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The German Ideology / Theses on Feuerbach / Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy
Nearly two years before his powerful Communist Manifesto, Marx (1818—1883) co-wrote The German Ideology in 1845 with friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels expounding a new political worldview, including positions on materialism, labor, production, alienation, the expansion of capitalism, class conflict, revolution, and eventually communism. They chart the course of "true" socialism based on G. W.F. Hegel's dialectic, while criticizing the ideas of Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner and Ludwig Feuerbach. Marx expanded his criticism of the latter in his now famous Theses on Feuerbach, found after Marx's death and published by Engels in 1888. Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, also found among the posthumous papers of Marx, is a fragment of an introduction to his main works. Combining these three works, this volume is essential for an understanding of Marxism.
584 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1846
About the author
Karl Marx
2,996 books5,374 followersWith the help of Friedrich Engels, German philosopher and revolutionary Karl Marx wrote
The Communist Manifesto
(1848) and
Das Kapital
(1867-1894), works, which explain historical development in terms of the interaction of contradictory economic forces, form many regimes, and profoundly influenced the social sciences.
German social theorist Friedrich Engels collaborated with Karl Marx on The Communist Manifesto in 1848 and on numerous other works.
Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin in London opposed Communism of Karl Marx with his antithetical anarchy.
Works of Jacques Martin Barzun include Darwin, Marx, Wagner (1941).
The Prussian kingdom introduced a prohibition on Jews, practicing law; in response, a man converted to Protestantism and shortly afterward fathered Karl Marx.
Marx began co-operating with Bruno Bauer on editing Philosophy of Religion of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (see Democritus and Epicurus), doctoral thesis, also engaged Marx, who completed it in 1841. People described the controversial essay as "a daring and original piece... in which Marx set out to show that theology must yield to the superior wisdom." Marx decided to submit his thesis not to the particularly conservative professors at the University of Berlin but instead to the more liberal faculty of University of Jena, which for his contributed key theory awarded his Philosophiae Doctor in April 1841. Marx and Bauer, both atheists, in March 1841 began plans for a journal, entitled Archiv des Atheismus (Atheistic Archives), which never came to fruition.
Marx edited the newspaper Vorwärts! in 1844 in Paris. The urging of the Prussian government from France banished and expelled Marx in absentia; he then studied in Brussels. He joined the league in 1847 and published.
Marx participated the failure of 1848 and afterward eventually wound in London. Marx, a foreigner, corresponded for several publications of United States.
He came in three volumes. Marx organized the International and the social democratic party.
Marx in a letter to C. Schmidt once quipped, "All I know is that I am not a Marxist," as Warren Allen Smith related in Who's Who in Hell .
People describe Marx, who most figured among humans. They typically cite Marx with Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, the principal modern architects.
Bertrand Russell later remarked of non-religious Marx, "His belief that there is a cosmic ... called dialectical materialism, which governs ... independently of human volitions, is mere mythology" ( Portraits from Memory , 1956).
More: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Marx
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/marx/
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bi...
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/...
http://www.historyguide.org/intellect...
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic...
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/...
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/t...
German social theorist Friedrich Engels collaborated with Karl Marx on The Communist Manifesto in 1848 and on numerous other works.
Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin in London opposed Communism of Karl Marx with his antithetical anarchy.
Works of Jacques Martin Barzun include Darwin, Marx, Wagner (1941).
The Prussian kingdom introduced a prohibition on Jews, practicing law; in response, a man converted to Protestantism and shortly afterward fathered Karl Marx.
Marx began co-operating with Bruno Bauer on editing Philosophy of Religion of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (see Democritus and Epicurus), doctoral thesis, also engaged Marx, who completed it in 1841. People described the controversial essay as "a daring and original piece... in which Marx set out to show that theology must yield to the superior wisdom." Marx decided to submit his thesis not to the particularly conservative professors at the University of Berlin but instead to the more liberal faculty of University of Jena, which for his contributed key theory awarded his Philosophiae Doctor in April 1841. Marx and Bauer, both atheists, in March 1841 began plans for a journal, entitled Archiv des Atheismus (Atheistic Archives), which never came to fruition.
Marx edited the newspaper Vorwärts! in 1844 in Paris. The urging of the Prussian government from France banished and expelled Marx in absentia; he then studied in Brussels. He joined the league in 1847 and published.
Marx participated the failure of 1848 and afterward eventually wound in London. Marx, a foreigner, corresponded for several publications of United States.
He came in three volumes. Marx organized the International and the social democratic party.
Marx in a letter to C. Schmidt once quipped, "All I know is that I am not a Marxist," as Warren Allen Smith related in Who's Who in Hell .
People describe Marx, who most figured among humans. They typically cite Marx with Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, the principal modern architects.
Bertrand Russell later remarked of non-religious Marx, "His belief that there is a cosmic ... called dialectical materialism, which governs ... independently of human volitions, is mere mythology" ( Portraits from Memory , 1956).
More: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Marx
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/marx/
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bi...
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/...
http://www.historyguide.org/intellect...
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic...
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/...
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/t...
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 214 reviews
December 28, 2014
This is interesting, not least because it is one of the earliest formulations of Marx’s understanding of historical materialism and his breaking away from both Hegel’s idealism and Feuerbach’s naïve materialism. The book starts with a very useful editor’s introduction where this work is located within both Marx’s and Engels’s developing understanding of what they were coming to view as the motive force of history. That is, the class struggle. What is interesting here is how frequently they reference literature and the arts, and not always to praise the accomplishments of the high arts, but often to frame their understanding of the potential of a future human society. Life under ‘communism’ is sketched in what can only be called the briefest of outlines – “in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic”. They make it clear that the division of labour, particularly as it has been perfected under capitalism, does much to make the vast majority of human lives almost unbearable, so the key defining characteristic of the communist society is the breaking of this division of labour. The unbearable nature of the division of labour was particularly true of the cruelly deskilled work that was being undertaken in the factories of their day – but one hardly has to travel to the third world (where most of our clothes, electrical equipment and such are made) to see people reduced to half-lives at the beck and call of the division of labour. In this sense, art as a means of human expression – even for people who would never want to call themselves ‘artists’ is presented as a pathway to a fuller, more human life.
The basic ideas framing the Marxist vision are that our material conditions are the foundation upon which the rest of our modes of being – whether they be religious, philosophical, social, legal, artistic and so on – are determined. There is plenty of scope for variety, so that two countries could well have the same levels of development of their productive forces (economic well-being), but still have very different legal and cultural systems. All the same, there are things that are more or less closed off to us once we move beyond certain periods of economic development and other things that are impossible until certain economic pre-conditions have been obtained. I’m not going to use their examples, but rather I’m going to use some that I’ve been thinking about recently.
In this Marx says that Epic poetry is one of the things that is closed off once we reach a certain level of economic development – that it makes perfect sense as a form in Ancient Greece, but wouldn’t really be possible today. I would rather look at something like architecture. Many people believe we don’t today have the technology to build a pyramid. This is basically nonsense. But what is interesting is that we would never dream of building a pyramid today. Why? Well, because there are so many much more interesting things that we do build today, that building a huge mound of rocks is never going to be something that interests us doing again. Perhaps since we have become capable of destroying real mountains we have become less interested in building puny, artificial mountains of our own. The Ancient Egyptians built pyramids, they are breathtaking, they are remarkable, but they were also at the far end of their technical abilities. We are able to send a camera into space and take images of the dawn of time, we are able to smash atoms to discover the mass of the Higgs Boson. I think that means we win, if there is such a thing as winners and losers with this stuff.
The Egyptians didn’t pose questions about the mass of the Higgs Boson, or anything like that. Why? Because there would have needed to have asked so many other questions first and all of those prior questions required strides forward in the economic underpinnings of society before they could even be contemplated.
Perhaps a better example is the one given in Margaret Wertheim in ‘The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace’ where she discusses how our notions of space completely changed with the Renaissance and perspective painting. And this is interesting for a number of reasons. Not only would such painting be impossible before the Renaissance – where we simply did not have the mathematics necessary or the understanding of optics or the explosion of painting techniques available to make such ‘realism’ possible, but this change in tools that became available to us with the rapid growth in human productiveness helped to fundamentally change the way we viewed the world – literally changed how we see. It did much to create modern humans – that is, by having a single ‘right’ place to stand and view a painting – something that was completely new because previously paintings were designed to be displayed in particular spaces and therefore designed to be seen from anywhere within that entire space. Now, there were right places to view from and therefore a right way to view – a privileged perspective. This did much to encourage ideas of the individual viewer standing in the right location to view and so to create the basis for ‘individuals’. Shakespeare did much the same by switching drama from a depiction of things that happen to various characters to bringing to the fore the motivations characters had for particular actions. Rather than being required to act according to the wishes of the gods, characters like MacBeth struggle with their wills, struggle with the ethical problems their desires and their morality throw into conflict. This ‘turn to the individual’ as actor and as creator of their destiny fits rather well with the early modern notions of the new and rising class – what Marx would call the Bourgeoisie.
What is interesting here is that changes in the economic structuring of society, brought about by the development of the productive forces – new technologies, new modes of work, new divisions of labour – all contributed to new ways of seeing the world, and, equally importantly, new understandings of what is ‘true’. In this book Marx points out that the ruling classes always endorse certain ideas, certain ways of understanding the world, and those ‘ways of seeing’ by the ruling classes become the ruling ideas in society too. So much so that all previous ways of seeing the world – whether of slave societies in ancient times or hierarchical structures where everyone is in their fixed location as associated with medieval times, become bizarre and incomprehensible, and, despite there clearly not having been, say, capitalist ways of understanding the world in these previous times, our commonsense notions assume there really must have been. When Fukuyama claims ‘the end of history’ he is not merely looking forward, but making claims about the past too. All ruling ideas become universalist, they all become ‘commonsense’, they all become hegemonic. There is no need for conspiracy here, just self-interest. There was an amusing piece in the newspaper the other day by an apologist of the free market
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/devi...
which spent a lot of time criticising the Pope’s naïve views on economics. How can the Pope not know that greed, as exemplified by the gross inequalities produced under capitalism, is actually the greatest boon to humanity? How can he be so foolish as to want to restrict the free operation of the market, when it has proven itself the only means of eradicating poverty? He is clearly a victim of that rubbish from Piketty – what we really need is more inequality, as it is the only thing that motivates people and turns the wheels of progress. Should we be surprised that such ideas end up getting printed in our leading newspapers? Newspapers that are owned by an ever-decreasing number of very rich robber barons? Perhaps we should rather be surprised there are places like Good Reads where some views can be expressed more or less without censorship – well, until you threaten the profits of Amazon, of course. Let’s not take this freedom stuff too far.
This ends work with a series of short texts by Marx – his Thesis on Feuerbach, his Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy, but one of the sections I found most interesting was his discussion of how important it is to move philosophy away from idle speculation and to see that many questions of ‘truth’ are not really questions for speculation, but rather are inherently practical questions and therefore need to be answered in action and by action.
I’m unlikely to read the entire work of which this is a selection – much like part 3 of the Manifesto, a lot of what is left out here sounds like too much detail on issues no longer of the least bit of interest – but I can recommend this short version, not least because while it clearly articulates the idea that the economic substructure is the basis for the rest of society – it is hardly put in a way that is as ‘dogmatic’ as some later ‘Marxists’ might have put it.
The basic ideas framing the Marxist vision are that our material conditions are the foundation upon which the rest of our modes of being – whether they be religious, philosophical, social, legal, artistic and so on – are determined. There is plenty of scope for variety, so that two countries could well have the same levels of development of their productive forces (economic well-being), but still have very different legal and cultural systems. All the same, there are things that are more or less closed off to us once we move beyond certain periods of economic development and other things that are impossible until certain economic pre-conditions have been obtained. I’m not going to use their examples, but rather I’m going to use some that I’ve been thinking about recently.
In this Marx says that Epic poetry is one of the things that is closed off once we reach a certain level of economic development – that it makes perfect sense as a form in Ancient Greece, but wouldn’t really be possible today. I would rather look at something like architecture. Many people believe we don’t today have the technology to build a pyramid. This is basically nonsense. But what is interesting is that we would never dream of building a pyramid today. Why? Well, because there are so many much more interesting things that we do build today, that building a huge mound of rocks is never going to be something that interests us doing again. Perhaps since we have become capable of destroying real mountains we have become less interested in building puny, artificial mountains of our own. The Ancient Egyptians built pyramids, they are breathtaking, they are remarkable, but they were also at the far end of their technical abilities. We are able to send a camera into space and take images of the dawn of time, we are able to smash atoms to discover the mass of the Higgs Boson. I think that means we win, if there is such a thing as winners and losers with this stuff.
The Egyptians didn’t pose questions about the mass of the Higgs Boson, or anything like that. Why? Because there would have needed to have asked so many other questions first and all of those prior questions required strides forward in the economic underpinnings of society before they could even be contemplated.
Perhaps a better example is the one given in Margaret Wertheim in ‘The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace’ where she discusses how our notions of space completely changed with the Renaissance and perspective painting. And this is interesting for a number of reasons. Not only would such painting be impossible before the Renaissance – where we simply did not have the mathematics necessary or the understanding of optics or the explosion of painting techniques available to make such ‘realism’ possible, but this change in tools that became available to us with the rapid growth in human productiveness helped to fundamentally change the way we viewed the world – literally changed how we see. It did much to create modern humans – that is, by having a single ‘right’ place to stand and view a painting – something that was completely new because previously paintings were designed to be displayed in particular spaces and therefore designed to be seen from anywhere within that entire space. Now, there were right places to view from and therefore a right way to view – a privileged perspective. This did much to encourage ideas of the individual viewer standing in the right location to view and so to create the basis for ‘individuals’. Shakespeare did much the same by switching drama from a depiction of things that happen to various characters to bringing to the fore the motivations characters had for particular actions. Rather than being required to act according to the wishes of the gods, characters like MacBeth struggle with their wills, struggle with the ethical problems their desires and their morality throw into conflict. This ‘turn to the individual’ as actor and as creator of their destiny fits rather well with the early modern notions of the new and rising class – what Marx would call the Bourgeoisie.
What is interesting here is that changes in the economic structuring of society, brought about by the development of the productive forces – new technologies, new modes of work, new divisions of labour – all contributed to new ways of seeing the world, and, equally importantly, new understandings of what is ‘true’. In this book Marx points out that the ruling classes always endorse certain ideas, certain ways of understanding the world, and those ‘ways of seeing’ by the ruling classes become the ruling ideas in society too. So much so that all previous ways of seeing the world – whether of slave societies in ancient times or hierarchical structures where everyone is in their fixed location as associated with medieval times, become bizarre and incomprehensible, and, despite there clearly not having been, say, capitalist ways of understanding the world in these previous times, our commonsense notions assume there really must have been. When Fukuyama claims ‘the end of history’ he is not merely looking forward, but making claims about the past too. All ruling ideas become universalist, they all become ‘commonsense’, they all become hegemonic. There is no need for conspiracy here, just self-interest. There was an amusing piece in the newspaper the other day by an apologist of the free market
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/devi...
which spent a lot of time criticising the Pope’s naïve views on economics. How can the Pope not know that greed, as exemplified by the gross inequalities produced under capitalism, is actually the greatest boon to humanity? How can he be so foolish as to want to restrict the free operation of the market, when it has proven itself the only means of eradicating poverty? He is clearly a victim of that rubbish from Piketty – what we really need is more inequality, as it is the only thing that motivates people and turns the wheels of progress. Should we be surprised that such ideas end up getting printed in our leading newspapers? Newspapers that are owned by an ever-decreasing number of very rich robber barons? Perhaps we should rather be surprised there are places like Good Reads where some views can be expressed more or less without censorship – well, until you threaten the profits of Amazon, of course. Let’s not take this freedom stuff too far.
This ends work with a series of short texts by Marx – his Thesis on Feuerbach, his Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy, but one of the sections I found most interesting was his discussion of how important it is to move philosophy away from idle speculation and to see that many questions of ‘truth’ are not really questions for speculation, but rather are inherently practical questions and therefore need to be answered in action and by action.
I’m unlikely to read the entire work of which this is a selection – much like part 3 of the Manifesto, a lot of what is left out here sounds like too much detail on issues no longer of the least bit of interest – but I can recommend this short version, not least because while it clearly articulates the idea that the economic substructure is the basis for the rest of society – it is hardly put in a way that is as ‘dogmatic’ as some later ‘Marxists’ might have put it.
July 15, 2012
if someone wants to save the humanity than u can't ignore marx
February 9, 2017
The German Ideology is frequently referenced as a great starter text for students of Marxism. Imagine my horror upon discovering it is nigh-600 pages long and a philosophical critique of previous philosophers.
The first portion, "INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY" is the most essential. It is a run down of various parts of Marx's burgeoning Dialectical Materialism.
The following three sections, critiquing the Young-Hegelian Feuerbach, Bauer, and Stirner in that order, is a real problem. The former two, and especially Bauer, are not often read or discussed in any context but this one: in which they are shut down by Marx. The Stirner passage lacks what even the former two sections had - brevity, with "Saint Max" stretching over 300 pages. Tracking the minute errors and logical issues of these un-read philosophers to all reach approximately the same conclusion was frustrating and nearly pointless. Allow me to summarize:
Hegel was great, but his Idealism has some problems. Namely failing to see that ideas are nothing but the products of the prevailing means of production. These three guys follow Hegel's Idealism but don't do much with it, especially Stirner who is a dumb idiot.
Volume II closes out with some other dumb idiots who now have the gall to bash the French revolutionaries for being too "crude" and not ideal enough.
The thinking was of course quality (and in many instances, the writing - Marx is pretty damn funny), but I do not recommend actually reading this work. Read up on the context of all of the aforementioned philosophers, and then read "Theses on Feuerbach" to get the same thing. There appear to be abridged printings of the text: I haven't looked at what is included in them, but perhaps they are worth seeking out.
The first portion, "INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY" is the most essential. It is a run down of various parts of Marx's burgeoning Dialectical Materialism.
The following three sections, critiquing the Young-Hegelian Feuerbach, Bauer, and Stirner in that order, is a real problem. The former two, and especially Bauer, are not often read or discussed in any context but this one: in which they are shut down by Marx. The Stirner passage lacks what even the former two sections had - brevity, with "Saint Max" stretching over 300 pages. Tracking the minute errors and logical issues of these un-read philosophers to all reach approximately the same conclusion was frustrating and nearly pointless. Allow me to summarize:
Hegel was great, but his Idealism has some problems. Namely failing to see that ideas are nothing but the products of the prevailing means of production. These three guys follow Hegel's Idealism but don't do much with it, especially Stirner who is a dumb idiot.
