining, if only for historical value in the case of the immortality of the soul essay. One funny thing I realized is that the way Hume has been characterized to me previously has been entirely wrong. Hume’s true view on religion and the nature of his argument on miracles are mostly what I am referring to. Read this book, then read some reviews on here to see exactly what I mean. It’s like they don’t even read the book!
Obviously, I don’t agree with everything said here, and I doubt most people will. The included essays are especially more susceptible to rebuttal, but that may be due to the nature of those as essays rather than a dialogue.
Unfortunately, there are some QUITE clear instances of misogyny here, which betray Hume’s extreme stupidity in that regard.
Overall, though, I think this book is a fantastic read, I’d say essential. Especially of interest to those who have any sort of interest in religion.
I loved The Dialogues and would recommend it to anyone, though admittedly I am quite biased as religion is one of my favorite topics in philosophy.
Stylistically, this book is absolutely fantastic. Obviously, the language used in philosophy is a huge detraction. The abstractions, jargon, and poor writing skills have frequently combined to make some books near unreadable. I am happy to report that this book was surprisingly easy to read. Hume writes with meticulous clarity, for sacrificing linguistic rigor for showmanship’s sake, aside from a few ironic comments. The ideas conveyed through the dialogue are extremely well-expressed, leaving little uncertainty at all due to the mode of his expression. Somehow, he manages to combine this clarity of ideas with an extremely entertaining format. This is no Socratic dialogue. There is no didactic tirade. This conversation captures the essence of a spirited debate perfectly. Sometimes they go too far, sometimes no responses can be thought of, sometimes it is acknowledged that the arguments are off the cuff.
Obviously, the arguments contained within are fantastic. The prevalent speaker here is Philo, debating Cleanthes, along with Demea. Philo and Demea generally agree that whatever ultimate force/god may be outlined by empirical findings, there can be nothing more inferred about it’s nature other than its existence. Cleanthes disagrees, holding an anthropomorphic view of god. I tended to agree more with Philo, but Cleanthes is not strawmanned at all. I thought many of his arguments were very strong. This changes at the end, as Philo certainly “wins” the debate, and Cleanthes has less and less to say, though the book ends with Philo somewhat agreeing with Cleanthes, and the narrator even crowns Cleanthes the victor.
That's essentially what this book is, just arguments. There is no overly abstract system of philosophy erected here, no life-altering worldview switches, just arguments and rebuttals. It’s great, it’s like a toolbox. Take what you need, provoke some thought, and go on with your day. Of course, there are many hints of Hume’s overall empiricist outlook, which were very interesting.
The essays included in this edition are entertaining, if only for historical value in the case of the immortality of the soul essay. One funny thing I realized is that the way Hume has been characterized to me previously has been entirely wrong. Hume’s true view on religion and the nature of his argument on miracles are mostly what I am referring to. Read this book, then read some reviews on here to see exactly what I mean. It’s like they don’t even read the book!
Obviously, I don’t agree with everything said here, and I doubt most people will. The included essays are especially more susceptible to rebuttal, but that may be due to the nature of those as essays rather than a dialogue.
Unfortunately, there are some QUITE clear instances of misogyny here, which betray Hume’s extreme stupidity in that regard.
Overall, though, I think this book is a fantastic read, I’d say essential. Especially of interest to those who have any sort of interest in religion.
January 3, 2020
نقطهی قوت این خوانش، در فاصله گرفتن از دیدگاههای معمول در مورد هیوم است. نگرشی از منظر روانشناختی-فلسفی که این گفتوگوها را نه بین چند دیدگاه، که در درون یک انسان میداند و سعی میکند نشان دهد که فاصلهی ناچیزی است که یک انسان، تبدیل شود به انسانی دیگر.
April 5, 2024
Never write a dialogue again pal
September 1, 2017
Featuring a dialogue amongst three philosophers, this volume debates the existence of god, highlighting the varied opinions on the nature and attributes of such...
July 18, 2020
I re-read this great book after 15 years. A must-read for anyone interested in philosophy or religion.
April 6, 2023
Devastating. If we still believed in human reason, it would be hard to grasp how theism survived it.