Volume II closes out with some other dumb idiots who now have the gall to bash the French revolutionaries for being too "crude" and not ideal enough.
The thinking was of course quality (and in many instances, the writing - Marx is pretty damn funny), but I do not recommend actually reading this work. Read up on the context of all of the aforementioned philosophers, and then read "Theses on Feuerbach" to get the same thing. There appear to be abridged printings of the text: I haven't looked at what is included in them, but perhaps they are worth seeking out.
November 14, 2018
The German Ideology (written in 1845, published in 1923) was Karl Marx’s first major work on his theory of materialism, as well as the first outline on Communism. Marx develops his thoughts in relation to contemporary German philosophy. This approach has its advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, it makes Marx’s main ideas – to be further developed over the decades – much easier to digest. It also illuminates the philosophical underpinnings of his theories in a way that all his later work fails to do. On the minus side, this approach makes Marx’s line of thought hard to follow without any knowledge of Idealism. It also makes the book rather obscure and outdated.
Before continuing this review, I have to state that I only read the first part of Volume I of The German Ideology (besides reading some minor parts of Volume II). The reason is that the first 120 pages or so are easy to follow, since Marx develops his own thoughts and barely mentions the ideas of Feuerbach – who is supposed to be the focus of this first part – and where he does, he usually explains Feuerbach’s position in a clear & concise way. The problems start when Marx enters upon the discussion of the Idealism of Bauer and especially Stirner (whose part takes up almost half the book!).
One has to be intimately familiar with the philosophies of Bauer and Stirner, since Marx sets out to meticulously & scrupulously refute the ideas involved. And not only this, he does this in a very cynical and sarcastic tone of voice. For instance, after dealing with Feuerbach – who seems to have earned the respect of Marx and to deserve a fair treatment, Marx presents a short interlude. In this interlude, he tells us how two clerics (Bauer and Stirner) have called a council to refute the gnostic viewpoint of a heretic (Feuerbach) as well as some rebels (Hess and others). Saint Bruno and Saint Max, Marx continues to calls them throughout Volume I.
After this short interlude, Saint Bruno gets a beating, and when he’s down and out, it’s time for the main events: Marx versus Saint Max. It is impossible to follow Marx’s tirade against both Saints without being thoroughly familiar with their papal bulls ( to continue Marx’s metaphor). Marx endlessly quotes these two idealists and then refutes them (or so he claims) on the finest points.
Nevertheless, the main ideas of The German Ideology are easy to grasp; beautiful in their nature and originality; harsh in their criticisms; and indispensable for a true understanding of Marx’s materialism. They are also easy to summarize:
Hegel claimed that World History is the development, in dialectical fashion, of Ideas. The subject, the consciousness, grasps the world through ideas. These ideas determine the world (very Kantian, although in a perverted fashion). All that exists is Ideas. And Consciousness comes to a true and full understanding of itself, Self-Consciousness, through this dialectical process. To understand World History, one has only to trace the history of Ideas. Hegel developed these obscure notions into an all-encompassing philosophical system, and taught this for years at the University of Berlin. When he died, his followers, the Young Hegelians, developed Hegel’s philosophy in their own ways. Marx originally was part of this group, but later on came to regard Idealism as futile and empty.
Now, in The German Ideology, Marx explains why. In Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Marx claimed: “Philosophers have hitherto tried to interpret the world in various ways, the point, however, is to change it.” His materialism, and its offshoot political programme Communism, was activism – change the world, not interpret it. This can be seen in his many later works, in which he predicted the downfall of capitalism and the need for Communist Revolutions and the creation of a Communist paradise, where each will get what he needs and desires. Alas, the meaning of changing, instead interpreting, the world goes much deeper and is directly linked to Hegel’s Idealism.
Hegel and the Young Hegelians (Feuerbach, Bauer, Stirner and others), claimed that reality is nothing but consciousness: the subject determines the object. This in itself is rooted in Kant, who tried the ‘subject determines object’ as prophylactic for his headaches on the incompatibility of Newton’s mechanics and Descartes’ rationalism. Science (and empiricism à la Locke and Hume) claimed that the object determines the subject (i.e. the objective reality is experienced by conscious beings), while the rationalists claimed that the object doesn’t exist without the subject (i.e. the conscious being constitutes the world, hence no chair if I’m not looking). David Hume became sceptical and claimed that this dilemma is unresolvable, we should just become sceptics and get on with life. Kant defeated Hume’s radical scepticism, or so he thought, by claiming that empiricism and rationalism are both right: the object is perceived by the subject, but at the same time the subject constitutes the object. Since the subject is a limited conscious being, the object can only be known superficially, the object as it is in itself is un-knowable. Kant, in short, resolved the dilemma by positing a whole new world, behind the world as we perceive – how is that for a fancy trashcan, in which to drop nasty questions?
Anyways, Hegel came on the scene and radicalized Kant: the subject, consciousness, is all there is. The objects are determined by the subject, by thinking or perceiving them. In other words: the material world is determined by consciousness. But this, then, leads immediately to the strangest of implications: the Ego is all there is. And history, the development of the material world, since the material world is determined by the consciousness perceiving it, is nothing but the history of ideas. Study the ideas and you understand the world. Forget about the rest.
Marx sees the flaw in this philosophical system and goes in for the kill. Ideas are abstract notions of material objects. E.g. Feuerbach’s Man is nothing but the generalization of many individuals, a general concept of mankind. The selection of individuals – their epoch, class, society & culture – determines the notion. Hence, philosophers project their idealization of certain concepts, like Man, onto the world as a whole and back in time. When Adam Smith and David Ricardo talk about how civil society is the pivot in economics they project their own epoch onto history, which leads to subversion of truth.
Marx’s criticism shoots two fatal arrows at Idealism. First, the abstractions that philosophers use to understand the world, lure them into the misguided idea that Ideas are the building blocks of science, while the Ideas are nothing but the end result of very material, earthly processes. According to Marx, when man stumbled on the scene (a brute fact), he immediately started to produce (i.e. pluck from Nature what he needed), since man came with immediate needs: (1) the need to produce the means of subsistence (food, drink, clothes, shelter), (2) the need to produce more than before, since (3) the need for reproduction increased population size, and (4) social relationships/intercourse within groups. It is only after these four needs are fulfilled, that consciousness kicks in: reflection comes after having something to reflect on (!) and the means to communicate your thoughts. Philosophers subvert the truth when they claim that consciousness determines the world; it’s not religion that determines man’s essence (Feuerbach), but man’s essence (material needs; social production) that determines religion. The same for politics, morality, law, etc.
The material world is the product of man’s production to fulfil his needs; through acting in and on the world, man determines the world. Then, consciousness arises of these changes, and this then influences man’s future acting. Starting a continuous cycle of change, in which man is shaping his world and vice versa. This is the true meaning of not interpreting the world, but change it: Revolution is possible once we acknowledge that man determines his own world and that acting, in community (preferably international), is the key to change. This can only be understand by first understanding Hegel’s philosophy and Marx’s criticisms.
The second fatal arrow that Marx aims at contemporary philosophy and science is pointing at another subversion. The political economists (Smith, Riccardo, and their followers) claimed that capitalism – the division of labour and the separation of production and property (i.e. appropriation) – is the fundamental part that underlies historical development in social and political spheres. What this means, in effect, is that the existence of a capitalist class, a middle class of merchants, traders and middle men, and a lower class of proletarians – the class relations, which are a product of social production – are a characteristic of economics. But with claiming this, Smith & co. project their contemporary (English) civil society onto history.
It’s simply untrue that capitalism is the mechanism of social development: capitalism is itself the end product of historical development – earlier epochs in which civil society didn’t exist, class relations were different, and economic mechanism worked in other ways. For example, the Roman Empire was not a capitalist society, and the feudal states that supplanted it in Western Europe weren’t either. Marx calls Smith, Riccardo and co. bourgeois economists, and it’s easy to see why: they project their bourgeois ideals on science and history.
But then, what is Marx’s alternative to idealism & political economics? Since man is born with material needs; these needs lead to the need for increasing production; man’s production leads to social relationships; and this all leads to consciousness of Nature (as a means to produce); it follows that man’s actions determine the world and ideas follow suit. Materialism, the stance that not ideas (subject) but man and nature (object) determine reality, is Marx’s alternative to German Idealism. I think we can grant him his victory over Hegel & co. Idealism is a dead-end, materialism (i.e. science) has been much more successful in understanding & shaping our world.
Marx’s alternative to political economics is slightly lengthier. Man in nature originally started, not as Rousseau’s solitary Man, but as member of a family. Over time, multiple families flocked together for reasons of safety and survival. In this tribal life, property is communal property.
Then, when agriculture became possible, and tribes started to settle in increasing villages, towns and cities, property couldn’t be communal anymore. With increasing population and increase of productivity, division of labour – which is already inherent in the family-structure – started to change, and hence change the nature of property. If I produce, and you don’t, but you claim some of my produce, why should I give it to you? You’re just a parasite on the community. Hence, the concept private property is introduced.
Also, with the increase of the community (especially in cities), and the tendency of the individual to look after his or her own interests, the general interests become too important for the survival of the whole. Hence, the need for a central authority arises: the State is introduced. The State’s goal: primitive regulations as rules of conduct and tools for decision making in clashes between private and general interests.
This state of affair continues for some time, until feudal times. Private property tends to accumulate; the means of production (i.e. property) in such societies being primarily agriculture (i.e. land), and only secondarily tools and skills of artisans and merchants. Landed property and serfdom is the social relationship of such feudal societies – once again the class relationships are the product of the social production/division of labour.
Peasants start to flock to the towns, the people in the towns manufacturing and selling become afraid that their professions would degrade and form alliances to exclude everyone from their professions and only accept apprentices on the condition that these apprentices work for them for a long period. Guilds.
Soon, towns start to connect with each other – either in trade, military alliances or both – and this leads to the rise of merchants. The contradiction town-country now comes to include town-town. Then, later on, towns being included in states, states start to compete and trade with each other. We see here an ever-growing division of labour and trade network.
With the discovery of America, things started to speed up. Now the whole world gradually became connected, foreign lands became colonized, and the nature of current social production started to spread globally. This leads to competition and alliances between states for colonies and markets. It also leads to the rise of the merchant class, which makes increasing amounts of money as the oil in the machine: intercourse becomes increasingly important.
Ultimately, this pre-capitalist society comes to an end when demands outgrow production capacity. Why this is so, Marx explains by using the law of accumulation: competition leads to inequalities in property. Certain nations do better than others (see here Adam Smith’s magnum opus Wealth of Nations (1776) as an attempt to explain what makes a national prosperous – free trade, according to him), and the ones who end up with the most property become the main producers for the global market. By the eighteenth century, the United Kingdom started to dominate the world, which led to ever-increasing demand on their production (coal, iron, wood, clothes, spices, etc.).
This shortage in production capacity leads to scientific discoveries and technological inventions: now production can be magnified to an unheard-of scales. The industrial age kicks in. Industrialization is a new form of social production: in this type of society – with this form of intercourse, as Marx would say – the means of production are accumulated in the hands of the few, to be put to used by the property-less many. The property of the masses – labour – is appropriated by those having a monopoly on the means of production: production and property are now separated for good. Industrialization, as a mode of social production, spreads across the globe and with this determines the form of social intercourse all over the world.
This, in very brief outlines, is Marx’s take on historical development. According to him, all of history is nothing but the change of form of social production and hence change of form of intercourse. History is rife with class conflicts; each epoch has its own classes and division of labour; but the key idea here is that ever-increasing changes in production lead to ever-increasing divisions of labour, which lead to ever-increasing class warfare. The more division of labour increases, the more property is separated from production – those that produce do, in the end (i.e. the industrial epoch), not own any property; this is appropriated by those owning the means of production.
According to Marx, history is an unfolding of class struggle. In capitalism, this battle of the classes come to an end: the property-less masses become so numerous, and the wealth and culture of the lucky few so pompous and visible, that the system will collapse. Not only this, the whole world also becomes highly homogenous under capitalism: in the end, all capitalists, all bourgeois, and all proletarians, will be uniformed – the same class will be united to its brethren in all other nations. Therefore, it is highly necessary to connect the proletarians, the property-less- all over the world with each other.
This, in essence, is the content of part 1 (on Feuerbach) of Volume I of The German Ideology. It is the most interesting part of the book (from a 2018-perspective), since in this part are to be found the seeds of later historical events. Communism is nothing but the abolition of the social division of labour, or, in other words: the abolition of property. Once capitalist appropriation is stopped, by either scaring or killing the capitalists and the proletarians confiscating the means of production, the final stage of history has come. Now, all people will produce what they want, when they want, where they want, how they want, and in cooperation with whom they want. Of course, this is not how things turned out in post-1922 USSR or in post-1949 China. Reality doesn’t bend just because ideology demands it. Human nature as it is, Marx’s utopia where it’s “possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic”, simply is unreachable.
Nobody in his right mind would draw this implication from a philosophical refutation of idealism and the establishment of materialism. Only someone like Marx would. We see here, as so often throughout history, the rich intellectual proclaiming visions of a perfect future. If only we’d listen to him.
While Marx claimed that the process of alienation – the appropriation of the products by the capitalists – led to a feeling of loss and resentment on the part of the proletarians, it seems that Marx, although a bourgeois to his bones – was alienated himself, but then in a slightly different way. Marx, unlike Engels, remained the intellectual in his ivory tower for his entire life. All his talk about social justice, appropriation, alienation, the need for revolution – all this is empty talk. Marx never experienced having to work for 18 hours in a factory – a day, let alone decades. Marx never experienced the effects of poor living conditions, harsh working conditions and poverty on the mind. All he had to do was ask daddy Engels for some money and he could continue to spend days in libraries. Engels even stepped in when Marx fathered an illegitimate child by a house maid, and claimed that it was his child. Just like during his adolescent years, when his father stepped in to rescue him from some conflict or other. Marx simply was an irresponsible trouble maker.
Perhaps one appreciates Marx’s struggle on behalf of the destitute (and applauds him for this), it remains the case that he was extremely alienated from it all. Had Marx had some (more) real life experience, perhaps he would have been more cautious in his activist call to action. In this, Marx wasn’t so innocent at all: he actively promoted a Communist Revolution, saw this as the culmination of history and, to judge his writings, couldn’t wait for it to start. One only has to combine such a mentality with the mentality of someone like Lenin – who claimed that one shouldn’t shy away from breaking a few egg shells in order to bake an omelette – and the world suddenly becomes deterministic.
It is ironic that Marx refutes Hegel’s Idealism on the grounds that ideas are products of real life events, while his own ideas – of social revolution and the establishment of communism – determined real life events. Marx’s own theories prove Hegel’s notion of Ideas determining the World. Saint Karl was obviously too enthusiastic about his own utopian ideals to see the flaws in them.
The German Ideology, although only partly comprehensible, is still relevant today. It’s the best exposition of Marxism’s philosophical underpinnings, the clearest definition of the Communist programme (although still very vague), a decent introduction to German Idealism and a highly useful introduction to Marx’s later economic theories. Understand the main concepts in this book and you understand Marxism, especially its inherent flaws and dangers (exposed in a bright light).
Before continuing this review, I have to state that I only read the first part of Volume I of The German Ideology (besides reading some minor parts of Volume II). The reason is that the first 120 pages or so are easy to follow, since Marx develops his own thoughts and barely mentions the ideas of Feuerbach – who is supposed to be the focus of this first part – and where he does, he usually explains Feuerbach’s position in a clear & concise way. The problems start when Marx enters upon the discussion of the Idealism of Bauer and especially Stirner (whose part takes up almost half the book!).
One has to be intimately familiar with the philosophies of Bauer and Stirner, since Marx sets out to meticulously & scrupulously refute the ideas involved. And not only this, he does this in a very cynical and sarcastic tone of voice. For instance, after dealing with Feuerbach – who seems to have earned the respect of Marx and to deserve a fair treatment, Marx presents a short interlude. In this interlude, he tells us how two clerics (Bauer and Stirner) have called a council to refute the gnostic viewpoint of a heretic (Feuerbach) as well as some rebels (Hess and others). Saint Bruno and Saint Max, Marx continues to calls them throughout Volume I.
After this short interlude, Saint Bruno gets a beating, and when he’s down and out, it’s time for the main events: Marx versus Saint Max. It is impossible to follow Marx’s tirade against both Saints without being thoroughly familiar with their papal bulls ( to continue Marx’s metaphor). Marx endlessly quotes these two idealists and then refutes them (or so he claims) on the finest points.
Nevertheless, the main ideas of The German Ideology are easy to grasp; beautiful in their nature and originality; harsh in their criticisms; and indispensable for a true understanding of Marx’s materialism. They are also easy to summarize:
Hegel claimed that World History is the development, in dialectical fashion, of Ideas. The subject, the consciousness, grasps the world through ideas. These ideas determine the world (very Kantian, although in a perverted fashion). All that exists is Ideas. And Consciousness comes to a true and full understanding of itself, Self-Consciousness, through this dialectical process. To understand World History, one has only to trace the history of Ideas. Hegel developed these obscure notions into an all-encompassing philosophical system, and taught this for years at the University of Berlin. When he died, his followers, the Young Hegelians, developed Hegel’s philosophy in their own ways. Marx originally was part of this group, but later on came to regard Idealism as futile and empty.
Now, in The German Ideology, Marx explains why. In Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Marx claimed: “Philosophers have hitherto tried to interpret the world in various ways, the point, however, is to change it.” His materialism, and its offshoot political programme Communism, was activism – change the world, not interpret it. This can be seen in his many later works, in which he predicted the downfall of capitalism and the need for Communist Revolutions and the creation of a Communist paradise, where each will get what he needs and desires. Alas, the meaning of changing, instead interpreting, the world goes much deeper and is directly linked to Hegel’s Idealism.
Hegel and the Young Hegelians (Feuerbach, Bauer, Stirner and others), claimed that reality is nothing but consciousness: the subject determines the object. This in itself is rooted in Kant, who tried the ‘subject determines object’ as prophylactic for his headaches on the incompatibility of Newton’s mechanics and Descartes’ rationalism. Science (and empiricism à la Locke and Hume) claimed that the object determines the subject (i.e. the objective reality is experienced by conscious beings), while the rationalists claimed that the object doesn’t exist without the subject (i.e. the conscious being constitutes the world, hence no chair if I’m not looking). David Hume became sceptical and claimed that this dilemma is unresolvable, we should just become sceptics and get on with life. Kant defeated Hume’s radical scepticism, or so he thought, by claiming that empiricism and rationalism are both right: the object is perceived by the subject, but at the same time the subject constitutes the object. Since the subject is a limited conscious being, the object can only be known superficially, the object as it is in itself is un-knowable. Kant, in short, resolved the dilemma by positing a whole new world, behind the world as we perceive – how is that for a fancy trashcan, in which to drop nasty questions?
Anyways, Hegel came on the scene and radicalized Kant: the subject, consciousness, is all there is. The objects are determined by the subject, by thinking or perceiving them. In other words: the material world is determined by consciousness. But this, then, leads immediately to the strangest of implications: the Ego is all there is. And history, the development of the material world, since the material world is determined by the consciousness perceiving it, is nothing but the history of ideas. Study the ideas and you understand the world. Forget about the rest.
Marx sees the flaw in this philosophical system and goes in for the kill. Ideas are abstract notions of material objects. E.g. Feuerbach’s Man is nothing but the generalization of many individuals, a general concept of mankind. The selection of individuals – their epoch, class, society & culture – determines the notion. Hence, philosophers project their idealization of certain concepts, like Man, onto the world as a whole and back in time. When Adam Smith and David Ricardo talk about how civil society is the pivot in economics they project their own epoch onto history, which leads to subversion of truth.
Marx’s criticism shoots two fatal arrows at Idealism. First, the abstractions that philosophers use to understand the world, lure them into the misguided idea that Ideas are the building blocks of science, while the Ideas are nothing but the end result of very material, earthly processes. According to Marx, when man stumbled on the scene (a brute fact), he immediately started to produce (i.e. pluck from Nature what he needed), since man came with immediate needs: (1) the need to produce the means of subsistence (food, drink, clothes, shelter), (2) the need to produce more than before, since (3) the need for reproduction increased population size, and (4) social relationships/intercourse within groups. It is only after these four needs are fulfilled, that consciousness kicks in: reflection comes after having something to reflect on (!) and the means to communicate your thoughts. Philosophers subvert the truth when they claim that consciousness determines the world; it’s not religion that determines man’s essence (Feuerbach), but man’s essence (material needs; social production) that determines religion. The same for politics, morality, law, etc.
The material world is the product of man’s production to fulfil his needs; through acting in and on the world, man determines the world. Then, consciousness arises of these changes, and this then influences man’s future acting. Starting a continuous cycle of change, in which man is shaping his world and vice versa. This is the true meaning of not interpreting the world, but change it: Revolution is possible once we acknowledge that man determines his own world and that acting, in community (preferably international), is the key to change. This can only be understand by first understanding Hegel’s philosophy and Marx’s criticisms.
The second fatal arrow that Marx aims at contemporary philosophy and science is pointing at another subversion. The political economists (Smith, Riccardo, and their followers) claimed that capitalism – the division of labour and the separation of production and property (i.e. appropriation) – is the fundamental part that underlies historical development in social and political spheres. What this means, in effect, is that the existence of a capitalist class, a middle class of merchants, traders and middle men, and a lower class of proletarians – the class relations, which are a product of social production – are a characteristic of economics. But with claiming this, Smith & co. project their contemporary (English) civil society onto history.
It’s simply untrue that capitalism is the mechanism of social development: capitalism is itself the end product of historical development – earlier epochs in which civil society didn’t exist, class relations were different, and economic mechanism worked in other ways. For example, the Roman Empire was not a capitalist society, and the feudal states that supplanted it in Western Europe weren’t either. Marx calls Smith, Riccardo and co. bourgeois economists, and it’s easy to see why: they project their bourgeois ideals on science and history.
But then, what is Marx’s alternative to idealism & political economics? Since man is born with material needs; these needs lead to the need for increasing production; man’s production leads to social relationships; and this all leads to consciousness of Nature (as a means to produce); it follows that man’s actions determine the world and ideas follow suit. Materialism, the stance that not ideas (subject) but man and nature (object) determine reality, is Marx’s alternative to German Idealism. I think we can grant him his victory over Hegel & co. Idealism is a dead-end, materialism (i.e. science) has been much more successful in understanding & shaping our world.
Marx’s alternative to political economics is slightly lengthier. Man in nature originally started, not as Rousseau’s solitary Man, but as member of a family. Over time, multiple families flocked together for reasons of safety and survival. In this tribal life, property is communal property.
Then, when agriculture became possible, and tribes started to settle in increasing villages, towns and cities, property couldn’t be communal anymore. With increasing population and increase of productivity, division of labour – which is already inherent in the family-structure – started to change, and hence change the nature of property. If I produce, and you don’t, but you claim some of my produce, why should I give it to you? You’re just a parasite on the community. Hence, the concept private property is introduced.
Also, with the increase of the community (especially in cities), and the tendency of the individual to look after his or her own interests, the general interests become too important for the survival of the whole. Hence, the need for a central authority arises: the State is introduced. The State’s goal: primitive regulations as rules of conduct and tools for decision making in clashes between private and general interests.
This state of affair continues for some time, until feudal times. Private property tends to accumulate; the means of production (i.e. property) in such societies being primarily agriculture (i.e. land), and only secondarily tools and skills of artisans and merchants. Landed property and serfdom is the social relationship of such feudal societies – once again the class relationships are the product of the social production/division of labour.
Peasants start to flock to the towns, the people in the towns manufacturing and selling become afraid that their professions would degrade and form alliances to exclude everyone from their professions and only accept apprentices on the condition that these apprentices work for them for a long period. Guilds.
Soon, towns start to connect with each other – either in trade, military alliances or both – and this leads to the rise of merchants. The contradiction town-country now comes to include town-town. Then, later on, towns being included in states, states start to compete and trade with each other. We see here an ever-growing division of labour and trade network.
With the discovery of America, things started to speed up. Now the whole world gradually became connected, foreign lands became colonized, and the nature of current social production started to spread globally. This leads to competition and alliances between states for colonies and markets. It also leads to the rise of the merchant class, which makes increasing amounts of money as the oil in the machine: intercourse becomes increasingly important.
Ultimately, this pre-capitalist society comes to an end when demands outgrow production capacity. Why this is so, Marx explains by using the law of accumulation: competition leads to inequalities in property. Certain nations do better than others (see here Adam Smith’s magnum opus Wealth of Nations (1776) as an attempt to explain what makes a national prosperous – free trade, according to him), and the ones who end up with the most property become the main producers for the global market. By the eighteenth century, the United Kingdom started to dominate the world, which led to ever-increasing demand on their production (coal, iron, wood, clothes, spices, etc.).
This shortage in production capacity leads to scientific discoveries and technological inventions: now production can be magnified to an unheard-of scales. The industrial age kicks in. Industrialization is a new form of social production: in this type of society – with this form of intercourse, as Marx would say – the means of production are accumulated in the hands of the few, to be put to used by the property-less many. The property of the masses – labour – is appropriated by those having a monopoly on the means of production: production and property are now separated for good. Industrialization, as a mode of social production, spreads across the globe and with this determines the form of social intercourse all over the world.
This, in very brief outlines, is Marx’s take on historical development. According to him, all of history is nothing but the change of form of social production and hence change of form of intercourse. History is rife with class conflicts; each epoch has its own classes and division of labour; but the key idea here is that ever-increasing changes in production lead to ever-increasing divisions of labour, which lead to ever-increasing class warfare. The more division of labour increases, the more property is separated from production – those that produce do, in the end (i.e. the industrial epoch), not own any property; this is appropriated by those owning the means of production.
According to Marx, history is an unfolding of class struggle. In capitalism, this battle of the classes come to an end: the property-less masses become so numerous, and the wealth and culture of the lucky few so pompous and visible, that the system will collapse. Not only this, the whole world also becomes highly homogenous under capitalism: in the end, all capitalists, all bourgeois, and all proletarians, will be uniformed – the same class will be united to its brethren in all other nations. Therefore, it is highly necessary to connect the proletarians, the property-less- all over the world with each other.
This, in essence, is the content of part 1 (on Feuerbach) of Volume I of The German Ideology. It is the most interesting part of the book (from a 2018-perspective), since in this part are to be found the seeds of later historical events. Communism is nothing but the abolition of the social division of labour, or, in other words: the abolition of property. Once capitalist appropriation is stopped, by either scaring or killing the capitalists and the proletarians confiscating the means of production, the final stage of history has come. Now, all people will produce what they want, when they want, where they want, how they want, and in cooperation with whom they want. Of course, this is not how things turned out in post-1922 USSR or in post-1949 China. Reality doesn’t bend just because ideology demands it. Human nature as it is, Marx’s utopia where it’s “possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic”, simply is unreachable.
Nobody in his right mind would draw this implication from a philosophical refutation of idealism and the establishment of materialism. Only someone like Marx would. We see here, as so often throughout history, the rich intellectual proclaiming visions of a perfect future. If only we’d listen to him.
While Marx claimed that the process of alienation – the appropriation of the products by the capitalists – led to a feeling of loss and resentment on the part of the proletarians, it seems that Marx, although a bourgeois to his bones – was alienated himself, but then in a slightly different way. Marx, unlike Engels, remained the intellectual in his ivory tower for his entire life. All his talk about social justice, appropriation, alienation, the need for revolution – all this is empty talk. Marx never experienced having to work for 18 hours in a factory – a day, let alone decades. Marx never experienced the effects of poor living conditions, harsh working conditions and poverty on the mind. All he had to do was ask daddy Engels for some money and he could continue to spend days in libraries. Engels even stepped in when Marx fathered an illegitimate child by a house maid, and claimed that it was his child. Just like during his adolescent years, when his father stepped in to rescue him from some conflict or other. Marx simply was an irresponsible trouble maker.
Perhaps one appreciates Marx’s struggle on behalf of the destitute (and applauds him for this), it remains the case that he was extremely alienated from it all. Had Marx had some (more) real life experience, perhaps he would have been more cautious in his activist call to action. In this, Marx wasn’t so innocent at all: he actively promoted a Communist Revolution, saw this as the culmination of history and, to judge his writings, couldn’t wait for it to start. One only has to combine such a mentality with the mentality of someone like Lenin – who claimed that one shouldn’t shy away from breaking a few egg shells in order to bake an omelette – and the world suddenly becomes deterministic.
It is ironic that Marx refutes Hegel’s Idealism on the grounds that ideas are products of real life events, while his own ideas – of social revolution and the establishment of communism – determined real life events. Marx’s own theories prove Hegel’s notion of Ideas determining the World. Saint Karl was obviously too enthusiastic about his own utopian ideals to see the flaws in them.
The German Ideology, although only partly comprehensible, is still relevant today. It’s the best exposition of Marxism’s philosophical underpinnings, the clearest definition of the Communist programme (although still very vague), a decent introduction to German Idealism and a highly useful introduction to Marx’s later economic theories. Understand the main concepts in this book and you understand Marxism, especially its inherent flaws and dangers (exposed in a bright light).
May 5, 2011
I have a soft spot for Marx...he has to be one of the most misread and misunderstood authors in history. I think this text, along with the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, really highlight the emphasis he placed on human consciousness and its intricate connection to the material world and mode of production which (alarmingly) conventional readings of Marx minimize, if not, completely ignore.
Read
September 10, 2015As many vaunted references as I've seen to The German Ideology, I've got to say, I simply couldn't get most of it. However, it's still a book of immense value. Let me explain.
Marx in this book is, while formulating his thought, bouncing off of, refuting, and satirizing the positions of a number of now largely forgotten German idealist thinkers (Feuerbach, Stirner, etc.) and their approaches, condemning them for engaging in Hegelian shell games rather than actually pursuing a real, world-changing political philosophy. The first two attacks are rather fun, but then the long slog begins in his diatribe against Stirner, which is about 250 pages too long, but then he brings it back with some more criticisms of criticisms of the French Revolution. It's not a casual read, and, really, for most of us who aren't German academics, a few excerpts are fine, but it is a game attempt at a philosophical house-cleaning. And, for the modern reader, it makes you realize how disappointed dear old Karl would be at the academic "Marxists" today who attempt to bombard his philosophy with similarly idealist tendencies.
Marx in this book is, while formulating his thought, bouncing off of, refuting, and satirizing the positions of a number of now largely forgotten German idealist thinkers (Feuerbach, Stirner, etc.) and their approaches, condemning them for engaging in Hegelian shell games rather than actually pursuing a real, world-changing political philosophy. The first two attacks are rather fun, but then the long slog begins in his diatribe against Stirner, which is about 250 pages too long, but then he brings it back with some more criticisms of criticisms of the French Revolution. It's not a casual read, and, really, for most of us who aren't German academics, a few excerpts are fine, but it is a game attempt at a philosophical house-cleaning. And, for the modern reader, it makes you realize how disappointed dear old Karl would be at the academic "Marxists" today who attempt to bombard his philosophy with similarly idealist tendencies.
July 24, 2010
I've been feeling like I don't read enough difficult books anymore, so The German Ideology was my crack at one. It is early Marx and Engels, in which they are first iterating their theories of materialism. One thing that has always struck me from the few times I've read Marx....I tend to think of Marxism as philosophy, and it is always interesting to see how much it was offered as science, a form I don't think ages well for it. One other thing....Marx weighs in one of the old questions here: Whether it is better to fight the system or transcend it. I think my own inclinations are more for the latter, which he assails as illusionary.
July 3, 2013
Those looking to garner a basic understanding of what precisely Marx and Engels meant by dialectical materialism must start here. The two authors were profoundly polemical, and like most polemics they are best understood in context. CJ Arthur's introduction provides that context in a way which is chronological and easy to understand.
Marx and Engels of course started out in the Young Hegelians. The starting point of their break with Hegel's philosophy came in their realization that Hegel's belief that the state gave citizens their meaning was actually upside down. This holds real material consequence, for if the conversation can just be left at the maintenance of a community before a state's machination it ignores the very real differences within that community. In other words, if primacy is not given to the economic base -- how people manage to survive, as well as create and procure the means to that survival -- then everything else just floats. The state cannot create community on its own out of some kind of ability to create consciousness of that community.
Arthur's intro goes further in a brief and succinct way: first through Marx writing on On the Jewish Question (equality before the law does not equal absolute equality or the liberation of human potential), the nature of contemporary political constitutions (the distinction between political rights and natural rights, understanding of "liberty" as predicated upon non-interference and therefore the actual separation of man rather than unification). He recounts how Marx insists that the conflict between actual material interests -- resolving them and placing actual equality on the same level as political equality -- requires a resolution between political power and social power. In short, civil society and the state becoming one. In turn, this ends the state's existence as a distinct entity from the masses.
But how will this resolution and merger be achieved? Arthur spends some time answering this question in a quick section summarizing the arguments of Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In the previous section, as Arthur points out, Marx never mentions the proletariat. Here, he points out that Marx argued the need for a class whose interests and needs are universal -- i.e. a class whose humanity has been totally stripped from them and therefore has interests in reclamation of that humanity. Only such a class, in civil society but not of civil society, can hope to set civil society and the state on a course toward resolution. Hence the proletariat.
Arthur then defines alienation -- a key part of understanding humanity's separation from its true nature and its relationship to both civil society and the state, and thus, a key part of Marxist dialectics. Says Arthur: "if one was to attempt a rough definition useful from the point of view of Marxian studies, one could say that alienation was a process whereby a subject suffers from dependence upon an apparently external agency that was originally its own product." This, in a nutshell, is what personifies the contradiction between labor and capital.
Arthur also takes us through various polemics with other philosophers -- Stirner, Bauer, the "true socialists." But from here, what we need to glean is that ideas are defined by conditions, not the other way round. And therefore, structures of rule and order and law and political power are not understood merely as personifications of ideas but as the results of actual material conditions. Unless one is looking to change those conditions then the ideas will be much less likely to change.
Now we are finally ready to move from CJ Arthur's introduction to Marx and Engels' actual pamphlet. The authors start by summarizing what the "German ideology" is actually composed of (Feuerbach, Stirner, Bauer, etc). This is best understood as a vague and incomplete pivot off of Hegel's philosophy itself, still very much a matter of how ideas change society rather than how material conditions shape those ideas:
And yet, if it is the job of the "enlightened" to lead the unenlightened out of the darkness, how do we know that the enlightened are actually enlightened? Marx and Engels are of course giving very much a cursory summary to the ideas of those they're polemicizing against (all of them can only generally be summed up as Young Hegelians) but he gets to the heart of the matter: who will educate the educators? How do we best understand where the ideas come from?
The authors take some time to go briefly through different productive relations of society, different class systems, examining how human beings have reproduced themselves, and the various forms of "ownership" that have therefore sprung from them. First the tribal society with only the most basic division of labor. Then the communal ownership of tribes that have coalesced into a city or town (due to agricultural innovations); slavery is the main force of production of the primitive surplus here, but it is still subject to a communal ownership and a ruling class whose main function is primarily defined by distribution rather than hoarding of the surplus.
From there, feudalism, rooted in the country more than the town productively speaking and therefore able to spread wider geographically. In the towns the counterpart to the feudal lord (though often antagonistic) was "corporative property," the feudal organization of trades. Agricultural and mercantile peasantry were the motor of production and therefore the way that humans reproduced themselves. Finally, to capitalism (where all means of production are firmly in the hands of the ruling class and all productive labor is performed by those with absolute lack of control over that labor) and to communism (where the contradiction is resolved).
Marx and Engels spend time going through this to highlight consciousness, how conceptions of ownership and relationships to ruling blocs, have followed in productive relations. Not the other way round. From there they speak of the "fundamental contradiction of history," namely that humans need to be able to reproduce themselves before history itself can be made, let alone forge the very conception of history. The notion of consciousness itself is predicated upon the very fact that humans must rely on each other to survive, must create a division of labor and begin understanding themselves as distinct from each other in order for the ideas of "individuals" and "community" to have any truck: "man's consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all."
The division of labor -- the parceling out of various kinds of tasks to others which you yourself are reliant upon -- is the seed of alienation. All notions of property are shaped in turn by this division. Simply shifting that conception of property so that we might be more enlightened with said property is not even close to sufficient for the implementation of communism, for resolving the rift between division and actual equality. The authors point out that communism isn't simply a "state of affairs" that might be understood into being, but an actual movement, i.e. the a real shift in relations brought about by another material force in history.
Seeing that consciousness arises out of productive forces, we can then understand where history as a distinct entity of human existence and temporal process begins to take root. Marx and Engels therefore move on to trace the understanding of history in the epoch of "civil society" -- the grand sum of all productive relations in bourgeois capitalism out of which the modern state arises. The way that separate spheres of existence continue to grow and interact with each other creates a sum totality (though this totality may be ever shifting, and usually is). Again, how powerful and quickly expanding these spheres may be is largely dependent on how much power the actual material and productive forces are behind it:
Everything else -- conceptions of morality, religion, philosophy, ethics -- springs from this material reality. How they change is dependent largely on how the relations and forces of production change. In other words, the motor of history is not mere ideas, but revolution itself. Great leaps forward come not from idealistic hand-wringing, but from the upheaval of conditions.