April 11, 2018
Sometimes Hume makes me hate him because i cannot follow his ideas and i want to blame it exclusively on his punctuation or if i'm not being reductive on his prose style but most likely i simply don't read carefully still his ideas and arguments are quite intriguing and usually convincing unsurprisingly as i'm not averse to criticizing Proofs of God's Existence but what the hell is up with the Miracles essay's claim that all religious miracles cancel each other out which occurs in a section i hate or misread or read lazily so thank Gore there are things such as Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to help a dimwit maybe understand a sentence such as
I may add as a fourth reason, which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony destroys itself.maybe i need to type the whole book rather than reading it because a glimmer of sense slightly more than a brief hint of meaning appeared to me just then
January 12, 2012
I have a small addiction to late night talk shows. When I say small, I mean that I am constantly searching for who is on so that I know when to record which program. A long time ago, Cornell West was on the Craig Ferguson show and somehow they started talking about David Hume. As an agnostic, I am always searching for a thought-provoking read. Inevitably, I end up re-reading Voltaire or random op-ed articles/journals. So when Cornell West said that this was the greatest piece of literature ever written about religion in terms of skepticism, I was rather surprised. After all, in the same breathe, Mr. West said that he was a Christian and that he disagreed with Hume's opinion. Needless to say, I was intrigued. (Sorry for the back-story.)
So I picked this up at a book sale and it blew my mind. I have never read something so articulate in terms of arguing against organized religion. I found myself nodding rigorously. For those of you who do not like dry humor attacks on theology, please don't read this. Like many people who have commented before me, I think this is a work of literature that can be read by people of all faiths, or lack thereof. It carries on a conversation that should be had, yet often isn't. Phenomenal work of literature.
So I picked this up at a book sale and it blew my mind. I have never read something so articulate in terms of arguing against organized religion. I found myself nodding rigorously. For those of you who do not like dry humor attacks on theology, please don't read this. Like many people who have commented before me, I think this is a work of literature that can be read by people of all faiths, or lack thereof. It carries on a conversation that should be had, yet often isn't. Phenomenal work of literature.
November 12, 2019
يضع هيوم أرائه فى الدين الطبيعى على لسان المتحاورين الثلاثة فى النص كما يضع الأفكار الجدالية التى مرت بعقله النقدى ليصل الى بعض الاراء المتواضعة ولكن الثابتة فى موضوع الدين . وهؤلاء المتحاورون هم دميان الأكثر تديناً وفيلون المعتدل وكليانثز المتشكك الى النهاية .
ويوضح هيوم خلال المحاورة كيف أن دميان لم يستطع استكمال الجدل عند احتدامه وكيف أن المعتدل دون تشكك لابد أن يتبنى أفكاراً دوجمائية ضارة أو متناقضة مع غايتها . وكيف أن المتشكك المعتدل لابد أن يصل الى آراء وأن يتبنى معتقدات معقولة ومفحوصة وهو يضع احتمال خطأها فى كل وقت ويقبل النقد المستمر لكل أفكاره حتى تتعدل بشكل مستمر ولكن فى حدود ضيقة لا تثير النفس او تصيبها بالقلق على عكس المتزمت والدوغمائى الذى يهرب من النقد بل ومن التفكير بعقله هو .
ويوضح هيوم خلال المحاورة كيف أن دميان لم يستطع استكمال الجدل عند احتدامه وكيف أن المعتدل دون تشكك لابد أن يتبنى أفكاراً دوجمائية ضارة أو متناقضة مع غايتها . وكيف أن المتشكك المعتدل لابد أن يصل الى آراء وأن يتبنى معتقدات معقولة ومفحوصة وهو يضع احتمال خطأها فى كل وقت ويقبل النقد المستمر لكل أفكاره حتى تتعدل بشكل مستمر ولكن فى حدود ضيقة لا تثير النفس او تصيبها بالقلق على عكس المتزمت والدوغمائى الذى يهرب من النقد بل ومن التفكير بعقله هو .
February 15, 2016
If you are a religious person stay away from this book because it will give you eye cancer.