This is what allows dialectical materialism to be such a profoundly bottom-up philosophical and historical outlook. Those who see ideas as the motor of history invariably end up focusing on the ideas of those who are most likely to have their ideas spread wide in the first place: history's so-called "great men." It is interesting how much the Hegelians and their defenders held in common with the spin doctors of the '90s with their "end of history" rhetoric. For the Hegelians, because the state was the ultimate in granting meaning to the masses, because "great ideas" and "pure spirit" now had the platform they supposedly deserved, history had reached its ultimate epoch.
In their polemics against Feuerbach, Marx and Engels point out that Feuerbach himself considers himself a "communist," but that his sense of the term is warped. Feuerbach is no member of a revolutionary group seeking to overthrow the established order. Rather, for him it is a state of mind (or spirit in a more directly Hegelian sense). Again, this gets it upside down.
If the productive forces and division of labor are key shapers of ideology, then it follows that different relationships to that labor and its divisions would arise as productive forces evolve. And so Marx and Engels briefly lay out how the division between town and country under feudalism shaped consciousness. Small-scale manufacturing existed in the towns but was largely dominated by the guild system. Artisans dedicated to a certain craft derived their subsistence not through sale of their own products or exchange on the market (though there was a crude market starting to emerge) but through the patronage of guild masters and/or master craftsmen. Ergo their relationship was at once slavish but also much more dedicated and less alienated.
Come about the fifteenth century, the spread of nascent markets across various borders allowed for the implementation of more factory-like settings. Land enclosures were beginning around this time, and armies were releasing many of their soldiers. These were people without any land or place to root themselves, and thus had no choice but to sell their labor. The products they manufactured went elsewhere, with their existence dependent upon a wage. Conceptions of labor, their relationship to it, and conceptions of property, changed too. Skill and pride in work decreased, alienation increased and the notion of communal property began to fade.
When the colonies of the "new world" became considerable consumers and resources became necessary to maintain their economic viability, things shifted yet again. Whereas the forces of industrial capitalism first took significant root in England, the changes in trade dynamics forced other countries as well as England to adopt different attitudes toward tariffs, taxes, and industry itself:
Previous ideologies, religious ideas and moral notions (many of which were unique according to regional needs and custom) were tossed aside or drastically adapted in favor of what was quickly becoming a universal system and universal modes of production. So too was it with the concepts and notions regarding how property should be mediated by the state, or even whether it should be mediated by the state at all!
Marx and Engels point out that with the dying out of communal/tribal property parceled out by village elders and feudal property rooted in land and the control over it, the state begun to take a larger role in the maintenance of private (i.e. capitalist) property relations.
The bourgeois are no longer an estate, but a class, organized nationally not regionally (they have to be if they wish to stay relevant in the rise of global trade). They rely on the centralized state more, but in their patronage of it transform its mechanisms of taxation into the entity of state debt. Property relations are less to do with a direct thru-line between rulers and ruled, less about various distributions of what is ultimately a more communal form of property, but more one of "emancipating" property from communal hands into private hands. At least, this was the mechanism of the enclosures, the dispossession of peasants and casting them into the cities to sell their labor.
As a result, the state becomes, in the authors' words, "a separate entity, beside and outside civil society." Those places where the state is most up front about its existence as a way to enshrine property rights are probably the best developed bourgeois states say the authors.
In a certain respect (albeit a very vague respect) Hegel is correct in saying that the state and civil society are distinct entities, but gets it upside down; it is how civil society -- in particular the productive relations within that society -- is organized that determines what kind of property will be protected. The meaning is derived from these relations, not the other way round. Likewise the Proudhonist observation that "property is theft," while glib and catchy, fails to understand that the protection of private property itself is greatly derived from how all commodities (and thus all property) are produced.
If being determines consciousness, then institutions that embody a certain consciousness are themselves rooted in relations rather than just the sum of their ideological parts. Or as Marx and Engels put it: "Hence the illusions that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis -- on free will."
Classes -- as a component of civil society -- aren't merely a matter of consciousness, but rather a matter of when the material interests of a group of individuals start to be consciously pitted against those of another. It is a real material process of subsumption. It's part of what makes up the base (which allows for warring within classes too), and again, the superstructure is determined from there.
Capitalism, because of its reliance upon a comparatively large gulf of alienation, creates conditions in which people's personality is shaped by the external class forces working upon them. In pre-capitalist times, the authors point out, one's identification as a "nobleman" or "commoner" was much more interwoven into their identity. This is in contrast to the identification with a class, a working class in particular, which is the only class that can, for various reasons "universalize itself" and begin to speak for the abolition of classes.
But, because of this kind of alienation, this subsumption of individuality to class identity, there is what Marx and Engels refer to as an illusion of freedom. But the alienation of labor, the coalescing and hoarding of resources and means of production into the hands of bourgeoisie, in fact makes things less free for people.
As for the state, it has naturally been turned toward favoring the bourgeoisie. Though all individuals are equal before both it and the law, the class interests -- precisely because they aren't formally acknowledged in the law -- are performed again and again.
Marx and Engels then move on to talk about the communist outlook. All that seemed trans-historical or "natural" has its true nature exposed by dialectical materialism, and under a system of communism it would be consciously treated as such. With a universal class -- the proletariat -- at the helm of society, a unity of individuals itself is universalized.
In turn, notions of individuality and property will be reshaped, their full potential opened up deliberately. Accidental and anarchic forces created by class society and its requisite division of labor and alienation, will be purposefully reunified. All that seemed beyond the control of the individual will be brought back to their realm.
Backtracking a bit, we can see how this is possible by understanding that historical development is the reflection of changes in the economic and material relations of the base. What seems at one moment to be an advance over the old relations and means of production may years later become the fetters on history. Within this there is the relationship between the superstructure and base itself. Cracks at the base can become chasms in the superstructure, and often this opens up the possibility of real change at the base.
Again, this is a process that has hitherto in class society been something that came naturally from its contradictions rather than a conscious free association of individuals. There is very little "conscious" in it. It is another expression of the alienated rift between consciousness and historical forces; that which has been beyond our control shaping our ideas themselves.
This isn't to say that these contradictions haven't resulted in the masses entering onto the world stage, or that they haven't changed history. It is to say that largely they have been moved to do so by forces beyond their control, in an attempt to bridge the gap: "Thus all collisions in history have their origin... in the contradiction between the forces of production and the form of intercourse."
The next section is a brief detour into asking how conquest interrupts this relationship of social change. The answer is: not much. That which is taken in conquest eventually has to be put to use, some kind of production eventually has to take place. When the Germanics conquered Rome they overthrew the slave-holding system and replaced it with feudalism, but it was reliant upon the previous conditions.
It can be surmised (as Marx and Engels do) that in industrial capitalism, private property in its actual existing state is counterposed to labor. The productive forces are, for the first time in history, separated, alienated, from the mass of people. Self-activity is divorced from this mass, the proletariat, as is the simple ability to survive, unless they agree to enter into the setup on its own terms.
Alienation, sense of individual harmony (which Feuerbach and others seem to believe comes from simply changing the view of yourself in relation to inequality) only comes, as the authors say, from the mass laying their hands on the productive forces: "Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all... only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations."
Marx and Engels of course started out in the Young Hegelians. The starting point of their break with Hegel's philosophy came in their realization that Hegel's belief that the state gave citizens their meaning was actually upside down. This holds real material consequence, for if the conversation can just be left at the maintenance of a community before a state's machination it ignores the very real differences within that community. In other words, if primacy is not given to the economic base -- how people manage to survive, as well as create and procure the means to that survival -- then everything else just floats. The state cannot create community on its own out of some kind of ability to create consciousness of that community.
Arthur's intro goes further in a brief and succinct way: first through Marx writing on On the Jewish Question (equality before the law does not equal absolute equality or the liberation of human potential), the nature of contemporary political constitutions (the distinction between political rights and natural rights, understanding of "liberty" as predicated upon non-interference and therefore the actual separation of man rather than unification). He recounts how Marx insists that the conflict between actual material interests -- resolving them and placing actual equality on the same level as political equality -- requires a resolution between political power and social power. In short, civil society and the state becoming one. In turn, this ends the state's existence as a distinct entity from the masses.
But how will this resolution and merger be achieved? Arthur spends some time answering this question in a quick section summarizing the arguments of Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In the previous section, as Arthur points out, Marx never mentions the proletariat. Here, he points out that Marx argued the need for a class whose interests and needs are universal -- i.e. a class whose humanity has been totally stripped from them and therefore has interests in reclamation of that humanity. Only such a class, in civil society but not of civil society, can hope to set civil society and the state on a course toward resolution. Hence the proletariat.
Arthur then defines alienation -- a key part of understanding humanity's separation from its true nature and its relationship to both civil society and the state, and thus, a key part of Marxist dialectics. Says Arthur: "if one was to attempt a rough definition useful from the point of view of Marxian studies, one could say that alienation was a process whereby a subject suffers from dependence upon an apparently external agency that was originally its own product." This, in a nutshell, is what personifies the contradiction between labor and capital.
Arthur also takes us through various polemics with other philosophers -- Stirner, Bauer, the "true socialists." But from here, what we need to glean is that ideas are defined by conditions, not the other way round. And therefore, structures of rule and order and law and political power are not understood merely as personifications of ideas but as the results of actual material conditions. Unless one is looking to change those conditions then the ideas will be much less likely to change.
Now we are finally ready to move from CJ Arthur's introduction to Marx and Engels' actual pamphlet. The authors start by summarizing what the "German ideology" is actually composed of (Feuerbach, Stirner, Bauer, etc). This is best understood as a vague and incomplete pivot off of Hegel's philosophy itself, still very much a matter of how ideas change society rather than how material conditions shape those ideas:
Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men... it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness.
And yet, if it is the job of the "enlightened" to lead the unenlightened out of the darkness, how do we know that the enlightened are actually enlightened? Marx and Engels are of course giving very much a cursory summary to the ideas of those they're polemicizing against (all of them can only generally be summed up as Young Hegelians) but he gets to the heart of the matter: who will educate the educators? How do we best understand where the ideas come from?
The authors take some time to go briefly through different productive relations of society, different class systems, examining how human beings have reproduced themselves, and the various forms of "ownership" that have therefore sprung from them. First the tribal society with only the most basic division of labor. Then the communal ownership of tribes that have coalesced into a city or town (due to agricultural innovations); slavery is the main force of production of the primitive surplus here, but it is still subject to a communal ownership and a ruling class whose main function is primarily defined by distribution rather than hoarding of the surplus.
From there, feudalism, rooted in the country more than the town productively speaking and therefore able to spread wider geographically. In the towns the counterpart to the feudal lord (though often antagonistic) was "corporative property," the feudal organization of trades. Agricultural and mercantile peasantry were the motor of production and therefore the way that humans reproduced themselves. Finally, to capitalism (where all means of production are firmly in the hands of the ruling class and all productive labor is performed by those with absolute lack of control over that labor) and to communism (where the contradiction is resolved).
Marx and Engels spend time going through this to highlight consciousness, how conceptions of ownership and relationships to ruling blocs, have followed in productive relations. Not the other way round. From there they speak of the "fundamental contradiction of history," namely that humans need to be able to reproduce themselves before history itself can be made, let alone forge the very conception of history. The notion of consciousness itself is predicated upon the very fact that humans must rely on each other to survive, must create a division of labor and begin understanding themselves as distinct from each other in order for the ideas of "individuals" and "community" to have any truck: "man's consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all."
The division of labor -- the parceling out of various kinds of tasks to others which you yourself are reliant upon -- is the seed of alienation. All notions of property are shaped in turn by this division. Simply shifting that conception of property so that we might be more enlightened with said property is not even close to sufficient for the implementation of communism, for resolving the rift between division and actual equality. The authors point out that communism isn't simply a "state of affairs" that might be understood into being, but an actual movement, i.e. the a real shift in relations brought about by another material force in history.
Seeing that consciousness arises out of productive forces, we can then understand where history as a distinct entity of human existence and temporal process begins to take root. Marx and Engels therefore move on to trace the understanding of history in the epoch of "civil society" -- the grand sum of all productive relations in bourgeois capitalism out of which the modern state arises. The way that separate spheres of existence continue to grow and interact with each other creates a sum totality (though this totality may be ever shifting, and usually is). Again, how powerful and quickly expanding these spheres may be is largely dependent on how much power the actual material and productive forces are behind it:
This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the material production of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production (i.e. civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history...
Everything else -- conceptions of morality, religion, philosophy, ethics -- springs from this material reality. How they change is dependent largely on how the relations and forces of production change. In other words, the motor of history is not mere ideas, but revolution itself. Great leaps forward come not from idealistic hand-wringing, but from the upheaval of conditions.
This is what allows dialectical materialism to be such a profoundly bottom-up philosophical and historical outlook. Those who see ideas as the motor of history invariably end up focusing on the ideas of those who are most likely to have their ideas spread wide in the first place: history's so-called "great men." It is interesting how much the Hegelians and their defenders held in common with the spin doctors of the '90s with their "end of history" rhetoric. For the Hegelians, because the state was the ultimate in granting meaning to the masses, because "great ideas" and "pure spirit" now had the platform they supposedly deserved, history had reached its ultimate epoch.
In their polemics against Feuerbach, Marx and Engels point out that Feuerbach himself considers himself a "communist," but that his sense of the term is warped. Feuerbach is no member of a revolutionary group seeking to overthrow the established order. Rather, for him it is a state of mind (or spirit in a more directly Hegelian sense). Again, this gets it upside down.
If the productive forces and division of labor are key shapers of ideology, then it follows that different relationships to that labor and its divisions would arise as productive forces evolve. And so Marx and Engels briefly lay out how the division between town and country under feudalism shaped consciousness. Small-scale manufacturing existed in the towns but was largely dominated by the guild system. Artisans dedicated to a certain craft derived their subsistence not through sale of their own products or exchange on the market (though there was a crude market starting to emerge) but through the patronage of guild masters and/or master craftsmen. Ergo their relationship was at once slavish but also much more dedicated and less alienated.
Come about the fifteenth century, the spread of nascent markets across various borders allowed for the implementation of more factory-like settings. Land enclosures were beginning around this time, and armies were releasing many of their soldiers. These were people without any land or place to root themselves, and thus had no choice but to sell their labor. The products they manufactured went elsewhere, with their existence dependent upon a wage. Conceptions of labor, their relationship to it, and conceptions of property, changed too. Skill and pride in work decreased, alienation increased and the notion of communal property began to fade.
When the colonies of the "new world" became considerable consumers and resources became necessary to maintain their economic viability, things shifted yet again. Whereas the forces of industrial capitalism first took significant root in England, the changes in trade dynamics forced other countries as well as England to adopt different attitudes toward tariffs, taxes, and industry itself:
Competition soon compelled every country that wished to retain its historical role to retain its manufactures by renewed customs regulations (the old duties were no longer any good against big industry) and soon after to introduce big industry under protective duties.
Previous ideologies, religious ideas and moral notions (many of which were unique according to regional needs and custom) were tossed aside or drastically adapted in favor of what was quickly becoming a universal system and universal modes of production. So too was it with the concepts and notions regarding how property should be mediated by the state, or even whether it should be mediated by the state at all!
Marx and Engels point out that with the dying out of communal/tribal property parceled out by village elders and feudal property rooted in land and the control over it, the state begun to take a larger role in the maintenance of private (i.e. capitalist) property relations.
The bourgeois are no longer an estate, but a class, organized nationally not regionally (they have to be if they wish to stay relevant in the rise of global trade). They rely on the centralized state more, but in their patronage of it transform its mechanisms of taxation into the entity of state debt. Property relations are less to do with a direct thru-line between rulers and ruled, less about various distributions of what is ultimately a more communal form of property, but more one of "emancipating" property from communal hands into private hands. At least, this was the mechanism of the enclosures, the dispossession of peasants and casting them into the cities to sell their labor.
As a result, the state becomes, in the authors' words, "a separate entity, beside and outside civil society." Those places where the state is most up front about its existence as a way to enshrine property rights are probably the best developed bourgeois states say the authors.
In a certain respect (albeit a very vague respect) Hegel is correct in saying that the state and civil society are distinct entities, but gets it upside down; it is how civil society -- in particular the productive relations within that society -- is organized that determines what kind of property will be protected. The meaning is derived from these relations, not the other way round. Likewise the Proudhonist observation that "property is theft," while glib and catchy, fails to understand that the protection of private property itself is greatly derived from how all commodities (and thus all property) are produced.
If being determines consciousness, then institutions that embody a certain consciousness are themselves rooted in relations rather than just the sum of their ideological parts. Or as Marx and Engels put it: "Hence the illusions that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis -- on free will."
Classes -- as a component of civil society -- aren't merely a matter of consciousness, but rather a matter of when the material interests of a group of individuals start to be consciously pitted against those of another. It is a real material process of subsumption. It's part of what makes up the base (which allows for warring within classes too), and again, the superstructure is determined from there.
Capitalism, because of its reliance upon a comparatively large gulf of alienation, creates conditions in which people's personality is shaped by the external class forces working upon them. In pre-capitalist times, the authors point out, one's identification as a "nobleman" or "commoner" was much more interwoven into their identity. This is in contrast to the identification with a class, a working class in particular, which is the only class that can, for various reasons "universalize itself" and begin to speak for the abolition of classes.
But, because of this kind of alienation, this subsumption of individuality to class identity, there is what Marx and Engels refer to as an illusion of freedom. But the alienation of labor, the coalescing and hoarding of resources and means of production into the hands of bourgeoisie, in fact makes things less free for people.
As for the state, it has naturally been turned toward favoring the bourgeoisie. Though all individuals are equal before both it and the law, the class interests -- precisely because they aren't formally acknowledged in the law -- are performed again and again.
Marx and Engels then move on to talk about the communist outlook. All that seemed trans-historical or "natural" has its true nature exposed by dialectical materialism, and under a system of communism it would be consciously treated as such. With a universal class -- the proletariat -- at the helm of society, a unity of individuals itself is universalized.
In turn, notions of individuality and property will be reshaped, their full potential opened up deliberately. Accidental and anarchic forces created by class society and its requisite division of labor and alienation, will be purposefully reunified. All that seemed beyond the control of the individual will be brought back to their realm.
Backtracking a bit, we can see how this is possible by understanding that historical development is the reflection of changes in the economic and material relations of the base. What seems at one moment to be an advance over the old relations and means of production may years later become the fetters on history. Within this there is the relationship between the superstructure and base itself. Cracks at the base can become chasms in the superstructure, and often this opens up the possibility of real change at the base.
Again, this is a process that has hitherto in class society been something that came naturally from its contradictions rather than a conscious free association of individuals. There is very little "conscious" in it. It is another expression of the alienated rift between consciousness and historical forces; that which has been beyond our control shaping our ideas themselves.
This isn't to say that these contradictions haven't resulted in the masses entering onto the world stage, or that they haven't changed history. It is to say that largely they have been moved to do so by forces beyond their control, in an attempt to bridge the gap: "Thus all collisions in history have their origin... in the contradiction between the forces of production and the form of intercourse."
The next section is a brief detour into asking how conquest interrupts this relationship of social change. The answer is: not much. That which is taken in conquest eventually has to be put to use, some kind of production eventually has to take place. When the Germanics conquered Rome they overthrew the slave-holding system and replaced it with feudalism, but it was reliant upon the previous conditions.
It can be surmised (as Marx and Engels do) that in industrial capitalism, private property in its actual existing state is counterposed to labor. The productive forces are, for the first time in history, separated, alienated, from the mass of people. Self-activity is divorced from this mass, the proletariat, as is the simple ability to survive, unless they agree to enter into the setup on its own terms.
Alienation, sense of individual harmony (which Feuerbach and others seem to believe comes from simply changing the view of yourself in relation to inequality) only comes, as the authors say, from the mass laying their hands on the productive forces: "Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all... only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations."
April 23, 2021
A Ideologia Alemã é um manuscrito só publicado postumamente e, como quase todo texto nessas condições, é cheia de omissões e supressões.
As intuições que os autores desenvolvem não acrescentam muito à simples leitura das 11 Teses ‘Ad Feuerbach’, que, normalmente, aparecem como um anexo a este livro.
Se, segundo Feuerbach, o homem precisava, para construir uma ideia clara de si e para ser livre, substituir as suas representações religiosas por representações corretas da realidade intuitiva e sensível, Marx e Engels dizem que a própria consciência de si só é possível dentro de uma práxis revolucionária voltada a mudar o estado de coisas das forças produtivas, condicionantes das relações reais dos indivíduos entre si e da sua consciência.
Para destruir a Sagrada Família é preciso transformar a família humana real.
As Teses ‘Ad Feuerbach’ deveriam ser gritadas dos telhados.
Surgiram como um simples esboço para futuros textos. Um fichamento. Eram a ‘Review’ de Marx ao “A Essência do Cristianismo”.
Mas naquelas poucas linhas está gravado, para a posteridade, o esquema da mentalidade revolucionária.
É preciso transformar o mundo e não procurar entendê-lo, como “os filósofos” fizeram, porque a vida humana só tem sentido na práxis revolucionária. Todo o resto é absurdo, alienação insuportável, opressão sem fim. Por isso a terrível pressa de mudança.
Acédia revolucionária! Inquietação do espírito que chutou as tradições sapienciais e se jogou no torvelinho da história disposto a tudo, menos a lidar com a própria solidão, o próprio silêncio.
As intuições que os autores desenvolvem não acrescentam muito à simples leitura das 11 Teses ‘Ad Feuerbach’, que, normalmente, aparecem como um anexo a este livro.
Se, segundo Feuerbach, o homem precisava, para construir uma ideia clara de si e para ser livre, substituir as suas representações religiosas por representações corretas da realidade intuitiva e sensível, Marx e Engels dizem que a própria consciência de si só é possível dentro de uma práxis revolucionária voltada a mudar o estado de coisas das forças produtivas, condicionantes das relações reais dos indivíduos entre si e da sua consciência.
Para destruir a Sagrada Família é preciso transformar a família humana real.
As Teses ‘Ad Feuerbach’ deveriam ser gritadas dos telhados.
Surgiram como um simples esboço para futuros textos. Um fichamento. Eram a ‘Review’ de Marx ao “A Essência do Cristianismo”.
Mas naquelas poucas linhas está gravado, para a posteridade, o esquema da mentalidade revolucionária.
É preciso transformar o mundo e não procurar entendê-lo, como “os filósofos” fizeram, porque a vida humana só tem sentido na práxis revolucionária. Todo o resto é absurdo, alienação insuportável, opressão sem fim. Por isso a terrível pressa de mudança.
Acédia revolucionária! Inquietação do espírito que chutou as tradições sapienciais e se jogou no torvelinho da história disposto a tudo, menos a lidar com a própria solidão, o próprio silêncio.
April 1, 2021
Volume 5 of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Collected Works, International Publishers ISBN 0-7178-0505-0 (v.5) is a nicely produced and annotated edition of the complete German Ideologies and one of the few that include the full discussion of Max Stirner’s The Ego and His Own. Although I wanted to find this for years it has been ludicrously expensive on the net until a recent price drop.
Incidentally I think it is desirable to read The Holy Family before this book.
The book was written in 1845 [though not published until 1923] by two ambitious and still young German intellectuals, exasperated by the contrast between exciting developments in France, England and the United States in the capitalist economies and in the political awakening of the proletariat, alongside the dismally parochial character of a backward German bourgeoisie and an idealist national philosophy dominating German academic and political life; even German socialists were hopelessly enmeshed in idealism. Sadly, Germany was where they lived. They present a stark contrast, then, between practical political engagement with a communist ideology based on a realistic analysis of material conditions, which of course they advocate, compared with an entirely academic idealist philosophy detached from political activism and far removed from material reality.
To their credit, the two mavericks set out an ambitious and coherent materialist model of social history which some modern day historians continue to find a useful framework for research and others, who challenge it, still take very seriously. In their commentary on writers with whom they disagree, Marx and Engels periodically take time out to offer well-argued alternatives, displaying in the process a high level of erudition.
It is especially interesting to observe that many of the ideas which are described today as Marxist they do not claim as their own, but attribute to others, giving a clear impression that the basic framework of communist ideology was already very much in place, perhaps especially in France, and already had a long tradition. One example is from p461, where they list as English communists “Thomas More, the Levellers, Owen, Thompson, Watts, Holyoake, Harney, Morgan, Southwell, Goodwyn Barmby, Edmonds, Hobson, Spence…” In many places they describe communism in terms of a well-established set of principles and they are scornful of German idealists who lack familiarity with the communist model.
Having said that, they seem to me to evade the distinction between a solidly empirical, materialist analysis of history and contemporary social and economic life on the one hand, and on the other hand speculation about the future of humanity under communism which is potentially no less moral and imaginative than the idealist philosophies they attack. Obviously I can see the value of well grounded predictions based on well supported theories about society and human nature but one cannot claim the level of certainty that Marx and Engels sometimes appear to do.
The Ideologies set out arguments against a range of German Idealists, the final hundred pages or so concerning self style socialists, but the most lengthy and detailed discussion is an analysis of Max Stirner’s book, which in this edition of the German Ideologies covers 336 pages out of 584 of actual text. This material is normally omitted from English language editions and I have seen a few arguments for this. One is that Stirner is of only historical interest and only a minor writer, who just happened to cause a brief sensation at the time when Marx and Engels were writing the Ideologies. Another is that the Ideologies provide such a comprehensive demolition of every aspect of Stirner’s book that it no longer retains a shred of credibility or interest. I disagree with both of these assertions. I also read sometimes that this material exemplifies Marx and Engels being undisciplined and tedious in a typical example of their awful style. I think this has some validity but only if one is not interested in the subject; in fairness, they are analysing a book of considerable length and ambition which is, in itself, frequently tedious, rambling and repetitive and if one is interested in Stirner then one is interested in this detailed analysis. Even so, the sarcastic and often insulting tone of their critique, including ponderous humour at the expense of someone they obviously despise as a mere school teacher, does wreck many passages where a simple statement of the arguments would have been more effective. Reading this can be a bit too much like picking the bones out of a fish.
Marx and Engels helpfully track down the sources, especially in Hegel’s Logik, for many of Stirner’s key ideas, but only to cackle repeatedly that Stirner’s ideas are unoriginal. Since Stirner was indeed German and since German philosophy at this time was indeed dominated by Idealism and particularly the Neo Hegelians, it is not entirely exceptional that he developed his ideas and wrote his book within that cultural context, not only borrowing from and emulating his models but also engaging in a debate with them on their terms. Arguably the reason his book had such a huge impact when published was precisely because it was written in that manner for that audience.
Marx and Engels were never going to be Stirner’s ideal reader. Everything they despised in German Idealism of this time was present in its most glaring form in Stirner’s book. Their complaints were well founded. They advocated a realist, materialist approach to both history and social analysis in opposition to the cavalier manner in which Stirner, for example (but emulating Hegel and behaving in line with the practice of other German Idealists, as explained at length in the Ideologies) simply made stuff up to provide a narrative for theories lacking any better foundation. From their point of view, and probably from that of a 21st Century reader, Stirner’s book was exposed to the most severe debunking.
However, careful reading of their arguments against Stirner does not leave this reader convinced that they are always arguing in good faith. They misrepresent at least some important aspects of Stirner’s writing, they sometimes clearly misread the text as it stands on the page, and they are not really honest either about their own position in opposition to his. At best, the Ideologies goes much too far and is often careless. Who, after all, has the patience to systematically challenge a book length critique of another lengthy and disjointed book?
One particular argument stands out to my mind. Stirner argues that one does not have to become an egoist but rather become conscious that one is already an egoist. Marx and Engels quote him writing: “It is your nature to be” egoists, and “Precisely because you are that already, you have no need to become so”. Marx and Engels respond as follow:
“Here again Stirner exploits the old philosophical device to which we shall return later. The philosopher does not say directly: You are not people. [He says] You have always been people, but you were not conscious of what you were, and for that very reason you were not in reality True people. Therefore your appearance was not appropriate to your essence. You were people and you were not people… This entire separation of consciousness from the individuals who are its basis and from their actual conditions, this notion that the egoist of present day bourgeois society does not possess the consciousness corresponding to his egoism, is merely an old philosophical fad that [Stirner] here credulously accepts and copies. [*This fad becomes more ridiculous in history where the consciousness of a later epoch regarding an earlier epoch naturally differs from the consciousness the latter has of itself, e.g. the Greeks saw themselves through the eyes of the Greeks and not as we see them now; to blame them for not seeing themselves with our eyes – that is “not being conscious of themselves as they really were” – amounts to blaming them for being Greeks.]” p250 [*including a footnote]
Marx is surely not referring to the same “old philosophical device” behind concepts of “class consciousness” and even false consciousness, on which so much Marxist theory hangs. Certainly, the Ideologies repeatedly bemoans Stirner’s failure to adopt a materialist approach to history and society, his failure to be a communist or a Marxist, his insistence on approaching every topic within the framework of the Idealist philosophers, borrowing heavily from Hegel and his successors. But is not that exactly the problem? Marx is attacking Stirner for being Stirner. Stirner’s book is over ambitious and tackles many topics in which it is not only doomed to fail but also offers countless opportunities to demonstrate the superiority of Marx and Engels’ materialist philosophy. Having said that, Stirner’s central concern is to liberate the unique individual from being suffocated by ideology and his contribution is not fairly presented by Marx and Engels. They do answer him, mainly towards the end of their critique, but by no means do they destroy him. In some respects, I suggest it is possible and desirable to see Stirner as an opponent of the very idealism in which he is soaked, struggling towards a rebuttal of its approach, and suggesting alternative values that are compatible with a materialist philosophy.
Nor is the general debate between a materialist and an idealist philosophy without relevance to the 21st century, and especially the huge influence of cultural studies and “post Marxist” thinking. This conversation is not over and I suggest it is as important today as in 1845.
Incidentally I think it is desirable to read The Holy Family before this book.
The book was written in 1845 [though not published until 1923] by two ambitious and still young German intellectuals, exasperated by the contrast between exciting developments in France, England and the United States in the capitalist economies and in the political awakening of the proletariat, alongside the dismally parochial character of a backward German bourgeoisie and an idealist national philosophy dominating German academic and political life; even German socialists were hopelessly enmeshed in idealism. Sadly, Germany was where they lived. They present a stark contrast, then, between practical political engagement with a communist ideology based on a realistic analysis of material conditions, which of course they advocate, compared with an entirely academic idealist philosophy detached from political activism and far removed from material reality.
To their credit, the two mavericks set out an ambitious and coherent materialist model of social history which some modern day historians continue to find a useful framework for research and others, who challenge it, still take very seriously. In their commentary on writers with whom they disagree, Marx and Engels periodically take time out to offer well-argued alternatives, displaying in the process a high level of erudition.
It is especially interesting to observe that many of the ideas which are described today as Marxist they do not claim as their own, but attribute to others, giving a clear impression that the basic framework of communist ideology was already very much in place, perhaps especially in France, and already had a long tradition. One example is from p461, where they list as English communists “Thomas More, the Levellers, Owen, Thompson, Watts, Holyoake, Harney, Morgan, Southwell, Goodwyn Barmby, Edmonds, Hobson, Spence…” In many places they describe communism in terms of a well-established set of principles and they are scornful of German idealists who lack familiarity with the communist model.
Having said that, they seem to me to evade the distinction between a solidly empirical, materialist analysis of history and contemporary social and economic life on the one hand, and on the other hand speculation about the future of humanity under communism which is potentially no less moral and imaginative than the idealist philosophies they attack. Obviously I can see the value of well grounded predictions based on well supported theories about society and human nature but one cannot claim the level of certainty that Marx and Engels sometimes appear to do.
The Ideologies set out arguments against a range of German Idealists, the final hundred pages or so concerning self style socialists, but the most lengthy and detailed discussion is an analysis of Max Stirner’s book, which in this edition of the German Ideologies covers 336 pages out of 584 of actual text. This material is normally omitted from English language editions and I have seen a few arguments for this. One is that Stirner is of only historical interest and only a minor writer, who just happened to cause a brief sensation at the time when Marx and Engels were writing the Ideologies. Another is that the Ideologies provide such a comprehensive demolition of every aspect of Stirner’s book that it no longer retains a shred of credibility or interest. I disagree with both of these assertions. I also read sometimes that this material exemplifies Marx and Engels being undisciplined and tedious in a typical example of their awful style. I think this has some validity but only if one is not interested in the subject; in fairness, they are analysing a book of considerable length and ambition which is, in itself, frequently tedious, rambling and repetitive and if one is interested in Stirner then one is interested in this detailed analysis. Even so, the sarcastic and often insulting tone of their critique, including ponderous humour at the expense of someone they obviously despise as a mere school teacher, does wreck many passages where a simple statement of the arguments would have been more effective. Reading this can be a bit too much like picking the bones out of a fish.
Marx and Engels helpfully track down the sources, especially in Hegel’s Logik, for many of Stirner’s key ideas, but only to cackle repeatedly that Stirner’s ideas are unoriginal. Since Stirner was indeed German and since German philosophy at this time was indeed dominated by Idealism and particularly the Neo Hegelians, it is not entirely exceptional that he developed his ideas and wrote his book within that cultural context, not only borrowing from and emulating his models but also engaging in a debate with them on their terms. Arguably the reason his book had such a huge impact when published was precisely because it was written in that manner for that audience.
Marx and Engels were never going to be Stirner’s ideal reader. Everything they despised in German Idealism of this time was present in its most glaring form in Stirner’s book. Their complaints were well founded. They advocated a realist, materialist approach to both history and social analysis in opposition to the cavalier manner in which Stirner, for example (but emulating Hegel and behaving in line with the practice of other German Idealists, as explained at length in the Ideologies) simply made stuff up to provide a narrative for theories lacking any better foundation. From their point of view, and probably from that of a 21st Century reader, Stirner’s book was exposed to the most severe debunking.
However, careful reading of their arguments against Stirner does not leave this reader convinced that they are always arguing in good faith. They misrepresent at least some important aspects of Stirner’s writing, they sometimes clearly misread the text as it stands on the page, and they are not really honest either about their own position in opposition to his. At best, the Ideologies goes much too far and is often careless. Who, after all, has the patience to systematically challenge a book length critique of another lengthy and disjointed book?
One particular argument stands out to my mind. Stirner argues that one does not have to become an egoist but rather become conscious that one is already an egoist. Marx and Engels quote him writing: “It is your nature to be” egoists, and “Precisely because you are that already, you have no need to become so”. Marx and Engels respond as follow:
“Here again Stirner exploits the old philosophical device to which we shall return later. The philosopher does not say directly: You are not people. [He says] You have always been people, but you were not conscious of what you were, and for that very reason you were not in reality True people. Therefore your appearance was not appropriate to your essence. You were people and you were not people… This entire separation of consciousness from the individuals who are its basis and from their actual conditions, this notion that the egoist of present day bourgeois society does not possess the consciousness corresponding to his egoism, is merely an old philosophical fad that [Stirner] here credulously accepts and copies. [*This fad becomes more ridiculous in history where the consciousness of a later epoch regarding an earlier epoch naturally differs from the consciousness the latter has of itself, e.g. the Greeks saw themselves through the eyes of the Greeks and not as we see them now; to blame them for not seeing themselves with our eyes – that is “not being conscious of themselves as they really were” – amounts to blaming them for being Greeks.]” p250 [*including a footnote]
Marx is surely not referring to the same “old philosophical device” behind concepts of “class consciousness” and even false consciousness, on which so much Marxist theory hangs. Certainly, the Ideologies repeatedly bemoans Stirner’s failure to adopt a materialist approach to history and society, his failure to be a communist or a Marxist, his insistence on approaching every topic within the framework of the Idealist philosophers, borrowing heavily from Hegel and his successors. But is not that exactly the problem? Marx is attacking Stirner for being Stirner. Stirner’s book is over ambitious and tackles many topics in which it is not only doomed to fail but also offers countless opportunities to demonstrate the superiority of Marx and Engels’ materialist philosophy. Having said that, Stirner’s central concern is to liberate the unique individual from being suffocated by ideology and his contribution is not fairly presented by Marx and Engels. They do answer him, mainly towards the end of their critique, but by no means do they destroy him. In some respects, I suggest it is possible and desirable to see Stirner as an opponent of the very idealism in which he is soaked, struggling towards a rebuttal of its approach, and suggesting alternative values that are compatible with a materialist philosophy.
Nor is the general debate between a materialist and an idealist philosophy without relevance to the 21st century, and especially the huge influence of cultural studies and “post Marxist” thinking. This conversation is not over and I suggest it is as important today as in 1845.