It's hard to put sense into someone whose defense for their beliefs is just as irrational as themselves.
Parents should not subject children to manipulation and fear in order for them to believe in this person called 'god'. Let them make their own decision when they have the age and knowledge to make it.
A lot of people need to read this before they start to become aware of how absurdly far fetched and claptrap the holy books are.
It's hard to put sense into someone whose defense for their beliefs is just as irrational as themselves.
Parents should not subject children to manipulation and fear in order for them to believe in this person called 'god'. Let them make their own decision when they have the age and knowledge to make it.
A lot of people need to read this before they start to become aware of how absurdly far fetched and claptrap the holy books are.
March 5, 2012
One of the worst books that I was ever forced to read in college.
March 29, 2022
I deeply wish I had read this sooner. Not only does Hume write incredibly well, but the arguments he makes regarding the issue concerning the nature of God, are almost bulletproof. Surprisingly there were some humorous moments in the book as well which had me laughing out loud. I think atheists site him often and I can see why. This book, even more so than the God Delusion, does a better job at making a convincing argument against the watchmaker argument entirely through logic. Hume was ahead of his time and what shocked me most was that he managed to hint at something almost like evolution before Darwin even published his theory, indeed Darwin wasn't even born at the time of his writing this.
Favourite Quotes:
1. "But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?”
2. "“So far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable sophism.”
3.“How the most absurd argument, replied CLEANTHES, in the hands of a man of ingenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! ”
4. "“The disorders of the mind, continued DEMEA, though more secret, are not perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often the absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to render life ineligible.
Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as a specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him, and[…]”
5. "“EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?”
6." “Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all along insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn and indignation.”
7. "“There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. ”
8."“But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who is the ultimate cause of all things...”
9."“It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior.
To know God, says SENECA, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious DEMON, who exercises his power without reason and without humanity! ”
I have managed to delete my notes of this book somehow, and so for future reference, I'm listing the arguments here which are taken from SparkNotes:
1. "Cleanthes argues the position of empirical theism—the position that we can come to know about God by reasoning from the evidence afforded us by nature"
"The argument is supposed to work by way of analogy (an argument of this form is called an argument by analogy): (1) The world resembles a finely tuned machine. (2) All machines we know of are created by intelligence (human intelligence). (3) Therefore, the world must also be caused by intelligence (divine intelligence). By looking at nature, in other words, we obtain overwhelming evidence that God's intelligence resembles human intelligence (though of course, in much more perfect form)."
2. "Philo the skeptic delivers Hume's objections to the argument from design."
"First, the analogy between machines and the universe is weak at best, and as such any reasoning based on this analogy must also be weak.
Second, the universe and a machine are not strictly analogous phenomena because they are not independently existing entities, rather the universe is a whole and a machine is a part of it."
"Philo also argues that it is not true that all order we experience is caused by intelligence that we can sense. Some order, such as that found in organic bodies, is caused by generation and vegetation. There is no reason, then, to think that just because the world is ordered, it is necessarily a result of intelligent design.
Finally, an inductive argument (that is, an argument that argues for a conclusion based on past evidence), which the argument from design certainly is, requires repeated experience of the phenomena in question (i.e. repeated experience of the cause followed by the effect). However here the relevant cause (God) and effect (the universe) are both wholly unique, so there is no way that we could have such repeated experience of their existences or anything that resembles them."
3. "Philo takes up another line of attack. He argues that the claim that God is an intelligent designer does not even succeed in explaining why the world is ordered. It is no easier to understand how God's thoughts might set the world in order than it is to understand how the material world might be its own source of order. "
4. "In part V, Philo argues that even if we can infer anything from the argument from design, it is not what we want to be able to infer. Given the evidence we have from nature we have no grounds on which to conclude that God is infinite, that God is perfect, that there is only one God, or even that God lacks a physical body. "
5. "Philo attempts to show that there are many other possible analogies, other than the analogy to machines, that are equally well supported by the evidence we find in nature. For instance, the universe can be analogized to an animal body and God to its soul. It is therefore almost random to choose the analogy between the universe and a machine."