Read
November 13, 2009Evidently this is considered marx's first fully matured statement about his thinking. It's an impressive piece on many levels. Not only does he effectively topple the BS uber abstract tendencies that German philosophy had devolved into at that point (Herder, Hegel, etc.) by positing a system of thinking that was concerned with the actual material conditions of life. He also provides a devastatingly accurate description of the sense of alienation and futility which rampant, industrial-era capitalism helped bring into being. I remember walking through an abandoned shopping mall in suburban Kansas City once, feeling creeped out by all of the closed stores, the empty walkways, the haunting way the muzak still played over the speakers, and just thinking how empty and cold a space could be. Reading this took me right back there.
July 24, 2020
Great introduction to Marx' thinking, if you don't feel like reading Capital yet, this is a good collection of texts to start off with. An interesting critique of German idealism, an introduction to historical materialism as the alternative, and other important texts introducing the main aspects of Marx' philosophy.
January 26, 2022
mr. marx is a silly little young hegelian who needs to stop using words like "contemplative materialism"
January 24, 2024
I read the unabridged version in MECW Vol 5. Marx and Engels' critique of Stirner as idealist and petty-bourgeois is devastating, although I don't think they escape Stirner's accusation of communism as idealist either, despite their best efforts at grounding things in historical materialism.
May 18, 2020
Nice introduction to Marx's ideas. Interesting to notice how Marx reacts and departs from Hegel, while at the same time continuing to use Hegel's language, historical, and dialectical approaches. I liked how he mentioned that the only effective way to oppose and overcome any ideology – including the German Ideology – is by revolution and not by critical theory. Following this idea, one may ask what is the point of his insightful critique of the bourgeois's philosophical, economic, legal, and other systems; but definitely worth a reading.
September 13, 2020
The German Ideology by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
A new historical and political worldview, including revolutionary positions on Marx’s materialistic approach to history, labor, production, alienation, the expansion of capitalism, class conflict, revolution, and eventually communism.
This Student edition makes easily accessible the most important parts of The book!
.
“For history to exist, first and foremost, men have to exist. For men to continue to exist, their needs must be satisfied (food, shelter, mating,etc.). Satisfying these first needs will lead to new and more complex needs. Eventually, this pack of humans will reproduce and have more offspring, which means more assurance of human existence. Hence more complex needs that require human cooperation (they must make certain relations) and capacity of finding new strategies. These relations and cooperation are determined by existing materials in the environment by which humans produce their products (men’s mode of production), and that is the first historical act.
Human language, consciousness, and relations emerge as necessities to contact other men in herd-like consciousness, only to increase productivity. But this productivity, improvement, and security cause division of labor between humans (both physical and mental labor). Only then, consciousness starts to do on its own to consider itself as something separate and independent from men and its material life. It begins to represent something other than real material conditions (representing ideas that do not exist). That is Karl Marx's deductive and revolutionary approach to history. Revolutionary because it was considered as the first materialistic movement after a long period which idealistic notions occupied German philosophy and Germany was under the influence of Hegelian philosophy. German idealism emerged as a philosophical movement in the late 18th century (started under Kant's influence and reached the pick by Hegelian philosophy).
It continued as the most dominant movement in Germany for a century; all German movements descend from heaven to earth. They began from men's ideas and consciousness to reach men's flesh and life. Til Marx reversed the notion by his materialistic approach to the history of men. Marx ascends from earth (Man’s real, and material life) in order to reach reach heavens (man’s ideas).”
A new historical and political worldview, including revolutionary positions on Marx’s materialistic approach to history, labor, production, alienation, the expansion of capitalism, class conflict, revolution, and eventually communism.
This Student edition makes easily accessible the most important parts of The book!
.
“For history to exist, first and foremost, men have to exist. For men to continue to exist, their needs must be satisfied (food, shelter, mating,etc.). Satisfying these first needs will lead to new and more complex needs. Eventually, this pack of humans will reproduce and have more offspring, which means more assurance of human existence. Hence more complex needs that require human cooperation (they must make certain relations) and capacity of finding new strategies. These relations and cooperation are determined by existing materials in the environment by which humans produce their products (men’s mode of production), and that is the first historical act.
Human language, consciousness, and relations emerge as necessities to contact other men in herd-like consciousness, only to increase productivity. But this productivity, improvement, and security cause division of labor between humans (both physical and mental labor). Only then, consciousness starts to do on its own to consider itself as something separate and independent from men and its material life. It begins to represent something other than real material conditions (representing ideas that do not exist). That is Karl Marx's deductive and revolutionary approach to history. Revolutionary because it was considered as the first materialistic movement after a long period which idealistic notions occupied German philosophy and Germany was under the influence of Hegelian philosophy. German idealism emerged as a philosophical movement in the late 18th century (started under Kant's influence and reached the pick by Hegelian philosophy).
It continued as the most dominant movement in Germany for a century; all German movements descend from heaven to earth. They began from men's ideas and consciousness to reach men's flesh and life. Til Marx reversed the notion by his materialistic approach to the history of men. Marx ascends from earth (Man’s real, and material life) in order to reach reach heavens (man’s ideas).”
May 14, 2014
For all his nay-saying about German ideology, Marx (and Engels) remains a German ideologue--and a very thorough one. Materialism, as Marx would have it, owes a debt to Hegel and romantic philosophy in general. He (Marx)may have turned metaphysics on its head, yet he failed to remove the head. But there's no getting rid of it. Marxist economy requires a hidden hand, better said, a shift in ontology, or the way one values the world (and oneself). Materialism itself, if history is anything to go by, has failed to achieve that.
Marx's nay-sayings about Stirner are highly entertaining. Only a keen metaphysician would take so much time with him (300 plus pages). Here Marx reminds me of Hunter Thompson: the sort of maniacal joy he found in opposition. If Max Stirner is Sancho Panza, Marx is Cervantes.
The German Ideology is very much a rant, and I enjoyed it as such. It seems like a good place to start with historical materialism and the like. Perhaps I'll know for sure when I've read Capital.
Marx's nay-sayings about Stirner are highly entertaining. Only a keen metaphysician would take so much time with him (300 plus pages). Here Marx reminds me of Hunter Thompson: the sort of maniacal joy he found in opposition. If Max Stirner is Sancho Panza, Marx is Cervantes.
The German Ideology is very much a rant, and I enjoyed it as such. It seems like a good place to start with historical materialism and the like. Perhaps I'll know for sure when I've read Capital.
October 15, 2010
In the beginning... there was German Ideology (1845-6) and the EPM of 1844.
Here, in Chapter One, Feuerbach is taken to task. This is the section everyone must read. A theory of history: turn that Hegel off his head and back onto his feet! What are the preconditions of social life? What are the stages of human development? What is consciousness? What are forms of intercourse? What is liberation? What are the ruling ideas (religion, law, politics) and their relationship to material life? These questions are all answered for you, so pay attention!
Chapter Two is reserved for Bruno Bauer. Chapter Three for that radical egoist son-of-a-gun Max Stirner. A lot of silly, redundant polemic expended on philosophers relegated to the dustbin of history. Some gems in the later chapters though were dug out in my English translation.
Here, in Chapter One, Feuerbach is taken to task. This is the section everyone must read. A theory of history: turn that Hegel off his head and back onto his feet! What are the preconditions of social life? What are the stages of human development? What is consciousness? What are forms of intercourse? What is liberation? What are the ruling ideas (religion, law, politics) and their relationship to material life? These questions are all answered for you, so pay attention!
Chapter Two is reserved for Bruno Bauer. Chapter Three for that radical egoist son-of-a-gun Max Stirner. A lot of silly, redundant polemic expended on philosophers relegated to the dustbin of history. Some gems in the later chapters though were dug out in my English translation.
April 11, 2023
re-read this and it still slaps. yeah it contains some of marx's most dangerous early miscues (flirting a bit too much w feuerbach, a teleology concerning the necessity of the development of the productive forces for communism, etc). and the part on Stirner (mercifully abridged out of this version) is definitely an "I ain't reading all that. I'm happy for u tho. Or sorry that happened." but it contains so many bangers, particularly concerning alienation. i really think that being brought into practical connection with the material and intellectual production of the whole world and being put in a position to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth seems like a GOOD THING TO DO.
October 17, 2010
While Marx's theory of historical materialism, and his teleological view of history is interesting, there are obvious philosophical holes in his argument (not to mention economic and scientific ones, too). What was most maddening was the lack of organization in the book. It was a stark contrast to The Communist Manifesto, which was clearly written for the layman.
June 21, 2008
A good introduction to Karl Marx's philosophy. This book can present important issues about his philosophical thinking, such as, historical materialism, critique on the german idealism (Kant, Hegel,...), etc.
A pre-resquisite book before the famous Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital.
A pre-resquisite book before the famous Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital.
April 19, 2020
While his critique against Bauer and Feuerbach seem to be on point, his critique against Stirner is nothing but a huge river-flow of strawman arguments. I honestly don’t understand why academics are so obsessed with this particular work of his
October 30, 2014
the ruling cosmetological ideas of any era are the ideas of the ruling class. so says a man so poor that he could ill afford a shave and haircut.
October 1, 2020
Review to come soon.
May 31, 2019
Verso il materialismo storico
Scrivo un'unica recensione di quest'opera e de La sacra famiglia perché possono essere lette quasi come un unicum, rappresentando, accanto ai più noti Manoscritti economico-filosofici del 1844 il momento del definitivo distacco dei due pensatori dall'idealismo della sinistra hegeliana e dell'elaborazione di quello che sarebbe stato l'architrave su cui verrà eretta la grandiosa costruzione teorica marx-engelsiana, la concezione materialistica della storia.
Entrambe le opere sono state scritte tra il 1844 e il 1845 come risposta polemica alle posizioni dei filosofi tedeschi della sinistra hegeliana. In particolare La sacra famiglia, o Critica della critica critica intende polemizzare con la rivista Allgemaine literatur-Zeitung che Bruno Bauer, uno degli esponenti di spicco dei giovani hegeliani, pubblicava con l'apporto dei fratelli e di alcuni altri esponenti dell'idealismo prussiano. E' questa l'opera che segna l'inizio del sodalizio tra Marx ed Engels, che si protrarrà fino alla morte di Marx e, idealmente, anche oltre. Quando, l'anno seguente, l'opuscolo venne pubblicato a Francoforte, la rivista di Bauer aveva già cessato le pubblicazioni, per cui dal punto di vista della polemica immediata esso apparve in ritardo sui tempi.
L'ideologia tedesca, scritta l'anno successivo, riprende in qualche modo la polemica con Bauer e la amplia e sistematizza, rivolgendosi anche al pensiero di altri esponenti dell'idealismo post-hegeliano, in primis allo stesso Feuerbach, cui è dedicato il primo, forse più significativo, capitolo, a Max Stirner, agli esponenti del cosiddetto Vero socialismo. L'opera non fu pubblicata per contrasti con l'editore, e più tardi Marx ebbe a dire che era stata volentieri ... abbandonata alla roditrice critica dei topi, in quanto avevamo già raggiunto il nostro scopo principale, che era di veder chiaro in noi stessi. Apparirà in edizione integrale (salvo qualche pagina mangiata appunto dai topi...) solo nel 1932.
Già nel titolo della prima opera, che avrebbe dovuto essere solo Critica della critica critica (La sacra famiglia fu un'aggiunta dell'editore, peraltro approvata da Marx) si intuisce una delle caratteristiche fondamentali delle opere di Marx e – in misura a mio modo di vedere minore – di Engels: la brillantezza della scrittura, la capacità di esporre la loro devastante e assoluta critica alla società ed all'inconsistenza della speculazione filosofica rivestendola con una ironia corrosiva che molte volte spinge, durante la lettura di entrambi i testi, al sorriso se non al riso sardonico. E' una caratteristica a mio avviso non secondaria rispetto al contenuto delle opere dei due immensi pensatori, perché contribuisce a rendere accessibili concetti che in alcuni casi, se non si è armati di solide basi teoretiche, si fatica a comprendere appieno.
Si tenga presente che quando i due scrivono La sacra famiglia hanno rispettivamente 26 e 24 anni, che Marx si trova da pochi mesi in esilio volontario a Parigi, dopo la conclusione dell'esperienza della Gazzetta renana e la constatazione della impossibilità di proseguire, nella Germania reazionaria di Federico Guglielmo IV, un'attività pubblicistica e politica che non attirasse gli occhiuti interventi della censura, e che Engels ha appena trascorso un periodo di apprendistato nella fabbrica di famiglia in Inghilterra. Sono quindi entrambi giovani, pieni di energia, il loro pensiero è in costante evoluzione e maturazione , vivificato dal contatto con i circoli operai comunisti di Parigi e Manchester: entrambi hanno una gran fame di realtà, di conoscenza, entrambi sono pienamente consapevoli che il loro distacco dall'idealismo hegeliano li sta portando verso nuovi lidi, per giungere ai quali sarà necessario un immane sforzo di approfondimento teorico: intravedono che al pensiero filosofico si può attribuire un nuovo ruolo, un nuovo rapporto con la storia e con l'evoluzione della società, e questa visione sarà mirabilmente sintetizzata nell'ultima, celeberrima, delle Tesi su Feuerbach che Marx scriverà nel 1845: I filosofi hanno solo interpretato il mondo in modi diversi; si tratta però di mutarlo.
Per approdare a questi nuovi lidi è però necessario fare i conti con l'idealismo, con Hegel, con Feuerbach e con i loro epigoni, che ancora attribuiscono al mondo delle idee e alla speculazione astratta del filosofo la funzione di motore in grado di cambiare il mondo.
La sacra famiglia e, in maniera più organica, L'ideologia tedesca nascono proprio con questo obiettivo di marcare il distacco definitivo da una concezione teorica che sino a pochi anni prima era stata la loro (tra l'altro quelli che ora sono i bersagli della loro polemica erano stati in molti casi degli amici).
L'importanza delle due opere non sta tanto nella polemica diretta con i pensatori post-hegeliani, che come detto in alcuni casi appariva superata già al tempo, quanto nella possibilità di ricostruire la fecondissima e rapidissima evoluzione della concezione teorica di Marx ed Engels, della loro capacità di comprendere la storia come un movimento incessante alla cui base sono lo sviluppo delle forze produttive, dei relativi rapporti sociali di produzione e la contraddizione che nelle varie fasi storiche si è stabilita tra questi e quelle.
Marx ed Engels ci dicono, in forma più embrionale ne La sacra famiglia e più compiuta ed articolata ne L'ideologia tedesca, che non sono le idee che fanno la storia, ma le condizioni materiali di vita degli uomini, così come sono determinate dai rapporti che tra loro si stabiliscono essenzialmente a causa della necessità di organizzare la produzione e la distribuzione dei beni di cui gli uomini stessi necessitano. Ci dicono che tutta la storia dell'umanità, compresa la storia delle idee che essa ha prodotto e delle istituzioni politiche, religiose, giuridiche etc. che ha costruito nelle varie epoche, e compresa la forma in cui la proprietà delle cose si manifesta, può essere spiegata a partire dalle condizioni materiali di vita determinate dalle necessità della produzione. Così, ad esempio, il modo di produzione feudale, basato sulla servitù della gleba nelle campagne e sulle corporazioni artigiane nelle città, comportava una necessaria organizzazione della proprietà delle terre da parte del Signore, una organizzazione gerarchica e un diritto volti ad assicurare la perpetuazione di quell'ordine, concezioni religiose che riflettevano la visione dell'uomo che tale ordine produttivo comportava etc.
Marx ed Engels ci dicono anche che lo sviluppo delle forze produttive, cioè della capacità che la società acquisisce di produrre in modo diverso, entra comunque in contraddizione con i rapporti sociali di produzione, cioè con l'organizzazione che la società si è data per regolare la produzione, e che questa contraddizione porta inevitabilmente ad un cambiamento, spesso violento, dell'organizzazione sociale, con la sostituzione del dominio di una classe con un'altra. Così, per rimanere nell'esempio precedente, le botteghe degli artigiani medievali hanno posto le basi per la nascita delle prime officine in cui prevale il lavoro salariato, e per una nuova organizzazione e divisione del lavoro tra le persone, in definitiva per la nascita di una nuova classe capitalistica borghese. L'ulteriore sviluppo di questa organizzazione della produzione non poteva avvenire nell'ambito dei rapporti sociali di produzione dati, ed è stato quindi necessario che la nuova classe borghese prendesse il potere e li cambiasse, cambiando così anche la sovrastruttura politica, istituzionale e culturale che le accompagnava. Così, come è avvenuto in passato, ad un determinato grado di sviluppo le forze produttive della società capitalistica entreranno in contraddizione con i rapporti sociali di produzione che le reggono, e l'impalcatura crollerà. L'elemento di contraddizione è identificato in Marx ed Engels nel proletariato, classe generata dalla divisione del lavoro che nella produzione capitalistica raggiunge il suo apice e che avrà il compito storico di portare l'umanità verso una società senza più classi, e quindi senza più necessità di politica, stato, religione.
E' la vera e propria fondazione della Concezione materialistica della storia che La Sacra famiglia e L'ideologia tedesca ci consegnano: è a mio avviso uno dei più alti e formidabili strumenti di comprensione della realtà sociale che ancora possediamo, pur con tutte le elaborazioni teoriche intervenute in oltre 150 anni. Le aspettative rivoluzionarie di Marx ed Engels, il compito storico di liberazione assegnato al proletariato non si sono inverati, e forse a queste possono essere sostituite, o affiancate come possibilità, visioni più cupe di un esito luxemburghianamante barbarico ed apocalittico, ma l'idea di storia come movimento delle forze produttive, la lucida analisi della contraddizione tra queste e i rapporti sociali stanno lì come pilastri imprescindibili del nostro sapere comune, che solo la stupidità dei tempi e degli interessi dominanti tende a farci dimenticare. Ma, come dice un grande poeta italiano, la storia dà torto e dà ragione e non mancherà di farlo anche stavolta.
Scrivo un'unica recensione di quest'opera e de La sacra famiglia perché possono essere lette quasi come un unicum, rappresentando, accanto ai più noti Manoscritti economico-filosofici del 1844 il momento del definitivo distacco dei due pensatori dall'idealismo della sinistra hegeliana e dell'elaborazione di quello che sarebbe stato l'architrave su cui verrà eretta la grandiosa costruzione teorica marx-engelsiana, la concezione materialistica della storia.
Entrambe le opere sono state scritte tra il 1844 e il 1845 come risposta polemica alle posizioni dei filosofi tedeschi della sinistra hegeliana. In particolare La sacra famiglia, o Critica della critica critica intende polemizzare con la rivista Allgemaine literatur-Zeitung che Bruno Bauer, uno degli esponenti di spicco dei giovani hegeliani, pubblicava con l'apporto dei fratelli e di alcuni altri esponenti dell'idealismo prussiano. E' questa l'opera che segna l'inizio del sodalizio tra Marx ed Engels, che si protrarrà fino alla morte di Marx e, idealmente, anche oltre. Quando, l'anno seguente, l'opuscolo venne pubblicato a Francoforte, la rivista di Bauer aveva già cessato le pubblicazioni, per cui dal punto di vista della polemica immediata esso apparve in ritardo sui tempi.
L'ideologia tedesca, scritta l'anno successivo, riprende in qualche modo la polemica con Bauer e la amplia e sistematizza, rivolgendosi anche al pensiero di altri esponenti dell'idealismo post-hegeliano, in primis allo stesso Feuerbach, cui è dedicato il primo, forse più significativo, capitolo, a Max Stirner, agli esponenti del cosiddetto Vero socialismo. L'opera non fu pubblicata per contrasti con l'editore, e più tardi Marx ebbe a dire che era stata volentieri ... abbandonata alla roditrice critica dei topi, in quanto avevamo già raggiunto il nostro scopo principale, che era di veder chiaro in noi stessi. Apparirà in edizione integrale (salvo qualche pagina mangiata appunto dai topi...) solo nel 1932.
Già nel titolo della prima opera, che avrebbe dovuto essere solo Critica della critica critica (La sacra famiglia fu un'aggiunta dell'editore, peraltro approvata da Marx) si intuisce una delle caratteristiche fondamentali delle opere di Marx e – in misura a mio modo di vedere minore – di Engels: la brillantezza della scrittura, la capacità di esporre la loro devastante e assoluta critica alla società ed all'inconsistenza della speculazione filosofica rivestendola con una ironia corrosiva che molte volte spinge, durante la lettura di entrambi i testi, al sorriso se non al riso sardonico. E' una caratteristica a mio avviso non secondaria rispetto al contenuto delle opere dei due immensi pensatori, perché contribuisce a rendere accessibili concetti che in alcuni casi, se non si è armati di solide basi teoretiche, si fatica a comprendere appieno.
Si tenga presente che quando i due scrivono La sacra famiglia hanno rispettivamente 26 e 24 anni, che Marx si trova da pochi mesi in esilio volontario a Parigi, dopo la conclusione dell'esperienza della Gazzetta renana e la constatazione della impossibilità di proseguire, nella Germania reazionaria di Federico Guglielmo IV, un'attività pubblicistica e politica che non attirasse gli occhiuti interventi della censura, e che Engels ha appena trascorso un periodo di apprendistato nella fabbrica di famiglia in Inghilterra. Sono quindi entrambi giovani, pieni di energia, il loro pensiero è in costante evoluzione e maturazione , vivificato dal contatto con i circoli operai comunisti di Parigi e Manchester: entrambi hanno una gran fame di realtà, di conoscenza, entrambi sono pienamente consapevoli che il loro distacco dall'idealismo hegeliano li sta portando verso nuovi lidi, per giungere ai quali sarà necessario un immane sforzo di approfondimento teorico: intravedono che al pensiero filosofico si può attribuire un nuovo ruolo, un nuovo rapporto con la storia e con l'evoluzione della società, e questa visione sarà mirabilmente sintetizzata nell'ultima, celeberrima, delle Tesi su Feuerbach che Marx scriverà nel 1845: I filosofi hanno solo interpretato il mondo in modi diversi; si tratta però di mutarlo.
Per approdare a questi nuovi lidi è però necessario fare i conti con l'idealismo, con Hegel, con Feuerbach e con i loro epigoni, che ancora attribuiscono al mondo delle idee e alla speculazione astratta del filosofo la funzione di motore in grado di cambiare il mondo.
La sacra famiglia e, in maniera più organica, L'ideologia tedesca nascono proprio con questo obiettivo di marcare il distacco definitivo da una concezione teorica che sino a pochi anni prima era stata la loro (tra l'altro quelli che ora sono i bersagli della loro polemica erano stati in molti casi degli amici).
L'importanza delle due opere non sta tanto nella polemica diretta con i pensatori post-hegeliani, che come detto in alcuni casi appariva superata già al tempo, quanto nella possibilità di ricostruire la fecondissima e rapidissima evoluzione della concezione teorica di Marx ed Engels, della loro capacità di comprendere la storia come un movimento incessante alla cui base sono lo sviluppo delle forze produttive, dei relativi rapporti sociali di produzione e la contraddizione che nelle varie fasi storiche si è stabilita tra questi e quelle.
Marx ed Engels ci dicono, in forma più embrionale ne La sacra famiglia e più compiuta ed articolata ne L'ideologia tedesca, che non sono le idee che fanno la storia, ma le condizioni materiali di vita degli uomini, così come sono determinate dai rapporti che tra loro si stabiliscono essenzialmente a causa della necessità di organizzare la produzione e la distribuzione dei beni di cui gli uomini stessi necessitano. Ci dicono che tutta la storia dell'umanità, compresa la storia delle idee che essa ha prodotto e delle istituzioni politiche, religiose, giuridiche etc. che ha costruito nelle varie epoche, e compresa la forma in cui la proprietà delle cose si manifesta, può essere spiegata a partire dalle condizioni materiali di vita determinate dalle necessità della produzione. Così, ad esempio, il modo di produzione feudale, basato sulla servitù della gleba nelle campagne e sulle corporazioni artigiane nelle città, comportava una necessaria organizzazione della proprietà delle terre da parte del Signore, una organizzazione gerarchica e un diritto volti ad assicurare la perpetuazione di quell'ordine, concezioni religiose che riflettevano la visione dell'uomo che tale ordine produttivo comportava etc.
Marx ed Engels ci dicono anche che lo sviluppo delle forze produttive, cioè della capacità che la società acquisisce di produrre in modo diverso, entra comunque in contraddizione con i rapporti sociali di produzione, cioè con l'organizzazione che la società si è data per regolare la produzione, e che questa contraddizione porta inevitabilmente ad un cambiamento, spesso violento, dell'organizzazione sociale, con la sostituzione del dominio di una classe con un'altra. Così, per rimanere nell'esempio precedente, le botteghe degli artigiani medievali hanno posto le basi per la nascita delle prime officine in cui prevale il lavoro salariato, e per una nuova organizzazione e divisione del lavoro tra le persone, in definitiva per la nascita di una nuova classe capitalistica borghese. L'ulteriore sviluppo di questa organizzazione della produzione non poteva avvenire nell'ambito dei rapporti sociali di produzione dati, ed è stato quindi necessario che la nuova classe borghese prendesse il potere e li cambiasse, cambiando così anche la sovrastruttura politica, istituzionale e culturale che le accompagnava. Così, come è avvenuto in passato, ad un determinato grado di sviluppo le forze produttive della società capitalistica entreranno in contraddizione con i rapporti sociali di produzione che le reggono, e l'impalcatura crollerà. L'elemento di contraddizione è identificato in Marx ed Engels nel proletariato, classe generata dalla divisione del lavoro che nella produzione capitalistica raggiunge il suo apice e che avrà il compito storico di portare l'umanità verso una società senza più classi, e quindi senza più necessità di politica, stato, religione.
E' la vera e propria fondazione della Concezione materialistica della storia che La Sacra famiglia e L'ideologia tedesca ci consegnano: è a mio avviso uno dei più alti e formidabili strumenti di comprensione della realtà sociale che ancora possediamo, pur con tutte le elaborazioni teoriche intervenute in oltre 150 anni. Le aspettative rivoluzionarie di Marx ed Engels, il compito storico di liberazione assegnato al proletariato non si sono inverati, e forse a queste possono essere sostituite, o affiancate come possibilità, visioni più cupe di un esito luxemburghianamante barbarico ed apocalittico, ma l'idea di storia come movimento delle forze produttive, la lucida analisi della contraddizione tra queste e i rapporti sociali stanno lì come pilastri imprescindibili del nostro sapere comune, che solo la stupidità dei tempi e degli interessi dominanti tende a farci dimenticare. Ma, come dice un grande poeta italiano, la storia dà torto e dà ragione e non mancherà di farlo anche stavolta.
July 16, 2017
Written in 1846, unpublished till 1932 in Soviet Union. For the first time in this book Marx & Engels (i would say Marx&Engels with subject He, because i think they both can not be divided with one another, they both are indeed an appearance of dialectic) explained materialistic conception of history and emphasized communism as deterministic society. His criticism devastated German Idealism which had been at the time dominant in Prussia, especially Hegelianism and of course, the man who heavily influenced Marx's understanding on philosophy of materialism, Ludwig Feuerbach. His thinking was also influenced by Hegel, mainly dialectical method. Hegels's historical conception defined history as development of human's principal and in parallel with consciousness (human's reason) and he defined the essence of human was working, bcs everything is occured by creation of human and it derrived from consiousness which inherently, naturally, divinely human has. State (based on freedom) are appearance of a development human's consciousness in history through the consiousness which before the emergence of state alienated relation between people upon each other. State is the highest result of its dialectical process between Master and Serf, for instance he said in Phänomenologie des Geistes and in Enzyklopädie that master (who is literally subject, too) is actually not free by treating another subject (serf) badly. This alienation can only be abolished through common consciousness (Allgemeines Bewusstsein), State of law is the inevitably progress of reason/consciousness :
"Durch die Arbeit kommt (das Bewußtsein) zu sich selbst. In dem Moment, welches der Begierde im Bewußtsein des Herrn entspricht, schien dem dienenden Bewußtsein zwar die Seite der unwesentlichen Beziehung (Entfremdung) auf das Ding zugefallen zu sein, indem das Ding darin eine Selbständigkeit behält."
"Das... Resultat des Kampfes im Anerkennung (zwischen Herr und Knecht) ist das.. Allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein (common consciousness), d.h dasjenige freie Selbstbewußten nicht mehr... ein unfreies, sondern ein gleichfalls selbständiges ist."
These opinions are point of His (Marx&Engels) criticism,
He opined in totally different way of thinking He satirically then criticized :
"In direct contrast to German Philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh."
(The German Ideology, edited&introduced by C.J Arthur, p.47)
Men's history is not merely driven by consciousness, men's history is driven by object surrounding and economic situation which will determine how men thinks and shapes the world after his own image, consciousness is determined by life/Not subject but object where everything began, not purely consciousness itself. Then to Feuerbach (although he confessed as a materialist philosopher) who distinguished men and animal by being sure that men has no limited character as animal, like reason and religion without arguing where that reason comes from, as if it was inevitably grace of god. Religion which according to Feuerbach a product of embedded individual, but it is a product of society in which it depends on basis. His prime historical materialism is the answer of all this fallacy of German Idealism which had problem with reality. Historical materialism analyses the genealogie of private eigentum (and its division of labour) and proves that material needs (Gegenstände, Object) had a great desicive role as driving force of history instead of consciousness. He explained firstly early communist society in which private property did not exist and hierarchy was merely in family or clan chief, then due to growing population emerged inevitably wars, conquest and slavery. "Then modern private property appeared only on a more extensive scale (concentration of private property) which began very early in Rome (proved by Licinian agrarian law 367 B.C)". In Rome which highly civilised, "had developed productive forces and after that in early middle ages european tribes resisted against roman colonial and destroying a number of productive force. Agriculture had declined, industry had decayed for want of a market, trade had died out or been violently suspended, the rural and urban population had been decreased. In such conditions and the mode of organisation of the conquest determined by them and feudal property appeared as the third ownership". In feudalism merchant (bourgeoisie) demanded fairness in trade which nobles had at the time normally restricted and burdened them taxes. Social relation between feudal and merchant was abolished through American Revolution 1776 and French Revolution 1789. The era of proletarianism emerged then. He tried to depict society as a whole through economic condition- relation between mode of production & socio-politic are undivideable.
German philosophy (Idealism) has landed in a wrong direction, well flawed, in a wrong consciousness (verkehrtes Bewußtsein) and this is actually a regression for Him, this has completely alienated human being between his fellow as well as to its real world. This point of view must be replaced and restored by scientific worldview which is also communism. A very interesting example i got from the class :
"Our development is our own deed" - secularised version (scientific worldview)
"Our development is our own consciousness/reason" - idealised version (negativ)
In my understanding sofar, He seems here deconstructing everything, He tried excellently to expose our view from cultural attributes, identities and symbols (superstructure : for instance like politics, hierarchies, state, everything which causes division of labour) which un- or intentionally (by nature) formed or established based on economical reason (Basis). Any form of subjugation in history - rulers over masses has appeared due to these 2 factors, which will determine how a society reproduce its own needs and shapes its own history. Regarding establishment and relation between basis and superstructure it is interresting to look in Harmuth Elsenshans' book Kapitalismus Global : Aufstieg - Grenzen - Risiken (2012). How state is established basically to secure its strategic area, therefore state can monopole trade or the emergence of monotheistic religion which basically demanding equality during polytheistic religion was at the time very dominated and hierarchie (division of labour) was so strict (hinduism and another polytheist beliefs). Moreover for Marx&Engels capitalism means accumulation of wealth and we can contemplate it in our current situation - inequality is currently even greater - the richest 1% own the same wealth as the poorest 50% in 2016. Thomas Piketty in his book Capital in 21st also analysed in 2014 great income inequality between workers, managers or CEO from year to year is also even greater.
His accumulation theory is also explained well enough by Ibn Khaldun (arabic philosopher in 14. centuries, probably the first arab materialist philosopher) which civilisation makes inequality wider bcs wealth concentrates more on the city and solidarity between tribes has lost.
Marxism has heavily shaped my point view how i look and consider society, moreover it was a great experience for me personally to attend (for the first time, since i know Marx's ideas about 5 years ago and read it independently) Marx class in the last semester at my university (probably i wouldn't have opportunity to learn Marx specifically for a semester in my homecountry), as David Harvey said in his class Reading Capital Vol 1 that he has been teaching the capital since long year ago and he always got new interpretation from year to year, so i do, there's a lot of different point of view i have obtained and enlightened me to understand more about the ideas.
"Durch die Arbeit kommt (das Bewußtsein) zu sich selbst. In dem Moment, welches der Begierde im Bewußtsein des Herrn entspricht, schien dem dienenden Bewußtsein zwar die Seite der unwesentlichen Beziehung (Entfremdung) auf das Ding zugefallen zu sein, indem das Ding darin eine Selbständigkeit behält."
"Das... Resultat des Kampfes im Anerkennung (zwischen Herr und Knecht) ist das.. Allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein (common consciousness), d.h dasjenige freie Selbstbewußten nicht mehr... ein unfreies, sondern ein gleichfalls selbständiges ist."
These opinions are point of His (Marx&Engels) criticism,
He opined in totally different way of thinking He satirically then criticized :
"In direct contrast to German Philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh."
(The German Ideology, edited&introduced by C.J Arthur, p.47)
Men's history is not merely driven by consciousness, men's history is driven by object surrounding and economic situation which will determine how men thinks and shapes the world after his own image, consciousness is determined by life/Not subject but object where everything began, not purely consciousness itself. Then to Feuerbach (although he confessed as a materialist philosopher) who distinguished men and animal by being sure that men has no limited character as animal, like reason and religion without arguing where that reason comes from, as if it was inevitably grace of god. Religion which according to Feuerbach a product of embedded individual, but it is a product of society in which it depends on basis. His prime historical materialism is the answer of all this fallacy of German Idealism which had problem with reality. Historical materialism analyses the genealogie of private eigentum (and its division of labour) and proves that material needs (Gegenstände, Object) had a great desicive role as driving force of history instead of consciousness. He explained firstly early communist society in which private property did not exist and hierarchy was merely in family or clan chief, then due to growing population emerged inevitably wars, conquest and slavery. "Then modern private property appeared only on a more extensive scale (concentration of private property) which began very early in Rome (proved by Licinian agrarian law 367 B.C)". In Rome which highly civilised, "had developed productive forces and after that in early middle ages european tribes resisted against roman colonial and destroying a number of productive force. Agriculture had declined, industry had decayed for want of a market, trade had died out or been violently suspended, the rural and urban population had been decreased. In such conditions and the mode of organisation of the conquest determined by them and feudal property appeared as the third ownership". In feudalism merchant (bourgeoisie) demanded fairness in trade which nobles had at the time normally restricted and burdened them taxes. Social relation between feudal and merchant was abolished through American Revolution 1776 and French Revolution 1789. The era of proletarianism emerged then. He tried to depict society as a whole through economic condition- relation between mode of production & socio-politic are undivideable.
German philosophy (Idealism) has landed in a wrong direction, well flawed, in a wrong consciousness (verkehrtes Bewußtsein) and this is actually a regression for Him, this has completely alienated human being between his fellow as well as to its real world. This point of view must be replaced and restored by scientific worldview which is also communism. A very interesting example i got from the class :
"Our development is our own deed" - secularised version (scientific worldview)
"Our development is our own consciousness/reason" - idealised version (negativ)
In my understanding sofar, He seems here deconstructing everything, He tried excellently to expose our view from cultural attributes, identities and symbols (superstructure : for instance like politics, hierarchies, state, everything which causes division of labour) which un- or intentionally (by nature) formed or established based on economical reason (Basis). Any form of subjugation in history - rulers over masses has appeared due to these 2 factors, which will determine how a society reproduce its own needs and shapes its own history. Regarding establishment and relation between basis and superstructure it is interresting to look in Harmuth Elsenshans' book Kapitalismus Global : Aufstieg - Grenzen - Risiken (2012). How state is established basically to secure its strategic area, therefore state can monopole trade or the emergence of monotheistic religion which basically demanding equality during polytheistic religion was at the time very dominated and hierarchie (division of labour) was so strict (hinduism and another polytheist beliefs). Moreover for Marx&Engels capitalism means accumulation of wealth and we can contemplate it in our current situation - inequality is currently even greater - the richest 1% own the same wealth as the poorest 50% in 2016. Thomas Piketty in his book Capital in 21st also analysed in 2014 great income inequality between workers, managers or CEO from year to year is also even greater.
His accumulation theory is also explained well enough by Ibn Khaldun (arabic philosopher in 14. centuries, probably the first arab materialist philosopher) which civilisation makes inequality wider bcs wealth concentrates more on the city and solidarity between tribes has lost.
Marxism has heavily shaped my point view how i look and consider society, moreover it was a great experience for me personally to attend (for the first time, since i know Marx's ideas about 5 years ago and read it independently) Marx class in the last semester at my university (probably i wouldn't have opportunity to learn Marx specifically for a semester in my homecountry), as David Harvey said in his class Reading Capital Vol 1 that he has been teaching the capital since long year ago and he always got new interpretation from year to year, so i do, there's a lot of different point of view i have obtained and enlightened me to understand more about the ideas.