6. "In parts X and XI, Philo gives his most famous and most decisive arguments against empirical theism. Until this point, the discussion has centered around God's natural attributes—his infiniteness, his eternality, and his perfection. Now Philo examines the idea of God's moral attributes (for instance, his goodness) and asks whether these can be inferred through an investigation of nature....As Philo puts it, if the universe is a machine, its only goal is the bare survival of each species, not that any species be happy. Given how much evil there is in the world, we cannot possibly look at the world and infer that God is infinitely good, infinitely wise, and infinitely powerful. In fact, we cannot even look at the world and infer from the evidence that he is at all good, wise, and powerful."
Favourite Quotes:
1. "But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?”
2. "“So far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable sophism.”
3.“How the most absurd argument, replied CLEANTHES, in the hands of a man of ingenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! ”
4. "“The disorders of the mind, continued DEMEA, though more secret, are not perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often the absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to render life ineligible.
Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as a specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him, and[…]”
5. "“EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?”
6." “Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all along insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn and indignation.”
7. "“There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. ”
8."“But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who is the ultimate cause of all things...”
9."“It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior.
To know God, says SENECA, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious DEMON, who exercises his power without reason and without humanity! ”
I have managed to delete my notes of this book somehow, and so for future reference, I'm listing the arguments here which are taken from SparkNotes:
1. "Cleanthes argues the position of empirical theism—the position that we can come to know about God by reasoning from the evidence afforded us by nature"
"The argument is supposed to work by way of analogy (an argument of this form is called an argument by analogy): (1) The world resembles a finely tuned machine. (2) All machines we know of are created by intelligence (human intelligence). (3) Therefore, the world must also be caused by intelligence (divine intelligence). By looking at nature, in other words, we obtain overwhelming evidence that God's intelligence resembles human intelligence (though of course, in much more perfect form)."
2. "Philo the skeptic delivers Hume's objections to the argument from design."
"First, the analogy between machines and the universe is weak at best, and as such any reasoning based on this analogy must also be weak.
Second, the universe and a machine are not strictly analogous phenomena because they are not independently existing entities, rather the universe is a whole and a machine is a part of it."
"Philo also argues that it is not true that all order we experience is caused by intelligence that we can sense. Some order, such as that found in organic bodies, is caused by generation and vegetation. There is no reason, then, to think that just because the world is ordered, it is necessarily a result of intelligent design.
Finally, an inductive argument (that is, an argument that argues for a conclusion based on past evidence), which the argument from design certainly is, requires repeated experience of the phenomena in question (i.e. repeated experience of the cause followed by the effect). However here the relevant cause (God) and effect (the universe) are both wholly unique, so there is no way that we could have such repeated experience of their existences or anything that resembles them."
3. "Philo takes up another line of attack. He argues that the claim that God is an intelligent designer does not even succeed in explaining why the world is ordered. It is no easier to understand how God's thoughts might set the world in order than it is to understand how the material world might be its own source of order. "
4. "In part V, Philo argues that even if we can infer anything from the argument from design, it is not what we want to be able to infer. Given the evidence we have from nature we have no grounds on which to conclude that God is infinite, that God is perfect, that there is only one God, or even that God lacks a physical body. "
5. "Philo attempts to show that there are many other possible analogies, other than the analogy to machines, that are equally well supported by the evidence we find in nature. For instance, the universe can be analogized to an animal body and God to its soul. It is therefore almost random to choose the analogy between the universe and a machine."
6. "In parts X and XI, Philo gives his most famous and most decisive arguments against empirical theism. Until this point, the discussion has centered around God's natural attributes—his infiniteness, his eternality, and his perfection. Now Philo examines the idea of God's moral attributes (for instance, his goodness) and asks whether these can be inferred through an investigation of nature....As Philo puts it, if the universe is a machine, its only goal is the bare survival of each species, not that any species be happy. Given how much evil there is in the world, we cannot possibly look at the world and infer that God is infinitely good, infinitely wise, and infinitely powerful. In fact, we cannot even look at the world and infer from the evidence that he is at all good, wise, and powerful."
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