March 8, 2016
BUMI
DENGAN pemikiran yang menggugat, 154 tahun yang lalu Marx dan Engels berteriak yakin: “Kita berangkat dari bumi ke langit!”
Kata-kata itu tak bisa diremehkan. Kita tahu, kata-kata itu ada dalam The Germany Ideology, dan tak lepas dari perjalanan studi dan situasi politik di Prussia saat itu. Pemerintahan Prussia dengan semena-mena menghapus undang-undang dasar yang memberikan kebebasan kepada rakyat, melakukan sensor yang ketat pada pers, dan mengawasi profesor atau guru-guru besar di universitas yang mengajarkan hal liberal.
Di Berlin, di universitas-universitas masa itu, bersamaan dengan situasi politik yang menekan itu, Marx yang tak suka menemukan senjata intelektual dalam tradisi Hegelian yang sangat kental. Sebab, filsafat Hegel merupakan filsafat yang mengajarkan rasionalitas dan kebebasaan sebagai nilai tertinggi.
Hegel, sebagaimana ditulis Frans Magnis-Suseno dalam Pemikiran Karl Marx: Dari Sosialisme Utopis ke Perselisihan Revisionisme, memahami sejarah sebagai gerak ke arah rasionalitas dan kebebasan. Dulu, kebebasan terbatas pada sang raja, yang dianggap dewa. Kemudian kebebasan ada pada mereka yang menggunakan akal budi. Kebudayaan Yunani menghadirkan majikan dan budak. Dalam perkembangan selanjutnya, kebebasan hadir untuk setiap orang, seperti dalam kitab suci Kristen yang tak membeda-bedakan umat. Kebebasan itu secara dialektik akhirnya menjadi Revolusi Prancis, yang berawal dari mind, memunculkan negara sebagai Roh Obyektif yang paling tinggi. Di sinil Hegel menganggap negara modern Prussia sebagai realisasi rasionalitas dan kebebasan, yang dituntun suara hati. Hegel pun menjadi guru revolusi yang memberi jalan pertentangan kepada sistem politik yang otoriter.
Tapi kenyataan ternyata lain. Filsafat total yang diungkapkan Hegel bertabrakan dengan realita yang “pecah belah”. Pasti ada yang salah, pikirnya. Dan Marx menemukan: pemikiran Hegel baru sekedar ungkapan teoritis. Karena itu perlu suatu antitesis dari tesis Hegel: praksis. Dengan ini Marx mulai berpandangan bahwa “api kontemplasi di Gunung Olympus mesti dilempar kepada umat manusia oleh sosok-sosok seperti Prometheus yang mencuri api dari dewa”.
Marx mengarahkan pandang pada materialisme yang dianggap bisa memenuhi atau bertindak sebagai antitesis idealisme Hegel. Namun materialisme ini tak lepas dari kritik: ketika kita, misalnya, mendefinisikan bunga sedemikian rupa secara materi, apakah maksud bunga itu sendiri seperti yang kita definisikan? Atau, itu sekedar pemaksaan definisi terhadap bunga? Dengan kata lain, idealisme menyerang sisi dasar materialisme, dan menegaskan bahwa pada akhirnya ide lah yang menentukan segalanya. Ide memberi makna pada dunia.
Kelemahan-kelemahan tersebut sangat menganggu. Namun upaya menemukan titik terang Marx muncul pada diri seorang yang semula berniat menjadi pendeta Protestan: Ludwig Feuerbach.
Secara mendasar, Feuerbach menyerang pemikiran Hegel mengenai Roh Semesta. Menurut Hegel, Roh Semesta (atau agaknya ia ingin mengatakan Allah) muncul dalam kesadaran manusia yang senantiasa berpikir dan bertindak. Jadi, meski manusia memiliki kebebasan untuk berpikir dan bertindak, di belakangnya berdiri Roh Semesta.
Gagasan Hegel itulah yang dikritik oleh Feuerbach: konsepsi Hegel tidak sesuai fakta. Hegel mengemukakan bahwa Roh Semesta yang tak kelihatan seakan-akan nyata, sedang manusia yang kelihatan secara inderawi hanya sesuatu serupa wayang. Menurut Feuerbach, apa saja yang dapat dicapai dengan indera adalah realitas. Realitas selalu berbentuk materi. Pada realitas seperti inilah Marx berdiri bersama Feuerbach.
Dengan itu Roh Semesta ilutif. Tuhan dan agama (beserta ide-ide mengenai surga-neraka-malaikat) sesungguhnya hanyalah ciptaan angan-angan manusia. Dengan kata lain, agama merupakan proyeksi terhadap hakikat manusia. Manusia menciptakan agama. Namun, malangnya, menurut Feuerbach, kehidupan manusia kemudian dikuasai oleh apa yang dibuatnya dari angan-angan itu. Hal ini mirip dengan pembuatan berhala dalam kisah kerasulan di mana berhala yang diciptakan malah ditakuti, disembah, dan dihormati oleh manusia yang menciptakannya. Dalam antropologi: fetisisme.
Logika yang dipakai Feuerbach adalah logika dari Hegel bahwa manusia harus menjadi objek bagi dirinya sendiri untuk menjadi manusia. Seorang seniman menjadi seniman hanya jika ia berhasil mem-proyeksikan bakatnya dalam bentuk sebuah karya seni. Dalam alam pikiran, manusia pun mesti membayangkan diri untuk mengenal diri dan menemukan identitasnya.
Yang kemudian dipertanyakan Marx adalah mengapa manusia mengasingkan diri kepada agama? Jawaban Marx: karena manusia tak mampu memproyeksikan diri dalam realitas sosisal, karena penderitaan yang dialami, manusia berpaling pada dan mengangankan kebahagiaan di surga, pada agama ─sesuatu yang tak terlihat, yang semu.
Kritik agama Feuerbach berubah menjadi kritik masyarakat di tangan Marx. Ia menggagas kunci memahami yang sesungguhnya adalah dengan memahami manusia. Ia pun mengemukakan premis pertama: sejarah manusia adalah “eksistensi manusia sebagai individu-individu yang hidup”.
Seterusnya akan menjadi begini: manusia mesti berproduksi, dan ia tak bisa sendiri. Manusia saling membutuhkan dan menjadi sosial. Dengan “intercourse” itu manusia saling melengkapi hakikat dan merealisasikan kesosialannya, dan yang terjadi adalah pembagian kerja. Lama-lama muncul hak milik yang menimbulkan penderitaan dan kelas. Untuk itu, perubahan sosial mesti dilakukan terhadap negara, melalui perjuangan kelas, melalui cara-cara revolusioner (kelas atas tentu tidak begitu saja menyerahkan kekuasaan). Yang diharapkan dari revolusi tersebut adalah masyarakat tanpa kelas, dengan kesetaraan. Di sini kebebasan manusia tak lagi dikekang dan keterasingan manusia menemui hakikat yang sebenarnya. Negara yang semula melindungi hak milih pribadi tak diperlukan lagi. Masyarakat yang terbentuk bisa mengatur jadwal “pagi hari untuk berburu, siang hari memancing ikan, sore hari memelihara ternak” dengan santai.
Tentu saja ada kritik. Tapi yang riil menampilkan apa yang rumit dari Karl Marx sekaligus tradisi yang tak henti mencari jawab: ia mencoba berangkat dari manusia yang aktif, berdasarkan proses kehidupan nyata, “dari bumi”. Ia mencoba membuktikan “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life”, menafikan hantu-hantu “fantastic isolation or rigidity”, menegaskan bahwa “sosialisme tidak muncul hanya karena dinilai baik dan kapitalisme dinilai buruk”. Yang patut diperhatikan, setelah pemakaman Marx yang hanya dihadiri 8 orang, pemikiran “dari bumi ke langit” itu mampu `menggerakkan` bermiliar-miliar orang, berpuluh-puluh tahun kemudian.
Paul Lafargue dalam sebuah catatan mengenang Marx dalam Die Neue Zeit di suatu hari di tahun 1890 mengutip untuknya: “Dia seorang manusia, manfaatkanlah keseluruhan dirinya untuk semua. Saya tidak akan melihat manusia seperti dia lagi.” ─Hamlet, Act I, Sc. 2
DENGAN pemikiran yang menggugat, 154 tahun yang lalu Marx dan Engels berteriak yakin: “Kita berangkat dari bumi ke langit!”
Kata-kata itu tak bisa diremehkan. Kita tahu, kata-kata itu ada dalam The Germany Ideology, dan tak lepas dari perjalanan studi dan situasi politik di Prussia saat itu. Pemerintahan Prussia dengan semena-mena menghapus undang-undang dasar yang memberikan kebebasan kepada rakyat, melakukan sensor yang ketat pada pers, dan mengawasi profesor atau guru-guru besar di universitas yang mengajarkan hal liberal.
Di Berlin, di universitas-universitas masa itu, bersamaan dengan situasi politik yang menekan itu, Marx yang tak suka menemukan senjata intelektual dalam tradisi Hegelian yang sangat kental. Sebab, filsafat Hegel merupakan filsafat yang mengajarkan rasionalitas dan kebebasaan sebagai nilai tertinggi.
Hegel, sebagaimana ditulis Frans Magnis-Suseno dalam Pemikiran Karl Marx: Dari Sosialisme Utopis ke Perselisihan Revisionisme, memahami sejarah sebagai gerak ke arah rasionalitas dan kebebasan. Dulu, kebebasan terbatas pada sang raja, yang dianggap dewa. Kemudian kebebasan ada pada mereka yang menggunakan akal budi. Kebudayaan Yunani menghadirkan majikan dan budak. Dalam perkembangan selanjutnya, kebebasan hadir untuk setiap orang, seperti dalam kitab suci Kristen yang tak membeda-bedakan umat. Kebebasan itu secara dialektik akhirnya menjadi Revolusi Prancis, yang berawal dari mind, memunculkan negara sebagai Roh Obyektif yang paling tinggi. Di sinil Hegel menganggap negara modern Prussia sebagai realisasi rasionalitas dan kebebasan, yang dituntun suara hati. Hegel pun menjadi guru revolusi yang memberi jalan pertentangan kepada sistem politik yang otoriter.
Tapi kenyataan ternyata lain. Filsafat total yang diungkapkan Hegel bertabrakan dengan realita yang “pecah belah”. Pasti ada yang salah, pikirnya. Dan Marx menemukan: pemikiran Hegel baru sekedar ungkapan teoritis. Karena itu perlu suatu antitesis dari tesis Hegel: praksis. Dengan ini Marx mulai berpandangan bahwa “api kontemplasi di Gunung Olympus mesti dilempar kepada umat manusia oleh sosok-sosok seperti Prometheus yang mencuri api dari dewa”.
Marx mengarahkan pandang pada materialisme yang dianggap bisa memenuhi atau bertindak sebagai antitesis idealisme Hegel. Namun materialisme ini tak lepas dari kritik: ketika kita, misalnya, mendefinisikan bunga sedemikian rupa secara materi, apakah maksud bunga itu sendiri seperti yang kita definisikan? Atau, itu sekedar pemaksaan definisi terhadap bunga? Dengan kata lain, idealisme menyerang sisi dasar materialisme, dan menegaskan bahwa pada akhirnya ide lah yang menentukan segalanya. Ide memberi makna pada dunia.
Kelemahan-kelemahan tersebut sangat menganggu. Namun upaya menemukan titik terang Marx muncul pada diri seorang yang semula berniat menjadi pendeta Protestan: Ludwig Feuerbach.
Secara mendasar, Feuerbach menyerang pemikiran Hegel mengenai Roh Semesta. Menurut Hegel, Roh Semesta (atau agaknya ia ingin mengatakan Allah) muncul dalam kesadaran manusia yang senantiasa berpikir dan bertindak. Jadi, meski manusia memiliki kebebasan untuk berpikir dan bertindak, di belakangnya berdiri Roh Semesta.
Gagasan Hegel itulah yang dikritik oleh Feuerbach: konsepsi Hegel tidak sesuai fakta. Hegel mengemukakan bahwa Roh Semesta yang tak kelihatan seakan-akan nyata, sedang manusia yang kelihatan secara inderawi hanya sesuatu serupa wayang. Menurut Feuerbach, apa saja yang dapat dicapai dengan indera adalah realitas. Realitas selalu berbentuk materi. Pada realitas seperti inilah Marx berdiri bersama Feuerbach.
Dengan itu Roh Semesta ilutif. Tuhan dan agama (beserta ide-ide mengenai surga-neraka-malaikat) sesungguhnya hanyalah ciptaan angan-angan manusia. Dengan kata lain, agama merupakan proyeksi terhadap hakikat manusia. Manusia menciptakan agama. Namun, malangnya, menurut Feuerbach, kehidupan manusia kemudian dikuasai oleh apa yang dibuatnya dari angan-angan itu. Hal ini mirip dengan pembuatan berhala dalam kisah kerasulan di mana berhala yang diciptakan malah ditakuti, disembah, dan dihormati oleh manusia yang menciptakannya. Dalam antropologi: fetisisme.
Logika yang dipakai Feuerbach adalah logika dari Hegel bahwa manusia harus menjadi objek bagi dirinya sendiri untuk menjadi manusia. Seorang seniman menjadi seniman hanya jika ia berhasil mem-proyeksikan bakatnya dalam bentuk sebuah karya seni. Dalam alam pikiran, manusia pun mesti membayangkan diri untuk mengenal diri dan menemukan identitasnya.
Yang kemudian dipertanyakan Marx adalah mengapa manusia mengasingkan diri kepada agama? Jawaban Marx: karena manusia tak mampu memproyeksikan diri dalam realitas sosisal, karena penderitaan yang dialami, manusia berpaling pada dan mengangankan kebahagiaan di surga, pada agama ─sesuatu yang tak terlihat, yang semu.
Kritik agama Feuerbach berubah menjadi kritik masyarakat di tangan Marx. Ia menggagas kunci memahami yang sesungguhnya adalah dengan memahami manusia. Ia pun mengemukakan premis pertama: sejarah manusia adalah “eksistensi manusia sebagai individu-individu yang hidup”.
Seterusnya akan menjadi begini: manusia mesti berproduksi, dan ia tak bisa sendiri. Manusia saling membutuhkan dan menjadi sosial. Dengan “intercourse” itu manusia saling melengkapi hakikat dan merealisasikan kesosialannya, dan yang terjadi adalah pembagian kerja. Lama-lama muncul hak milik yang menimbulkan penderitaan dan kelas. Untuk itu, perubahan sosial mesti dilakukan terhadap negara, melalui perjuangan kelas, melalui cara-cara revolusioner (kelas atas tentu tidak begitu saja menyerahkan kekuasaan). Yang diharapkan dari revolusi tersebut adalah masyarakat tanpa kelas, dengan kesetaraan. Di sini kebebasan manusia tak lagi dikekang dan keterasingan manusia menemui hakikat yang sebenarnya. Negara yang semula melindungi hak milih pribadi tak diperlukan lagi. Masyarakat yang terbentuk bisa mengatur jadwal “pagi hari untuk berburu, siang hari memancing ikan, sore hari memelihara ternak” dengan santai.
Tentu saja ada kritik. Tapi yang riil menampilkan apa yang rumit dari Karl Marx sekaligus tradisi yang tak henti mencari jawab: ia mencoba berangkat dari manusia yang aktif, berdasarkan proses kehidupan nyata, “dari bumi”. Ia mencoba membuktikan “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life”, menafikan hantu-hantu “fantastic isolation or rigidity”, menegaskan bahwa “sosialisme tidak muncul hanya karena dinilai baik dan kapitalisme dinilai buruk”. Yang patut diperhatikan, setelah pemakaman Marx yang hanya dihadiri 8 orang, pemikiran “dari bumi ke langit” itu mampu `menggerakkan` bermiliar-miliar orang, berpuluh-puluh tahun kemudian.
Paul Lafargue dalam sebuah catatan mengenang Marx dalam Die Neue Zeit di suatu hari di tahun 1890 mengutip untuknya: “Dia seorang manusia, manfaatkanlah keseluruhan dirinya untuk semua. Saya tidak akan melihat manusia seperti dia lagi.” ─Hamlet, Act I, Sc. 2
February 11, 2021
A largely excellent and certainly crucial work in the Marxist canon.
After an exordium containing some amusing and characteristically feisty ad hominem barbs, the book is a powerful rejection of the bourgeois idealism of the Young Hegelians who had counted Marx among their number during his younger years. His deployment of the concept of alienation is critical to this undertaking and remained integral within his own work (particularly to his critique of the commodity in Capital Vol. 1). It would subsequently provide a rich seam to be mined by countless Marxists.
Marx’s explication and demonstration of the practical applicability of the materialist dialectic as a methodological framework within historical analysis makes this an indispensable read for those who understand that a critical examination of the past is vital for a nuanced understanding of present conditions and the future possibilities for radical change.
After an exordium containing some amusing and characteristically feisty ad hominem barbs, the book is a powerful rejection of the bourgeois idealism of the Young Hegelians who had counted Marx among their number during his younger years. His deployment of the concept of alienation is critical to this undertaking and remained integral within his own work (particularly to his critique of the commodity in Capital Vol. 1). It would subsequently provide a rich seam to be mined by countless Marxists.
Marx’s explication and demonstration of the practical applicability of the materialist dialectic as a methodological framework within historical analysis makes this an indispensable read for those who understand that a critical examination of the past is vital for a nuanced understanding of present conditions and the future possibilities for radical change.
January 10, 2024
My star rating is based on the practical applicability of the theory to practice now as compared to other texts by theorist and revolutionaries.
The first chapter on Feuerbach and the Appendix I think are the most relevant in relation to the importance of practice and how it fits with the theoretical contributions that Marx has articulated.
The chapter True Socialism, while entertaining from Marx’s cheeky and sassy criticism, seems less relevant now although general similarities with those criticized in the text appear in the “new” ideas and practices from liberal and revisionist activists.
The first chapter on Feuerbach and the Appendix I think are the most relevant in relation to the importance of practice and how it fits with the theoretical contributions that Marx has articulated.
The chapter True Socialism, while entertaining from Marx’s cheeky and sassy criticism, seems less relevant now although general similarities with those criticized in the text appear in the “new” ideas and practices from liberal and revisionist activists.
November 15, 2023
Ich verstehe nicht ganz, warum dieses Werk gelegentlich Beginner*innen empfohlen wird, zwar kann man an der geäußerten Kritik gut das philosophische Selbstverständnis von Marx und Engels erkennen, die sehr konkreten Bezüge auf die Junghegelianer und die zeitgenössische sozialistische Zeitungslandschaft bedürfen aber schon ein wenig kontextuelles Vorwissen, so dünkt es mir.
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